RALPH L. MULDER, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 4th DCA | 1978-03-21
No. 76-2317
ALDERMAN, C. J., and CROSS, J., concur.
356 So. 2d 870 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fourth District (1978) Negative Treatment
Cited by 19 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Mulder appeals a probation revocation resulting in a three-year prison sentence for uttering a forged instrument. The court holds that despite Mulder's negotiated plea limiting his initial sentence to two years, the trial court may impose any sentence up to the statutory maximum upon probation revocation.


Holding

After probation revocation, a trial court is free to impose any sentence up to the maximum sentence for the crime of which the defendant stands convicted, regardless of sentencing limitations imposed in a prior plea agreement. The plea agreement does not restrict the court's sentencing authority upon probation revocation.


Headnotes

[1] Upon revocation of probation, a trial court may impose any sentence that it might have originally imposed before placing the probationer on probation.

[2] Plea negotiations do not restrict a trial court's ability to impose the maximum sentence for a crime upon revocation of probation.

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Key Quotes

“After probation has been revoked, the trial court can "impose any sentence which it might have originally imposed before placing the probationer on probation."”

Establishes the statutory authority of trial courts upon probation revocation under Section 948.06(1), Florida Statutes.

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Facts & Procedural History

Mulder pleaded guilty to uttering a forged instrument, a third-degree felony. As part of a negotiated plea, the court agreed to a two-year maximum sen…

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Opinion of the Court
MOORE, Judge.

[*871] MOORE, Judge.

This is an appeal from a revocation of probation on which appellant was placed subsequent to pleading guilty to a charge of uttering a forged instrument, a third degree felony proscribed by Section 831.02, Florida Statutes (1975). Upon revocation of probation, appellant was sentenced to three years incarceration.

Appellant contends that because the court was limited to a two year maximum sentence under the terms of his negotiated plea that the trial court cannot exceed that sentence upon revocation of probation. The trial court accepted the plea negotiations and, without objection, placed the defendant on probation for a period of three years.

After probation has been revoked, the trial court can “impose any sentence which it might have originally imposed before placing the probationer on probation.” Section 948.06(1), Florida Statutes (1975). Appellant contends the plea negotiations were a restriction on this Statute. We disagree.

We hold that after probation has been revoked a trial court is free to impose any sentence up to the maximum sentence for the crime of which the defendant stands convicted. In this case the appellant was convicted of a third degree felony for which the maximum sentence was five years. Section 775.082(3)(d), Florida Statutes (1975).

Accepting appellant’s contentions would lead to absurd results. If the original plea negotiations including an understanding that a defendant would be placed on probation, and the court agreed, the court would then be unable to impose any prison sentence in the event probation was subsequently revoked. It cannot be said that the legislature intended to leave society without any recourse against those defendants who receive the benefit of the court’s mercy by being placed on probation and, subsequently, violate the terms thereof.

Appellant, having violated the terms of his probation, cannot now be heard to argue that the State is bound by the terms of an agreement which resulted in the initial imposition of probation.

Appellant’s remaining point having no merit, the conviction and sentence appealed from is accordingly

AFFIRMED.

ALDERMAN, C. J., and CROSS, J., concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • State v. Segarra, 388 So. 2d 1017 (Fla. 1980)
    …. By petition for certiorari we have for review a decision of the Third District Court of Appeal Segarra v. State, 360 So. 2d 79 (Fla.3d DCA 1978), which allegedly conflicts with a prior decision of another district court of appeal Mulder v. State, 356 So. 2d 870 (Fla.4th DCA 1978), on the same point of law. Art. V, section 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. The defendant, Segarra, was charged with burglary, a second degree felony carrying a maximum sentence of fifteen years. Plea negotiation resulted in a plea of guilty…
    1 / 2
  • State v. Payne, 404 So. 2d 1055 (Fla. 1981)
    …, Justice. By petition for certiorari, we have for review a decision of the District Court of Appeal, Third District, (Payne v. State, 372 So. 2d 152 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)), which conflicts with the decision of another district court (Mulder v. State, 356 So. 2d 870 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978)), on the same point of law. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla.Const. The district court’s opinion sets forth the pertinent facts: [*1056] [Respondent] Payne was charged by information with aggravated assault and unlaw…
  • Bilyou v. State, 404 So. 2d 744 (Fla. 1981)
    …illed the plea bargain. Upon revocation of probation the trial court is free to impose any punishment within the limits prescribed for the crime. Bilyou v. State at 757. The second and fourth district courts have held likewise. See Mulder v. State, 356 So. 2d 870 (Fla.4th DCA 1978); Johnson v. State, 378 So. 2d 335 (Fla.2d DCA 1980). As the fifth district court noted in its opinion, the Third District Court of Appeal has held contrarily. In Segarra v. State, regarding the same question, the third district h…

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