VIRGINIA ENFIELD AND KENNETH ENFIELD, HER HUSBAND, APPELLANTS,
v.
JOHN HELD, LYKES MEMORIAL HOSPITAL AND ARGONAUT INSURANCE COMPANY, A FOREIGN CORPORATION, APPELLEES

Fla. 2d DCA | 1978-04-21
No. 77-1812
HOBSON, Acting C. J., and SCHEB, J., concur.
357 So. 2d 772 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (1978) Positive Treatment
Cited by 8 cases

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Holding

The court held that while dismissal of the complaint was proper due to failure to allege compliance with medical mediation procedures, the dismissal should have been with leave to amend, not with prejudice.


Headnotes

[1] A medical malpractice complaint must allege compliance with statutory medical mediation procedures as a condition precedent to filing in circuit court.

[2] A motion to dismiss is confined to the allegations within the complaint, and extrinsic evidence cannot be considered.

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Facts & Procedural History

Appellants filed a medical malpractice complaint without alleging compliance with the statutory medical mediation procedure. The appellees moved to di…

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Opinion of the Court
OTT, Judge.

OTT, Judge.

The trial judge dismissed a medical malpractice complaint with prejudice. We affirm the dismissal of the complaint but hold that the dismissal should not have been with prejudice.

Plaintiffs Virginia and Kenneth Enfield, appellants herein, filed a complaint on May 18, 1977 alleging that Mrs. Enfield sustained injuries as a result of malpractice occurring on or about January 2,1975 while she was a patient at defendant Lykes Memorial Hospital, appellee herein. The hospital’s insurer, Argonaut Insurance Company, was joined as a defendant. The complaint failed to allege compliance (either specifically or generally) with the medical mediation procedure prior to filing the complaint in circuit court as required by Section 768.44, Florida Statutes (1976 Supp.).

Ap-pellees filed a motion to dismiss the En-fields’ complaint with prejudice. Attached to appellees’ motion was a copy of a claim filed by the Enfields with the medical liability mediation panel. The purpose of attaching the mediation claim was to establish its filing date of April 22, 1976. The jurisdiction of the mediation panel automatically terminated 10 months thereafter on February 22, 1977 under the provisions of Section 768.44(4), Florida Statutes (1976 Supp.).

The appellees argued that the circuit court was without jurisdiction to entertain the malpractice action since the complaint was not filed within 60 days after the mediation panel lost jurisdiction. Adopting this rationale the trial judge entered an order dismissing appellants’ complaint with prejudice. From this order appellants appeal.

A plaintiff claiming damages by reason of alleged medical malpractice must first submit that claim to the appropriate medical liability mediation panel as a condition precedent to the filing of the complaint in circuit court.

Section 768.44(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1976 Supp.).

The record reflects (albeit by a speaking motion) that a claim was in fact filed on April 22, 1976 with the mediation panel, but appellants’ complaint does not so allege. In considering a motion to dismiss the trial judge is confined to the allegations contained within the complaint. See Frank v. Campbell Property Management, Inc., 351 So. 2d 364 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977). Since in the present case the complaint fails to allege either a general compliance with all conditions precedent or a specific compliance by the filing of a claim with the appropriate medical mediation panel, the trial court properly dismissed appellant’s complaint.

However, the dismissal should have been with leave to amend to correct this deficiency.

Section 768.44(4), Florida Statutes (1976 Supp.) provides as follows:

The filing of the claim shall toll any applicable statute of limitations, and such statute of limitations shall remain tolled until the hearing panel issues its written decision or the jurisdiction of the panel is otherwise terminated. In any' event, a party shall have 60 days from the date the decision of the hearing panel is mailed to the parties or the date on which the jurisdiction of the panel is otherwise terminated in which to file a complaint in circuit court.

Both parties and the trial judge apparently interpreted this 60 day period as mandating the filing of the complaint within such period. The effect of such an interpretation would further shorten the statute of limitations in medical malpractice actions. We do not agree with this interpretation. We hold the 60 day period operates, under appropriate circumstances, as a saving not a limitation clause. See Ludwig v. Glover, 357 So. 2d 233, 1st DCA, Opinion filed April 5, 1978.

Section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes (1975) provides a two year statute of limitations for actions in tort or contract for alleged medical malpractice. This two year period began to run on January 2,1975, the date the alleged malpractice in the present ease is claimed to have occurred.

However, Section 768.44(4), Florida Statutes (1976 Supp.) provides that the filing of a claim with the medical mediation panel “tolls any applicable statute of limitations” until the panel decides the case or the jurisdiction of the panel is otherwise terminated.

Therefore, the two year statute of limitations was tolled when the Enfields filed their claim with the medical mediation panel on April 22, 1976. Since the mediation panel never decided this case (for reasons not material to this discussion) the jurisdiction of the panel automatically terminated after 10 months, on February 22, 1977. At this time there remained approximately nine months of the original two year statute of limitations.

Thus, appellants’ complaint was timely when filed on May 18, 1977. It was therefore error for the trial court to rule that the circuit court was without jurisdiction and to dismiss appellánts’ complaint with prejudice. That part of the order dismissing appellants’ complaint with prejudice is therefore reversed and the cause remanded to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this-opinion.

REVERSED and REMANDED.

HOBSON, Acting C. J., and SCHEB, J., concur.


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Cited By

  • John v. Smith and Lucy L. Smith, 368 So. 2d 81 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979)
    …PER CURIAM. The summary judgment in this case is reversed on the authority of Chambers v. Gaul, 365 So. 2d 213 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978); Jones v. North Dade Hospital, Inc., 359 So. 2d 56 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978) and Enfield v. Held, 357 So. 2d 772 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978); and this cause is remanded for further proceedings. REVERSED and REMANDED. DAUKSCH and MOORE, JJ., and FAR-RINGTON, OTIS, Associate Judge, concur.…
  • Morris Wimpey et ux. v. Gabriel A. Sanchez, M.D., 386 So. 2d 1241 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)
    …han sixty days; otherwise, the party may file the action any time before the statute of limitations expires. Chambers v. Gaul, 365 So. 2d 213 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978); Jones v. North Dade Hospital, Inc., 359 So. 2d 56 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978); Enfield v. Held, 357 So. 2d 772 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978). .It is equally clear that no sufficient showing has been made that the Wimpeys discovered or with the exercise of due diligence should have discovered the incident before January 5, 1975, the cutoff date suggested by the defenda…
  • Chambers v. Gaul, 365 So. 2d 213 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978)
    …om the date on which the jurisdiction of the panel is terminated. The 60 day filing period of § 768.-44(4) does not shorten the applicable statute of limitations. Jones v. North Dade Hospital, Inc., 359 So. 2d 56 (Fla.3d DCA 1978); Enfield v. Held, 357 So. 2d 772 (Fla.2d DCA 1978). The effect of the 60 day provision is to extend the applicable statute of limitations up to 60 days after termination of the mediation proceeding in those cases where less than 60 days remain on the statute of limitations. The or…

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