LOUIS F. SMITH, JR., APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 2d DCA | 1978-05-17
No. 77-2086
GRIMES, Acting C. J., and SCHEB and DANAHY, JJ., concur.
358 So. 2d 1164 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (1978) Positive Treatment
Cited by 16 cases

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Synopsis

Appellant Smith challenged his life sentence for kidnapping entered after a guilty plea, arguing it was illegal because the offense occurred when the maximum penalty was 15 years, not life. The Florida appellate court agreed that the sentence was illegal and clarified that defendants may appeal illegal sentences even after guilty pleas.


Holding

A defendant may appeal an illegal sentence directly even after entering a guilty plea. The statutory restriction on direct appeals after guilty pleas applies only to errors occurring before or during acceptance of the plea itself, not to challenges of illegal sentences. Smith's life sentence for kidnapping was illegal because the maximum penalty at the time of the offense was 15 years.


Headnotes

[1] A defendant is subject only to the penalty in effect at the time the offense was committed.

[2] A defendant may appeal an illegal sentence even after entering a guilty plea, provided the plea did not expressly reserve the right to appeal.

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Key Quotes

“a defendant is subject only to the penalty in effect at the time he committed the offense”

Establishes the ex post facto principle preventing application of enhanced penalties to crimes committed under prior law

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Facts & Procedural History

Smith entered guilty pleas to kidnapping, assault, aggravated battery, and escape on November 21, 1977. The trial court sentenced him to life for kidn…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

Appellant contends that he received an illegal sentence for kidnapping. We agree.

Appellant entered guilty pleas to charges of kidnapping, assault, aggravated battery, and escape. On November 21, 1977, the court adjudged him guilty and sentenced him to prison terms of five years for assault, five years for aggravated battery, life for kidnapping and five years for escape. The first three sentences were to run concurrently with each other but consecutive to the sentence for escape.

At the time the court sentenced appellant, the penalty for kidnapping was life in prison. Section 787.01, Florida Statutes (1977).1 However, the state charged appellant with violating Section 805.01, Florida Statutes (1973), and at the time appellant kidnapped his victim, October 3, 1973, a violation of that section was only a second degree felony carrying a maximum prison term of fifteen years. Section 775.082, Florida Statutes (1973). Therefore, any sentence over fifteen years was excessive because a defendant is subject only to the penalty in effect at the time he committed the offense. Castle v. State, 330 So. 2d 10 (Fla.1976), aff’g, 305 So. 2d 794 (Fla.4th DCA 1974).

While the state concedes that what we have said is true, it contends that appellant may not appeal the excessive sentence since he entered a plea of guilty. We disagree with that conclusion.

Section 924.06, Florida Statutes (1977), which governs a defendant’s right to an appeal, says:

(1) A defendant may appeal from:
(a) A final judgment of conviction when probation has not been granted under chapter 948, except as provided in subsection (3);

(b) An order granting probation under chapter 948;

(c) An order revoking probation under chapter 948; or

(d) A sentence, on the ground that it is illegal.

(2) An appeal of an order granting probation shall proceed in the same manner and have the same effect as an appeal of a judgment of conviction. An appeal of an order revoking probation may review only proceedings after the order of probation. If a judgment of conviction preceded an order of probation, the defendant may appeal from the order or the judgment or both.

(3) A defendant who pleads guilty or nolo contendere with no express reservation of the right to appeal shall have no right to a direct appeal. Such' a defendant shall obtain review by means of collateral attack.

Reading Subsection (l)(d) and Subsection (3)together, we believe that the legislature did not mean to cut off a defendant’s right to direct appeal from an illegal sentence when he has entered a guilty plea. Rather, we think that Subsection (3) only restricts direct appeals from any error which occurs prior to the acceptance of the plea by the court, or from any error in the acceptance itself.

Accordingly, we vacate the sentence appellant received for kidnapping and remand the case to the trial court for resentencing.

GRIMES, Acting C. J., and SCHEB and DANAHY, JJ., concur. . This section went into effect on July 1, 1975. Ch. 74-383, § 22 and § 67, Laws of Florida.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Williams v. State, 500 So. 2d 501 (Fla. 1986)
    …pursuant to a plea bargain. See Robbins v. State, 413 So. 2d 840 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982) (appellate review is always available where a court has imposed an illegal sentence, even if the judgment and sentence resulted from a guilty plea); Smith v. State, 358 So. 2d 1164 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978) (appellant may appeal from an illegal sentence even when he has entered a guilty plea). Similarly, a trial court cannot make the failure to appear a proper basis for departure by simply conditioning acceptance of a guilty plea upo…
  • Quarterman v. State, 506 So. 2d 50 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987)
    …ncoerced plea bargain. The court in Williams states: “A trial court cannot impose an illegal sentence pursuant to a plea bargain.” The cases cited in support of that statement, Robbins v. State, 413 So. 2d 840 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982) and Smith v. State, 358 So. 2d 1164 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978), were not sentences in excess of guidelines recommendations, but were illegal because of some fundamental error or because they exceeded the statutory limit. Plea bargain sentences have consistently been recognized as a valid reas…
  • Hackney v. State, 456 So. 2d 1209 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984)
    …ey v. State, 450 So. 2d 926 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984). AFFIRMED. COBB, C.J., and FRANK D. UP-CHURCH, Jr., J., concur. . See Ch. 921, Fla.Stat., and Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.701 and Form 3.988. . See Robinson v. State, 373 So. 2d 898 (Fla.1979); Smith v. State, 358 So. 2d 1164 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978); Walton v. State, 360 So. 2d 50 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978); Robbins v. State, 413 So. 2d 840 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982).…

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