EVERETTE D. ALDERMAN, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Alderman appeals his misdemeanor conviction for receiving stolen property, challenging the admission of evidence from an impounded vehicle and the legality of his one-year probation sentence. The court upheld the warrantless seizure as supported by probable cause but remanded to reduce the probation period from one year to six months, the statutory maximum for misdemeanors.
The warrantless seizure was lawful because the officers had probable cause to believe the car was stolen based on the observed tampering with the identification plate obtained with the defendant's consent. However, the one-year probation term exceeded the statutory maximum of six months for misdemeanor cases and was illegal.
[1] Probable cause to believe goods are stolen justifies seizure without a warrant when observed by an officer in the performance of lawful duties.
[2] A vehicle identification number altered with pop rivets, rather than spot-welding, and a mismatched vehicle type indicator can establish probable cause to believe a vehic…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“It is well settled that when an officer, while engaged in performing his lawful duties, observes contraband items or goods that he has probable cause to believe are stolen, such goods may be seized without a search warrant and are admissible in evidence.”
Establishes the legal standard for warrantless seizure of suspected stolen property based on probable cause
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligencePolice investigating stolen vehicles noticed a car with missing engine and interior in Alderman's driveway. Detective Delisle, with Alderman's consent…
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SCHEB, Judge.
Appellant Alderman pled nolo contendere to the misdemeanor offense of receiving stolen property, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress certain evidence. The trial judge withheld adjudication and placed appellant on probation for one year. This appeal ensued.
The facts leading up to appellant's arrest were these: Four police officers were investigating appellant’s next-door neighbor concerning two stolen motor vehicles. While at the neighbor’s residence, they noticed an automobile with the engine and interior missing parked in appellant’s driveway. Becoming suspicious, Detective Delisle asked appellant if he could check the identification number on the car. Appellant said he was welcome to do so.
Delisle checked the identification plate on the door and discovered that it was attached with pop rivets rather than spot-welded as it should have been. In addition, the portion of the manufacturer’s identification number, which indicates the type of vehicle to which it is attached, did not match the actual model of the car. These circumstances indicated to the officers that the car’s identification number had been altered.
At this point, the officers impounded the car and had it towed to a garage. There the hidden, or confidential, identification number of the vehicle was located. A cheek of this number through the police computer revealed that the automobile had indeed been stolen.
Appellant argues that any evidence derived from the impoundment of the car should have been suppressed because no search warrant was obtained. We do not agree.
The evidence of tampering with the car’s identification plate, which was obtained with appellant’s consent, was clearly sufficient to establish probable cause for the officers to believe that the car had been stolen. In State v. Parnell, 221 So. 2d 129, 131 (Fla.1969), Justice Roberts, speaking for the court, said:
It is well settled that when an officer, while engaged in performing his lawful duties, observes contraband items or goods that he has probable cause to believe are stolen, such goods may be seized without a search warrant and are admissible in evidence.
See also State v. Ashby, 245 So. 2d 225 (Fla.1971). We think these cases control the instant case and demonstrate that the trial court did not err in refusing to suppress the evidence against appellant.
Appellant also complains that the trial court could not have legally placed him on probation for one year. We agree. Although the state charged appellant with the felony offense of receiving stolen property, appellant was allowed, as a result of a plea bargain, to plead nolo contendere to the second-degree misdemeanor under Section 812.031(3), Florida Statutes (1975). The maximum term of imprisonment for a second-degree misdemeanor is sixty days. Section 775.082(4)(b), Florida Statutes (1975). And while probation cannot normally be extended beyond the maximum permissible sentence, the statute does permit the court to place a defendant on probation for six months in a misdemeanor case. Section 948.04, Florida Statutes (1975); Watts v. State, 328 So. 2d 223 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976). It follows that appellant’s probationary period was in excess of the maximum provided by law.
Accordingly, the order withholding adjudication of guilt and placing appellant on probation is affirmed, but the cause is remanded for modification of the term of probation consistent with this opinion.
BOARDMAN, C. J., and DANAHY, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
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Bouie v. State, 360 So. 2d 1142 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978)…lation. Appellant’s contention has merit. The longest permissible period of probation allowable for the violation of a second degree misdemeanor is six months. Section 775.082(4)(b) and Section 948.04(1), Florida Statutes (1977); Alderman v. State, 356 So. 2d 928 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978); McNulty v. State, 339 So. 2d 1155 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976); Watts v. State, 328 So. 2d 223 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976). Neither in Alderman v. State, supra, nor in this opinion are we dealing with the right of a trial court to set a probationa…
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Purvis v. The Honorable Hubert R. Lindsey, 587 So. 2d 638 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991)…hearing which this court sua sponte stayed. It is well settled that it is error to place a defendant on probation for more than six months for a second degree misdemeanor which is punishable by a maximum term of sixty days. See Alderman v. State, 356 So. 2d 928 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978); Bouie v. State, 360 So. 2d 1142 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978). See also Holloway v. State, 393 So. 2d 1185 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981); Corraliza v. State, 391 So. 2d 330 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980), rev. denied, 399 So. 2d 1141 (Fla.1981). Additionally, it…
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Smith v. State, 484 So. 2d 581 (Fla. 1986)…nors who are placed on probation shall be under supervision not to exceed 6 months unless otherwise specified by the court." While we have not examined the effect of the "otherwise specified" language, the district courts have. In Alderman v. State, 356 So. 2d 928 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978), the court held that six months was the maximum period of probation permitted for second degree misdemeanors. The trial judge had withheld adjudication of guilt pursuant to section 948.01(3) and imposed a one-year probationary per…
Previewing 3 of 7 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State v. Ashby, 245 So. 2d 225 (Fla. 1971)
- State v. Hiram Cazes Parnell, 221 So. 2d 129 (Fla. 1969)
- Watts v. State, 328 So. 2d 223 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976)