STEWART STEPHENS, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Defendant Stephens pleaded nolo contendere to grand larceny with a reservation of right to appeal the denial of his speedy trial discharge motion. The court affirmed, holding that the defendant waived his speedy trial protections by announcing he was not ready and requesting a continuance for his own reasons, rather than asserting the State's failure to proceed.
The defendant waived his speedy trial protections by failing to assert them at the call of the case. Rather than presenting the State's alleged fault as a basis for not going to trial, the defendant announced his own reasons for requesting a continuance, which was not binding on the court and prevented him from later claiming entitlement to discharge under the speedy trial rule.
[1] A defendant's announcement of unreadiness due to defense witness failure to appear for deposition, coupled with a desire to negotiate a plea or request a continuance, wai…
[2] A defense counsel's stated reason for requesting a continuance is not binding on the court.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Defense counsel's announcement of his reason for requesting a continuance was not binding on the court. If defendant had desired to stand upon the rights granted him under the speedy trial rule, he could have presented the alleged fault of the State as a basis for not going to trial on the scheduled date.”
Establishes that the defendant had the choice to either assert his speedy trial rights by blaming the State or request a continuance, and his failure to do so constituted a waiver.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDefendant was charged with grand larceny. At the call of the case before the 180-day speedy trial period expired, defense counsel announced the defens…
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PEARSON, Judge.
The defendant pleaded nolo contendere to a charge of grand larceny pursuant to a negotiated plea and a reservation of right to appeal the denial of his motions for discharge under the speedy trial rule (Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.191). The right of a defendant to accept a negotiated plea of nolo conten-dere and reserve the right to appeal is not argued in this case and is not decided on this appeal.
It affirmatively appears from the record in this case that the defendant, at the call of the case prior to the expiration of the 180 day period, announced that the defense was not ready because of the failure of defense witnesses to appear for deposition. At that time, defense counsel announced a desire to enter a negotiated plea if such could be arranged and further that if a negotiated plea could not be arranged, the defense would request a continuance. The trial was continued and, subsequently, the negotiated plea was entered.
Defense counsel’s announcement of his reason for requesting a continuance was not binding on the court. If defendant had desired to stand upon the rights granted him under the speedy trial rule, he could have presented the alleged fault of the State as a basis for not going to trial on the scheduled date. If the court found that the continuance had been necessitated by the failure of the State to proceed properly, the defendant would have been entitled to discharge upon the expiration of the 180 day period. To hold otherwise would deprive the State of the opportunity to proceed under Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.191(d)(2) for a continuance not charged to the State.
We conclude, therefore, that this appeal is not governed by the rule in State ex rel. Wright v. Yawn, 320 So. 2d 880 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975), but falls within the rule announced by the Supreme Court of Florida in Rubiera v. Dade County ex rel. Benitez, 305 So. 2d 161 (Fla.1974).
Affirmed.
. This appeal was first presented to this court upon a public defender memorandum brief pursuant to motion to withdraw. The court, finding an arguable point upon appeal, denied the motion and required full briefs by appellant and the State.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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The Honorable Jonathan T. Colby v. McNEILL, 595 So. 2d 115 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992)…), rev. denied, 534 So. 2d 398 (Fla.1988); State ex rel. Betancourt v. Klein, 354 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978). . State v. Golden, 571 So. 2d 49, 49-50 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990); State v. Haynes, 557 So. 2d 913, 914 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990); Stephens v. State, 359 So. 2d 21, 22 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978); State v. Banks, 349 So. 2d 736, 737 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977). . See, e.g., State ex rel. Gerstein v. Durant, 348 So. 2d 405 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977).…
Authorities Cited
- Honorable C. P. Rubiera v. Dade Cnty., 305 So. 2d 161 (Fla. 1974)
- State of Fla. ex rel. Robert Clark v. Theron A. Yawn, Jr., 320 So. 2d 880 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975)