KENNETH GONTERMAN, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Kenneth Gonterman appealed the denial of his motion to suppress marijuana found during a vehicle search at a Florida agricultural inspection station. The court held that Gonterman's consent to search was involuntary and reversed, suppressing the evidence.
The trial court erred in refusing to suppress the marijuana because Gonterman's consent to search was involuntary. His initial consent was limited to a flashlight search only, and the subsequent consent obtained at the station was coerced by the inspector's arrest, false statements about authority to search without consent, and repeated requests for permission.
[1] A search of a vehicle at an agricultural inspection station is unlawful when consent is obtained after the inspector arrests the driver, states he can search with or with…
[2] Consent to search a vehicle is not voluntary when obtained after the driver initially consents only to a limited search and the inspector lacks probable cause for further…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Appellant's consent was not voluntary. It is clear that appellant initially consented only to a limited "flashlight" search of the vehicle.”
Establishes the core holding that consent was limited in scope and not extended to full vehicle search
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceGonterman was driving north on I-75 in a camper-truck and failed to stop at the Hamilton County agricultural inspection station. An inspector stopped …
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PER CURIAM.
Did the trial court err in refusing to suppress marijuana found in appellant’s vehicle during a search at a Florida agricultural inspection station? We conclude it did and reverse.
Appellant, driving north on 1-75 in a camper-truck, failed to stop at the Hamilton County inspection station. The agriculture inspector on duty radioed this information to another inspector, who stopped appellant about three miles north of the station and asked him if he could “take a look inside” the truck. Appellant agreed, went to the rear of the truck and opened the window. The inspector looked inside the vehicle with his flashlight, saw what appeared to be a mattress and a box, then asked appellant if he could look inside the box and appellant answered, “I’d rather not.” The inspector then told appellant he would have to go back to the station for further inspection. Appellant testified that at the station the inspector arrested him for bypassing the station and then repeatedly asked him (at least six times) for permission to search the vehicle. The inspector stated that he only asked twice, but admitted that he had told appellant “we could search the vehicle with or without a warrant, but we’d rather get his permission, if at all possible.” Appellant finally gave what the inspector interpreted as consent, and the search revealing the marijuana was performed. Appellant later conditionally pled nolo conten-dere to the charge after his suppression motion was denied. Appellant’s consent was not voluntary. It is clear that appellant initially consented only to a limited “flashlight” search of the vehicle. The inspector realized that the scope of the consent was so limited; otherwise he would not have asked for additional permission to search. There was no contraband within plain view which would have justified further intrusion. Nor did the inspector have probable cause to believe, as he admitted during the hearing, that any of the articles seen within the truck contained illegal drugs. The “consent” obtained at the station was clearly involuntary under this court’s rulings in Sarga v. State, 322 So. 2d 592 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975), and Powell v. State, 332 So. 2d 105 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976).
Here the appellant acquiesced to the search only after the inspector (1) arrested him for bypassing the station, (2) stated that he had the authority to search with or without appellant’s permission (which authority he did not have in the absence of a warrant, see Powell, supra, and Section 570.15(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1975)) and (3) made repeated requests for the consent. State v. Drake, 343 So. 2d 1336 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977), is not to the contrary because there the inspector had not expressed an intention to obtain a warrant if consent were refused.
REVERSED.
MILLS, Acting C. J., and ERVIN and MELVIN, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (13 total)
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Denehy v. State, 400 So. 2d 1216 (Fla. 1980)…evidence of coercion such as prolonged detention or a threat to obtain a search warrant, Seuss v. State, 370 So. 2d 1203 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979); Powell v. State, 332 So. 2d 105 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976), or repeated requests for consent, Gonterman v. State, 358 So. 2d 595 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978); Sarga v. State, 322 So. 2d 592 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975), the trial judge under the applicable standard of proof, could properly conclude from the officer’s testimony that the appellants voluntarily consented to the search of the truc…
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McDONNELL v. State, 981 So. 2d 585 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008)…the consent was not voluntary”) (citation omitted). Additionally, cases have held that repeated requests for consent to search can render such consent involuntary. See, e.g., Seuss v. State, 370 So. 2d 1203 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979); Gonterman v. State, 358 So. 2d 595 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978). In the instant case, Christopher was asked two times, over the span of one and a half to two hours, if he would consent to a search of the home. Although this may not constitute “repeated requests,” combined with the other circu…
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Elsleger v. State, 503 So. 2d 1367 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987)…evidence of coercion such as prolonged detention or a threat to obtain a search warrant, Seuss v. State, 370 So. 2d 1203 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979); Powell v. State, 332 So. 2d 105 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976), or repeated requests for consent, Gonterman v. State, 358 So. 2d 595 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978); Sarga v. State, 322 So. 2d 592 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975), the trial judge under the applicable standard of proof, could properly conclude from the officer’s testimony that the appellants voluntarily consented to the search of the truc…
Previewing 3 of 13 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Powell v. State, 332 So. 2d 105 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976)
- Sarga v. State, 322 So. 2d 592 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975)
- State v. Drake, 343 So. 2d 1336 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977)