LUCILLE HARRELL RUPERT MERRILL, APPELLANT,
v.
LLOYD R. MERRILL, APPELLEE
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In a marriage dissolution case, the wife appeals a judgment awarding the husband a special equity in real and personal property he acquired before their seven-month marriage and transferred into joint names during the marriage. The court affirms, holding that the husband's donative intent (or lack thereof) is a factual question for the trial court, and that the wife's loss of her former husband's pension, while sympathetic, cannot defeat the husband's special equity in separately acquired property.
The husband's special equity in separately acquired property is not defeated by the wife's testimony regarding donative intent; the question of intent is one of credible evidence for the trial court. The wife's loss of her pension, although a sacrifice and contribution to the marriage, was not a contribution of material resources toward the acquisition of the subject property and thus cannot destroy the husband's special equity.
[1] A spouse's special equity in property acquired and paid for before marriage is not extinguished by the other spouse's testimony that the transfer into joint names was int…
[2] The question of donative intent is a matter of the preponderance of the credible evidence, to be determined by the chancellor.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“We cannot read Ball v. Ball, 335 So. 2d 5, 7 (Fla.1976), as holding that a word or two of testimony by the recipient spouse, to the effect that the other intended a gift, obliterates the special equity resulting from an unrebutted showing that the grantor spouse acquired the property from sources entirely independent of the marriage.”
Establishes that recipient spouse's testimony regarding donative intent does not automatically defeat the grantor spouse's special equity in separately acquired property.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe husband acquired certain real and personal property entirely from sources independent of his seven-month marriage to the wife. During the marriage…
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SMITH, Judge.
The wife appeals from a marriage dissolution judgment which found that the husband has a special equity in certain real and personal property which was wholly acquired and paid for by the husband long before the seven-month marriage, and which during the marriage he transferred into the joint names of his wife and himself. The wife testified that the transfers during coverture were intended by the husband as a gift to the wife; but he testified, apparently with telling effect o,n the chancellor, that no gift was intended and that the transfers were made solely for survivorship purposes during coverture. We cannot read Ball v. Ball, 335 So. 2d 5, 7 (Fla.1976), as holding that a word or two of testimony by the recipient spouse, to the effect that the other intended a gift, obliterates the special equity resulting from an unrebutted showing that the grantor spouse acquired the property from sources entirely independent of the marriage. Such a reading of Ball would manipulate its doctrines mechanically if not magically. The question of donative intent is one of a preponderance of the credible evidence; and that question is for the chancellor, not for us.
We recognize the seeming inequity of restoring the husband’s separate property to him and not somehow recompensing the wife for her loss, upon entering the marriage, of a substantial pension which was paid to her as widow of her former husband. Yet that appealing factor cannot be given effect to destroy the husband’s special equity in previously acquired property. Even though the wife’s sacrifice of her pension was a contribution to the marriage, it was not a contribution of material resources to the marriage, nor was it a contribution toward the husband’s acquisition of the subject property. See Ball, 335 So. 2d at 7, n. 7.
We recognize also that the Supreme Court in Ball limited its decision to questions of real property, 335 So. 2d at 8, n. 11, and that we áre here concerned with common stock as well as with land. We find no basis for treating personal property differently.
No other error appears. The judgment is
AFFIRMED.
McCORD, C. J., and MELVIN, J., concur.
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Citator
Cited By (22 total)
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Duncan v. Duncan, 379 So. 2d 949 (Fla. 1980)…perty, or services made over and above the performance of normal marital duties. Eakin v. Eakin, 99 So. 2d 854 (Fla.1958). See, e. g., Ball v. Ball, 335 So. 2d 5 (Fla.1976) (property acquired with inherited/ funds of one spouse); Merrill v. Merrill, 357 So. 2d 792 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978) (one spouse entered the marriage with possession of realty and personalty); and Green v. Green, 228 So. 2d 112 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969) (one spouse contributed special labor toward accumulation of the other spouse’s wealth). A special…
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Laws v. Laws, 364 So. 2d 798 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978)…the effect that the other intended a gift . . . does not obliterate “ . . . the special equity resulting from an unrebutted showing that the grantor spouse acquired the property from sources entirely independent of the marriage”, Merrill v. Merrill, 357 So. 2d 792, 793 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978), neither is the simple denial of donative intent by the donor spouse disposi-tive of the question. As stated by the Court in Merrill, supra, at 793: “The question of donative intent is one of a preponderance of the credible…
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Winner v. Winner, 370 So. 2d 845 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)…l of the donor and come within the power and control of the donee. 38 Am.Jur.2d, Gifts, § 31.” [e.s.] Nor is there anything in either Ball v. Ball, 335 So. 2d 5 (Fla.1976), or those of its progeny which involve personalty, e. g. Merrill v. Merrill, 357 So. 2d 792 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978), which in any way affects this rule. The absence of evidence of any species of a valid delivery, compare Burnham v. Burnham, 343 So. 2d 639 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977), therefore requires reversal of that portion of the final judgment wh…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Shannon v. State, 335 So. 2d 5 (Fla. 1976)