AMERICAN FIRE AND CASUALTY COMPANY, APPELLANT,
v.
MONICA BOYD, INDIVIDUALLY AND MONICA BOYD, AS NEXT FRIEND OF CHRISTAL KNAPER, APPELLEES
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American Fire and Casualty Company appeals a partial summary judgment granting coverage under an uninsured motorist provision where the at-fault driver (James Hansen) had a liability insurance policy with an exclusionary clause that prevented coverage at the time of the accident. The court affirmed, holding that a vehicle qualifies as uninsured under Florida law when the insurance policy affords no coverage due to an exclusion, even though the negligent driver's employer (the Federal Government) may be liable under the Federal Tort Claims Act.
The Hansen vehicle was an uninsured vehicle within the meaning of F.S. 627.727 because although Hansen had procured an insurance policy, that policy afforded no coverage due to the exclusionary clause. The fact that Hansen's negligence could invoke the Federal Tort Claims Act does not make him 'insured' within the statutory definition.
[1] A vehicle is considered uninsured under uninsured motorist coverage statutes when its liability insurance policy contains an exclusionary clause that renders the policy i…
[2] The existence of potential liability under the Federal Tort Claims Act does not preclude a vehicle from being classified as uninsured for the purposes of uninsured motori…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Whether the Hansen vehicle was "an uninsured vehicle" within the meaning of that term as used in F.S. 627.727. We hold that it was, and therefore affirm.”
Establishes the court's core holding on the definition of uninsured vehicle under the statute.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMonica Boyd and Christal Knaper were injured in a 1972 automobile accident while traveling in a vehicle owned by Henry W. Carlson, who was insured und…
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BOYER, Judge.
The issue to be resolved on this interlocutory appeal, as phrased by appellant, is: “Whether the trial court erred in determining that the vehicle being operated by James Hansen was an uninsured motorist vehicle and in entering its order of partial summary judgment for the plaintiffs on the issue of coverage.”
Appellee, plaintiff in the trial court, filed a complaint alleging that she and Christal Knaper were members of the household of Henry W. Carlson, who was insured by appellant, American Fire and Casualty Company, and that Boyd and Knaper were, while traveling in the Carlson vehicle in 1972, injured in an automobile accident caused by the negligence of an uninsured motorist, James Hansen; seeking coverage under the uninsured motorist provision of Carlson’s policy. Hansen had, at the time of the accident, a liability insurance policy with GEICO, which policy contained an exclusionary clause excluding coverage while Hansen was traveling on orders of a branch of the military service. At the time of the accident Hansen was traveling under orders of a branch of the military.
Appellant contends that notwithstanding the exclusionary clause in the GEICO policy Hansen’s vehicle nevertheless did not qualify under the statute as an uninsured vehicle because his employer, the United States Government, was liable for his negligence under the Federal Tort Claims Act.
The sole issue is whether the Hansen vehicle was “an uninsured vehicle” within the meaning of that term as used in F.S. 627.727. We hold that it was, and therefore affirm. Although Hansen had procured a policy of insurance, that policy afforded no coverage because of the exclusionary clause; and the mere fact that Hansen was in such a position as to cause to be invoked by his negligence the provisions of the Federal Tort Claims Act does not mean that he is thereby “insured” within the meaning of the statute.
Appellant has represented to the court that appellee has received from the United States a monetary settlement of appellee’s claim against the United States on account of Hansen’s negligence while driving the uninsured vehicle. That representation is not supported by the record presented to this court nor by evidence presented to the trial court. The partial summary judgment on liability was therefore without error as any benefits appellee may have received from the United States may be taken into account in fixing the amount of appellant’s liability. (Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Graff, 327 So. 2d 88 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976).)
AFFIRMED.
McCORD, C. J., and SMITH, J., concur.
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Allstate Ins. Co. v. Boynton, 486 So. 2d 552 (Fla. 1986)…urring in the pursuit of a business. This exclusion is applicable to the facts of this case. Luke’s policy, therefore, did not provide coverage for this particular occurrence. An analogous situation is found in American Fire & Casualty Co. v. Boyd, 357 So. 2d 768 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978). In that case, Boyd was injured in an automobile accident caused by the negligence of Hansen. Hansen had a liability policy which excluded coverage while traveling on military orders, which is what he was doing at the time of the…
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Boynton v. Allstate Ins. Co., 443 So. 2d 427 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984)…many instances, impossible in hit-and-run cases. Any other construction of the statute is unfair and unduly restricts the application intended by the Legislature, (emphasis added). 249 So. 2d at 430. In American Fire and Casualty Company v. Boyd, 357 So. 2d 768 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978), the court found the vehicle which caused plaintiff’s injury to be “uninsured,” though covered by a liability policy, because of a provision which excluded coverage when the insured was travelling under military orders. The court…
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Gares v. Allstate Ins. Co., 365 F.3d 990 (11th Cir. 2004)…ecause the tortfeasor had a liability policy. As that policy “specifically excluded injuries occurring in the pursuit of a business,” it “did not provide coverage for this particular occurrence.” Id. (discussing American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Boyd, 357 So. 2d 768 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978)). Concluding that the automobile was “uninsured” in “the context of the [injured mechanic’s] uninsured motorist policy,” the Florida Supreme Court addressed Reid in a footnote. It said that under Reid “a vehicle cannot be both…
Authorities Cited
- Gov't Emps. Ins. Co. v. Graff, 327 So. 2d 88 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976)