STATE OF FLORIDA, PETITIONER-CROSS RESPONDENT,
v.
ROBERT MUNFORD, RESPONDENT-CROSS PETITIONER

Fla. | 1978-04-04
No. 51411
OVERTON, C. J., and ADKINS, BOYD, ENGLAND, SUNDBERG and HATCH-ETT, JJ., concur.
357 So. 2d 706 Florida Supreme Court (1978) Caution
Cited by 44 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

The Florida Supreme Court held that a sentencing statute permitting separate sentences for multiple offenses arising from a single transaction cannot be applied retroactively to offenses committed before the statute's October 1, 1976 effective date. Under pre-1976 law, a defendant convicted of multiple offenses from a single transaction could only be sentenced for the highest offense.


Holding

Section 775.021(4) cannot be applied retroactively to offenses committed before its October 1, 1976 effective date. A defendant convicted of multiple offenses arising from a single transaction committed before October 1, 1976 could only be sentenced for the highest offense under pre-statute law, and the trial judge erred in imposing separate sentences.


Headnotes

[1] A statute's effective date determines its applicability to offenses committed prior to that date.

[2] A statute enacted after the commission of an offense cannot be applied retroactively to the defendant's detriment.

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Key Quotes

“the effective date of Section 775.021(4), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1976), is October 1, 1976”

Establishes the correct effective date, distinguishing it from the District Court's erroneous determination

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Facts & Procedural History

Munford was convicted of felony possession of marijuana and sale of a controlled substance in violation of Section 893.13, Florida Statutes, arising f…

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Opinion of the Court
KARL, Justice.

KARL, Justice.

This cause is before us on a cross-petition for writ of certiorari to review the decision of the District Court of Appeal, Second District, in Munford v. State, 343 So. 2d 67 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977), which is in direct conflict with the decisions of the District Court of Appeal, First District, in Montgomery v. State, 332 So. 2d 679 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976), and Jackson v. State, 311 So. 2d 811 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975). We have jurisdiction pursuant to Article V, Section 3(b)(3), Florida Constitution. The sole issue before us is the legality of the sentence imposed on cross-petitioner by the trial judge.

Cross-petitioner was adjudicated guilty of felony possession of marijuana and sale of a controlled substance in violation of Section 893.13, Florida Statutes (1975), and was sentenced to two concurrent three-year terms of probation.

On appeal, the cross-petitioner argued, inter alia, that the trial judge’s imposition of separate sentences for each offense when both offenses arose out of a single transaction constituted error. The District Court rejected cross-petitioner’s argument, holding that Section 775.-021(4), Florida Statutes (Supp.1976), which permits a separate sentence to be imposed for each criminal offense arising from a single act or transaction, was controlling and the imposition of the two sentences was not error. The basis of the District Court’s holding that Section 775.021(4), Florida Statutes (Supp.1976), applied was the court’s belief that the statute became effective on October 1, 1975, and, thus, was the applicable law when the cross-petitioner committed the offenses charged on November 3, 1975.

An examination'of Ch. 76-66, § 2, Laws of Florida, reveals that the effective date of Section 775.021(4), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1976), is October 1, 1976. Also, both the 1976 supplement to the Florida Statutes (1975) and the 1977 supplement to Florida Statutes Annotated recite the effective date of Section 775.021(4), Florida Statutes (Supp.1976), as being October 1, 1976. Therefore, it is apparent, and this fact is conceded by cross-respondent in its brief, that the District Court was wrong in ruling that Section 775.021(4), Florida Statutes (Supp.1976), was applicable to the offenses committed by cross-petitioner on November 3, 1975.

Prior to October 1, 1976, the law with regard to the sentencing of an individual upon his conviction of two or more criminal offenses arising out of the same transaction was accurately reflected by the decisions in Montgomery v. State, supra, and Jackson v. State, supra, which held that upon the conviction of two or more offenses arising out of the same transaction, an individual could only be sentenced for the higher of such offenses. Although Section 775.021(4), Florida Statutes (Supp.1976), as of October 1, 1976, replaced the holdings of Montgomery v. State, supra, and Jackson v. State, supra, as the controlling law on the question sub judice, the statute was not in effect on November 3, 1975, and cannot be applied retroactively to the cross-petitioner’s detriment. Higginbotham v. State, 88 Fla. 26, 101 So. 233 (1924).

Cross-petitioner was entitled to be sentenced pursuant to the law in effect on November 3, 1975, which required a sentence consistent with the decisions in Montgomery v. State, supra, and Jackson v. State, supra.

Accordingly, that portion of the District Court’s opinion rejecting cross-petitioner’s allegation of error by the trial judge in sentencing is quashed, and the cause is remanded to the District Court for further proceedings not inconsistent herewith. This Court has previously denied the petition for certiorari by order dated December 12, 1977.

It is so ordered.

OVERTON, C. J., and ADKINS, BOYD, ENGLAND, SUNDBERG and HATCH-ETT, JJ., concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By (21 total)

  • Baker v. State, 425 So. 2d 36 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982)
    …o Cribb v. State, 9 Fla. 409, 416 (1861). . See, e.g., Edmond v. State, 280 So. 2d 449 (Fla. 2d DCA 1973), and cases cited therein. . See Borges v. State, 415 So. 2d 1265 (Fla.1982); Gonzalez v. State, 367 So. 2d 1008 (Fla.1979); State v. Munford, 357 So. 2d 706 (Fla.1978); Portee v. State, 392 So. 2d 314 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980). . See, e.g., Stone v. State, 402 So. 2d 1222 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981); James v. State, 399 So. 2d 424 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981); Walker v. State, 386 So. 2d 630 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980). It is not the…
    1 / 2
  • State v. Zamora, 534 So. 2d 864 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988)
    …34 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978). The defendant need not allege all the elements of the defense; it is sufficient that the defense is possible in light of the alleged facts. See, e.g., Munford v. State, 343 So. 2d 67 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977), rev’d on other grounds, 357 So. 2d 706 (Fla.1978). Alternatively, the defendant’s burden is met if the necessary facts are apparent from other evidence. Munford v. State, see also State v. Mesa. When it appears [*869] that a defendant may have a valid basis to invoke an in camera hearing…
  • Johnson v. State, 366 So. 2d 418 (Fla. 1978)
    …shall be sentenced separately for each criminal offense, excluding lesser included offenses, committed during said criminal episode, and the sentencing judge may order the sentences to be 'served concurrently or consecutively. Cf. State v. Munford, 357 So. 2d 706 (Fla.1978). Although, in my opinion, the constitutional question argued by the defendants is without merit, I would not reach this question since it was raised for the first time in these proceedings in the petition for writ of certiorari. Sanford…

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