DEAUVILLE CORPORATION, A DELAWARE CORPORATION, AND THE NEW DEAUVILLE, A NEW JERSEY CORPORATION,
v.
IVY T. BLOUNT, AS TRUSTEE, ET AL.
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Deauville Corporation and The New Deauville appealed from an order appointing a receiver in a trust dispute. The Florida Supreme Court held that the trustee held only a passive trust over corporate stock and therefore lacked standing to seek appointment of a receiver, and reversed because no fraud was shown and the corporation was a going concern.
The court held that the trustee held only a passive or dry trust and was merely an agent, not the beneficial owner of the stock, and therefore did not have independent standing to seek receivership. The court further held that appointment of a receiver is not warranted where no fraud is alleged or shown, the corporation is a going concern, and the bill is brought by a minority stockholder.
“such limiting provisions constituted a mere dry or passive trust, and the trustee nothing more than agent”
Establishes that the trustee's powers were limited and he held only a passive trust, not beneficial ownership of the stock.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceIn May 1945, a trustee filed a complaint against the corporations alleging he held 8-1/3 shares of Deauville Corporation stock under a written trust f…
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In May, 1945, Respondent, as trustee, filed his bill of complaint in the circuit court against petitioners, alleging that he held under a written trust agreement, title to eight and one-third (8-1/3) shares of the capital stock of Deauville Corporation for the benefit of William M.- F. Magraw. It is also alleged that in August, 1944, the stockholders of said corporation held a meeting, at which the stock held by respondent, in-*323eluding the remaining sixteen and two-thirds (16-2/3) shares, was surrendered and cancelled, and new certificates of stock were forthwith issued in the amount of one hundred (100) shares, of which respondent received sixteen and one-third (16-1/3) shares, Princess Lucy Eristavi-Tchitcherine, thirty-two' and two-thirds (32-2/3) shares, and B. A. Winkel and J. A. Lasser, twenty-five and one-half (25 Yz) shares each.
The bill also alleges that respondent was not present at said meeting, had no notice of it, and was, therefore, illegally deprived of the ownership of his eight and one-third (8-1/3) shares of stock; that some of said Defendants have continuously managed the affairs of said corporation in total disregard of the rights of respondent. The bill of complaint prays for a receiver, for an accounting, and for other relief. A motion to dismiss the bill was overruled; an order was then entered appointing a receiver who took possession of the petitioners’ property. This appeal was prosecuted from the latter order.
There is much in the record and the briefs about the transfer of the case to the Federal Court, but, since that question appears to have been closed, we do not discuss it in this opinion. The only question we are confronted with here is whether or not the appointment of a receiver finds support in the record.
Respondent contends that his appointment as receiver was warranted under Section 691.03, Florida Statutes 1941. The purpose of said statute was to define the power of the trustee of an express trust in the absence of “contrary or limiting provisions in the trust instrument or a subsequent order or decree of a court of competent jurisdiction.”
In our view this statute has no application to the case at bar because of the “limiting provisions in the trust instrument.” The trust instrument shows on its face that it was intended to be an amended supplemental agreement entered into by Lucy Cotton Magraw and William M. F. Magraw. It provided that trustee vote the stock of the corporations “in the same way and to the same extent as the parties of the first part may vote the capital stock owned by them or either of them.” There was also an authorization to “receive and *324collect any dividends which may be declared thereon and to pay the same to the party of the second part.” The tenure of the trustee was to be so “long as his services are agreeable to the party of the first part.”
In our view such limiting provisions constituted a mere dry or passive trust, and the trustee nothing more than agent. Elvins v. Seestedt, 141 Fla. 266, 193 So. 54. We find no support for the contention that the trustee was, to all intents and purposes, the owner of the stock. The minutes of the stockholders’ meeting brought in question indicate that all stockholders were present at the stockholders’ meeting in August, 1944, and surrendered their stock to the corporation and authorized the issuance of one hundred (100) new shares of stock in place of the twenty-five (25) shares held by the Princess and her husband (Magraw). Fifty-one per cent of the new stock was sold to B. A. Winkel and J. A. Lasser for value.
The purpose of the bill of complaint was to appoint a receiver and liquidate the corporation. No fraud is alleged or shown, the corporation is shown to be a going concern, and the bill is brought by a minority stockholder. When this is the case, there is no basis for the appointment of a receiver. Tampa Waterworks Co. v. Wood, 97 Fla. 493, 121 So. 789; Lews Journal Corporation v. Gore, 147 Fla. 217, 2 So. (2) 741.
The petition for certiorari is granted, and the judgment appointing the receiver is quashed.
CHAPMAN, C. J., TERRELL, BUFORD and ADAMS, JJ., concur.
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Trueman Fertilizer Co. v. Allison, 81 So. 2d 734 (Fla. 1955)…ss, 17 Fla. 691; Griley v. Marion Mortgage Co., 132 Fla. 299, 182 So. 297. This rule is subject to the exception in a court of equity where the trustee is merely a passive one. 90 C.J.S., Trusts, § 366b (1); see also Deauville Corporation v. Blount, 157 Fla. 322, 25 So. 2d 812, and Elvins v. Seestedt, 141 Fla. 266, 193 So. 54, 126 A.L.R. 1001. Moreover, in an appropriate case, in the furtherance of justice, a court of equity will not overlook' that the stockholders are the real and substantial beneficiaries…
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Recarey v. Rader, 320 So. 2d 28 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975)…rporation is a last-resort remedy, and should not be employed when another adequate remedy is available. Papazian v. Kulhanjian, Fla.1955, 78 So. 2d 85; McAllister Hotel v. Schatzberg, Fla. 1949, 40 So. 2d 201; Deauville Corporation v. Blount, 1946, 157 Fla. 322, 25 So. 2d 812; Tampa Waterworks Co. v. Wood, 1929, 97 Fla. 493, 121 So. 789; Conlee Construction Company v. Krause, Fla.App.1966, 192 So. 2d 330; 65 Am.Jur.2d, Receivers, § 59; and 27 Fla.Jur., Receivers §§ 7-8. In light of the rules set forth abo…
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Conlee Constr. Co. v. Sylvan B. Krause, 192 So. 2d 330 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966)…g a receiver pendente lite is reversed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings. Reversed and remanded. . See also: Jones v. Harvey, Fla.1955, 82 So. 2d 371; Papazian v. Kulhanjian, Fla.1955, 78 So. 2d 85; Deauville Corporation v. Blount, 157 Fla. 322, 25 So. 2d 812 (1946); Tampa Waterworks Co. v. Wood, 97 Fla. 493, 121 So. 789 (1929).…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Tampa Water Works Co. v. Wood, 97 Fla. 493 (Fla. 1929)
- News-Journal Corp. v. Gore, 147 Fla. 217 (Fla. 1941)
- Elvins v. Seestedt, 141 Fla. 266 (Fla. 1940)