PAUL ARNOLD, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Arnold was convicted of buying, receiving, or concealing stolen property and sentenced to three years imprisonment plus $1,000 in court costs and probation conditions. The appellate court affirmed his conviction but reversed the imposition of court costs as part of his sentence because he was adjudged indigent, though costs as a condition of probation remained valid.
The conviction was affirmed because sufficient evidence supported the guilty verdict. The assessment of court costs as part of the sentence was reversed because a defendant adjudged insolvent cannot be assessed court costs, which must be paid by the county under Florida statute. However, the trial court did not err in ordering payment of court costs as a condition of probation, as this falls within the judge's discretion.
[1] A conviction for buying, receiving, or concealing stolen property will be affirmed if sufficient evidence supports the jury's finding of knowing possession.
[2] A defendant who has been adjudged insolvent cannot be assessed court costs.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“when a defendant in any criminal case has been adjudged insolvent, the costs allowed by law shall be paid by the county”
Establishes the statutory prohibition on assessing court costs against indigent defendants as part of a sentence
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceArnold was found guilty by jury of buying, receiving, or concealing stolen property. At arraignment, he was adjudged indigent and appointed a public d…
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BOYER, Judge.
Appellant Arnold seeks review of his conviction and sentence for the offense of buying, receiving or concealing stolen property. The record reveals that at arraignment he was adjudged indigent, whereupon the court appointed an Assistant Public Defender to serve as counsel. A jury of his peers found him guilty as charged following which the trial judge adjudged him guilty and imposed a sentence of three years imprisonment and payment of court costs in the sum of $1,000.00. An order was simultaneously entered which provided that after serving six months in the county jail, Arnold would be placed on probation. The order provided, inter alia: “After you are released on probation you shall comply with the following conditions of probation: * * (9) pay $1,000.00 court costs after release from county jail.”
By his first point, appellant argues in his brief that “the trial court erred in denying appellant’s motion for judgment of acquittal made at the close of the state’s case because the prosecution failed to adduce sufficient evidence to prove a prima facie case that appellant was in knowing possession of stolen property.” Our review of the record reveals sufficient evidence to support the conviction. Appellant’s first point is therefore without merit.
By his second point, appellant urges that the court erred in assessing court costs against him for the reason that he had been declared indigent. F.S. 939.15 provides that when a defendant in any criminal case has been adjudged insolvent, the costs allowed by law shall be paid by the county. That statute has been construed to prohibit the assessment of court costs against a defendant who has been adjudged insolvent. (Smith v. State, 352 So. 2d 1276 (Fla.App. 1st 1977); Cox v. State, 334 So. 2d 568 (Fla.1976) and Mack v. State, 305 So. 2d 264 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1976)) Accordingly, the imposition of costs as a part of the sentence was error and must be reversed.
However, the trial court did not err upon ordering the payment of court costs as a condition of probation. The granting of probation “rests within the broad discretion of the trial judge and is a matter of grace rather than right extended to the offender usually on the basis of a pre-sentence investigation which suggests that he is not likely to repeat his conduct and could be rehabilitated while at liberty under supervision. Statutory provisions which set out the procedures for extending probation privileges to those found guilty of violations of criminal laws are not mandatory on trial judges.” (Bernhardt v. State, 288 So. 2d 490 (Fla.1974) and cases therein cited)
F.S. 948.01(4) clearly provides that the granting of probation is permissive only and is within the discretion of the trial judge. F.S. 948.03 authorizes the judge to determine the terms and conditions of probation, specifically providing: “(2) The enumeration of specific kinds of terms and conditions shall not prevent the court from adding thereto such other or others as it considers proper.” Further, in Gryca v. State, 315 So. 2d 221 (Fla.App. 1, 1975) this Court, citing Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. 40, 94 S.Ct. 2116, 40 L.Ed.2d 642 (1974), held valid a condition of a probation order requiring the defendant to reimburse the county $100.00 as partial costs of prosecution, saying: “the State of Florida, who has provided so much to this defendant, may through its probation order require her to repay society a small share of the costs that her conduct placed upon the State of Florida.” (315 So. 2d at page 223)
The judgment and sentence are affirmed except for the assessment of costs as part of the sentence and this case is remanded with directions to delete that provision from the sentence. Such modification of the sentence may be made without pronouncement in open court and without the defendant being present.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
McCORD, C: J., and MELVIN J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Jenkins v. State, 444 So. 2d 947 (Fla. 1984)…of indi-gency. Even the most cursory reading of that statute, as well as common sense, reveals that a defendant may be unable to afford attorneys and the large court costs dealt with in State v. Byrd, 378 So. 2d 1231 (Fla.1979), or Arnold v. State, 356 So. 2d 862 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978), but is still easily able to pay $12.00 or $24.00. Jenkins was given ample opportunity to object and to convince the trial judge of his inability to pay the charge. He failed to take advantage of either. [*951] Sections 939.05 an…1 / 2
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State v. Arsoreda Byrd, 378 So. 2d 1231 (Fla. 1979)…d 1228 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978), which reversed an order of the circuit court requiring respondent, an indigent, to pay court costs as a condition of probation. We find conflict with the decisions of the First District Court of Appeal in Arnold v. State, 356 So. 2d 862 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978), and Gryca v. State, 315 So. 2d 221 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975), which held that such costs may properly be imposed as a condition of probation. We have jurisdiction.1 The respondent was charged with assault with a deadly weapon and two…1 / 2
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Jenkins v. State, 422 So. 2d 1007 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982)…n of indigency. Even the most cursory reading of that statute, as well as common sense, reveals that a defendant may be unable to afford attorneys and the large court costs dealt with in State v. Byrd, 378 So. 2d 1231 (Fla.1979), or Arnold v. State, 356 So. 2d 862 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978), but is still easily able to pay $12.00 or $24.00. Jenkins was given ample opportunity to object and to convince the trial judge of his inability to pay the charge. He failed to take advantage of either. Sections 939.05 and 939.…
Previewing 3 of 7 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Gideon Bernhardt v. State, 288 So. 2d 490 (Fla. 1974)
- Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. 40 (U.S. 1974)
- COX v. State, 334 So. 2d 568 (Fla. 1976)
- Gryca v. State, 315 So. 2d 221 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975)
- Jonah Mack v. State, 305 So. 2d 264 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974)
- Smith v. State, 352 So. 2d 1276 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977)