STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
PAUL C. BAXTER, III, APPELLEE

Fla. 1st DCA | 1978-02-15
No. GG-497
McCORD, C. J„ and MASON, ERNEST E., Associate Judge, concur.
356 So. 2d 1250 Florida District Court of Appeal, First District (1978) Caution
Cited by 4 cases

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Synopsis

Florida's appellate court affirmed the suppression of evidence from a search warrant, holding that the affidavit lacked sufficient probable cause. Although a confidential informant obtained prescription drugs from the defendant's residence, the affidavit failed to establish that any law was violated, since the drugs were lawfully obtainable prescription medications with no allegation of illegal sale or retention.


Holding

The court held that the affidavit was insufficient to establish probable cause. Although every fact alleged in the affidavit could be true, those facts were insufficient to establish a probability that any law was being violated. The mere presence of prescription drugs in a residence does not establish illegal conduct absent allegations that they were unlawfully obtained, retained, sold, or delivered.


Headnotes

[1] An affidavit for a search warrant must contain sufficient factual allegations to establish probable cause that a law is being violated.

[2] A search warrant affidavit based solely on a confidential informant's observation of controlled substances in a residence is insufficient if the allegations do not establ…

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Key Quotes

“Appellee argues that if the factual basis, as alleged in the affidavit, is sufficient for the issuance of a search warrant of a residence in the State of Florida, then there is virtually no residence not subject to search. We agree.”

The court agrees with the defendant's concern that the State's position would effectively permit searches of virtually all residences.

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Facts & Procedural History

A police officer applied for a search warrant based on an affidavit stating that a confidential informant had been inside defendant's residence within…

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Opinion of the Court
BOYER, Judge.

BOYER, Judge.

The State appeals an order of the trial court suppressing evidence on the basis that the search warrant was improvidently issued.

The affidavit of the police officer, which was the only basis for the issuance of the search warrant, alleged that he had reason to believe and did believe that on certain premises used by appellee was concealed and possessed “a controlled substance described as: valium, percodan, dexamyl and dilaudid in violation of Section 893.13(l)(e), Florida Statutes.” Said affidavit further recited that:

“[Wjithin the past month your affiant has been working with a confidential informant who advised your affiant that he has been inside the above described dwelling within the past month and had personally observed a quantity of drugs controlled by Ch. 893 F.S., therein.

“Based on the above information, your affiant met with said informant within the past 20 days, searched said informant and found him to be free of any contraband or controlled drugs. Your affiant then followed said informant to the above described dwelling and observed him as he entered the dwelling. A short time later, said informant emerged from the above described dwelling and went to a pre-arranged location where he turned over to your affiant a quantity of a controlled drug, recognized as such by your affiant and verified by comparison with the Physician’s Desk Reference, which he stated he had obtained from within the-above described dwelling. • ’

“During all times pertinent hereto, you affiant had said confidential informant under observation except for the time said confidential informant was inside above described dwelling. “After turning over the controlled drug he had obtained from within the dwelling the informant stated that there was still a quantity of the same drug along with valium, percodan, dexamyl and dilauid inside the dwelling.

“Your affiant has been a member of the Vice Division of the Jacksonville Sheriff’s Office for over four (4) years and is familiar with and able to recognize drugs controlled by Ch. 893 F.S.”

Appellee argues that if the factual basis, as alleged in the affidavit, is sufficient for the issuance of a search warrant of a residence in the State of Florida, then there is virtually no residence not subject to search. We agree.

It will be noted that the controlled substance, valium, percodan, dexamyl and dilauid, are medicines not infrequently prescribed by physicians and dispensed by pharmacists. For aught that appears in the affidavit the confidential informant slipped into the appellee’s residence, surreptitiously removed medication from a container bearing a prescription number and slipped back to the place where the officer, affiant, was waiting. There is no allegation that the controlled substances were illegally obtained, illegally retained nor that the quantity turned over to the officer by the informant was either sold or delivered by appellee or any occupant of said residence to said informant.

Lest this opinion be misunderstood and improperly cited as authority, we hasten to state that we do not here hold that recitation of unlawfulness, illegality, sale, delivery, nor that the occupant of the premises to be searched is not a physician or pharmacist, either or all, are essential to the adequacy of a factual statement recited in an affidavit for the issuance of a search warrant. Obviously the recitations in the affidavit will be different, depending on the facts of each case, and whether the controlled substance is an ordinary prescription drug or contraband such as marijuana or heroin. The facts alleged must, however, be sufficient to establish grounds for probable cause to believe that the laws are being violated. As already stated, it is apparent from a reading of the factual recitation in the subject affidavit that every fact there alleged could well be true and yet there be no probability of the violation of any law, except perhaps by the informant himself. The State, repeatedly in oral argument, urged that obviously the law had been violated because the informant was in possession of a controlled substance without a prescription which controlled substance was obtained from appellee’s residence. That position, however, begs the question. Obviously appellee may not be charged with the unlawful conduct of the State’s confidential informant.

AFFIRMED.

McCORD, C. J„ and MASON, ERNEST E., Associate Judge, concur.

Other
BOYER, Judge.

BOYER, Judge.

The State has filed a Petition for Rehearing, urging that we have overlooked State v. Gieseke, 328 So. 2d 16 (Fla.1976). It is apparent that the State, in relying upon that decision, has misconceived our reasoning and holding sub judice. A careful reading of State v. Gieseke reveals that the primary thrust of that decision is “that superfluous hearsay information will not vitiate a determination of probable cause where that determination is sufficiently supported by direct testimony of an affiant who personally experienced events which by themselves generate probable cause.” (328 So. 2d 18). Further, in that case the affidavit recited and the author of the opinion thrice referred to “a controlled buy”. There was no such allegation in the affidavit sub judice. Note our recitation in the opinion above: “There is no allegation that the controlled substances were illegally obtained, illegally retained, nor that the quantity turned over to the officer by the informant was either sold or delivered by appellee or any occupant of said residence to said informant.”

The Petition for Rehearing is denied.

McCORD, C. J., and MASON, ERNEST E., Associate Judge, concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Zaner v. State, 444 So. 2d 508 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984)
    …89 S.Ct. 584, 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969). . — U.S. -, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983). . — U.S. at -, 103 S.Ct. at 2329, 76 L.Ed.2d at 545. . Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 114, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 1514, 12 L.Ed.2d 723. . Compare, State v. Baxter, 356 So. 2d 1250 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978). In Baxter there was "no allegation that the controlled substances were illegally obtained, illegally retained nor that the quantity turned over to the officer by the informant was either sold or delivered by appellee or any occu…
  • Campbell v. State, 423 So. 2d 608 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982)
    …vit. The court further held that the successful “controlled buy” was a sufficient demonstration of the probable reliability of the informant’s hearsay statements relative to the presence of additional contraband on the premises. In State v. Baxter, 356 So. 2d 1250 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978), our court was confronted with a factual situation somewhat similar to Gieseke but reached a contrary result. There, the affiant, a police officer, stated that he had searched the informant before he entered the house and found h…

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