STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
GERALD R. COOK, APPELLEE
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Florida appeals a trial court's order suppressing evidence obtained from an inventory search of the defendant's impounded vehicle. The appellate court reverses, holding that the impoundment was necessary under the circumstances and therefore the inventory search was proper.
The impoundment was necessary as a matter of law. Because the driver and passengers were too intoxicated to drive or make rational decisions about the car's removal, and leaving the vehicle one foot from the highway at a busy intersection during darkness created a hazard to traffic, the officer had no viable alternative but to impound the vehicle.
[1] A vehicle impoundment is generally considered necessary when the driver is arrested for driving while intoxicated and is too intoxicated to make rational decisions regard…
[2] Leaving a vehicle stopped within a foot of a highway, especially at a busy intersection during darkness, constitutes a hazard to passing traffic, justifying its impoundme…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“As we examine this case, we must first note that the trial court used the correct standard-necessity-in considering the propriety of the impoundment and the resulting inventory search.”
Establishes that necessity is the proper legal standard for evaluating vehicle impoundment
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceOfficer Cooke stopped a Ford convertible traveling 80 mph through St. Petersburg streets at 2:30 a.m. The vehicle came to a halt one foot off the road…
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OTT, Judge.
The state appeals from an order granting appellee’s motion to suppress evidence. After a careful review of the record and the briefs we find that we must agree with the state that there is no evidence to support the trial court’s conclusion that the impoundment of appellee’s vehicle was unnecessary.
At the hearing on appellee’s motion to suppress, the only testimony came from Officer Paul Cooke. Officer Cooke testified that at 2:30 a. m. one morning he stopped a Ford convertible which was traveling at eighty miles per hour through the streets of St. Petersburg. When the car came to a halt, it was one foot off the road at a busy intersection. Its driver, appellee, and his two passengers all appeared to be quite intoxicated. As a result, Officer Cooke arrested appellee for driving while intoxicated, detained the two passengers under the Myers Act, Chapter 396, Florida Statutes (1975), and impounded the vehicle. Another officer conducted an inventory search of the car which produced the firearm that was the subject of the motion to suppress. Cooke testified that impoundment was, in such circumstances, normal police procedure.
After hearing the officer’s testimony and indicating that it was familiar with the intersection where the car had stopped, the court granted the motion to suppress. In so doing it ruled that the impoundment of the vehicle was unnecessary.
As we examine this case, we must first note that the trial court used the correct standard-necessity-in considering the propriety of the impoundment and the resulting inventory search. Altman v. State, 335 So. 2d 626 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976). However, we think that, as a matter of law, there was no evidence to support the finding by the trial court of a lack of necessity.
The uncontradicted testimony of Officer Cooke demonstrated that appellee and his passengers were all far too intoxicated to drive the car or make any rational decision concerning its removal. Consequently, the officer’s only alternative would have been to leave the car where it was, but we do not believe that this was a viable alternative. Anytime an automobile is left within a foot of a highway, it is a hazard to passing traffic. This is especially so where, as here, the car is parked at a busy intersection during the hours of darkness. Therefore, Officer Cooke really had no choice but to impound appellee’s vehicle.
Because the impoundment and inventory search of the car were proper, we reverse the order granting appellee’s motion to suppress and remand this case for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
HOBSON, Acting C. J., and SCHEB, J., concur.
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Citator
Cited By
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State v. Sanders, 387 So. 2d 391 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980)…ng to impound the truck as the quickest and most reliable method of removing and safeguarding it. In a case presenting almost identical circumstances, this court has held that the police had “no alternative” to impounding the vehicle. State v. Cook, 358 So. 2d 42 (Fla.2d DCA 1978). The various possibilities sanctioned by the instructions are primarily for the guidance of the officers under the particular circumstances confronting them, and not necessarily for the benefit of the arrestee. The order of suppre…
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Nealy v. State, 400 So. 2d 95 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)…rnatives are available, inventorying and impoundment may be justified as good faith attempts to safeguard an arrestee’s property. Knight v. State, 398 So. 2d 908 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981); State v. Sanders, 387 So. 2d 391 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980); State v. Cook, 358 So. 2d 42 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978); Mattson v. State, 328 So. 2d 246 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976). . See for example, United States v. Prazak, 500 F. 2d 1216 (9th Cir. 1974) (lock property in trunk of vehicle); State v. Tully, 348 A. 2d 603 (Conn. 1974) (lock and leave, an…
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Gordon v. State, 368 So. 2d 59 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)…Altman v. State, 335 So. 2d 626 (Fla.2d DCA 1976); Annot. 48 A.L.R.3d 537, 551 (1973). The cases recognize that such a necessity is shown where the vehicle represents a traffic hazard and is impeding the uninterrupted flow of traffic, State v. Cook, 358 So. 2d 42 (Fla.2d DCA 1978); State v. Deardon, 347 So. 2d 462 (Fla.2d DCA 1977); or where the vehicle is stolen, disabled, illegally parked or abandoned, South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 96 S.Ct. 3092, 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1976); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.…
Authorities Cited
- Fredric Winton Altman v. State, 335 So. 2d 626 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976)