BERNARD FRANCIS DECASTRO, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 3d DCA | 1978-07-11
No. 77-1318
Before HAVERFIELD, C. J, PEARSON, J., and CRAWFORD, GRADY L. (Ret.), Associate Judge.
360 So. 2d 474 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1978) Positive Treatment
Cited by 20 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Bernard Francis DeCastro appeals his robbery conviction, challenging the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on criminal intent and its refusal to read back selected testimony. The court affirms, holding that robbery under Florida law is a general intent offense and that the trial court properly exercised its discretion in declining to read back portions of eyewitness testimony.


Holding

The court held that no error occurred on either ground: robbery under Florida Statutes Section 812.13 is a general intent offense, not requiring proof of specific intent to permanently deprive, and the trial court properly exercised its discretion in refusing to read back portions of testimony where doing so would be impractical.


Headnotes

[1] Robbery, as defined under Section 812.13, Florida Statutes, is a general intent offense, and specific intent to permanently deprive is not a requisite element.

[2] A trial court's decision on whether to have testimony read back to a jury upon request is within its discretion.

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Key Quotes

“robbery is a general intent offense and, therefore, specific intent is no longer a requisite element”

Establishes that criminal intent to permanently deprive is not required for robbery under Florida law, rejecting appellant's first argument.

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Facts & Procedural History

DeCastro was convicted of robbery of a convenience store with a firearm. Three eyewitnesses, all employees of the store, identified the robber partly …

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

Bernard Francis DeCastro appeals his conviction of robbery of a convenience store with the use of a firearm.

DeCastro first urges as reversible error the failure of the trial court to instruct the jury that criminal intent (the intent to permanently deprive) is an element of the offense of robbery.

The point lacks merit because this court in Bell v. State, 354 So. 2d 1266 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978) held that as defined under Section 812.13, Florida Statutes (1975) robbery is a general intent offense and, therefore, specific intent is no longer a requisite element. In addition, the record reflects that defense counsel raised no objection to the instructions on robbery given by the court.

Appellant also argues that the trial court erred in refusing to have certain testimony read to the jury after it had retired and made a request therefor. Three eyewitnesses, employees of the convenience store burglarized, testified that in addition to other characteristics they were able to identify appellant by virtue of his facial scars and/or pockmarks. After retiring to deliberate, the jury transmitted to the trial court a note in effect requesting the testimony of the three eyewitnesses given in response to defense counsel’s questions with respect to their description of the robber and his facial markings. The court informed the jury that it was not practical to read back only portions of the testimony and all of the testimony would have to be read back which would take too long. The jury deliberated further and returned a verdict of guilty.

Under Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.410,1 it is within the trial court’s discretion to have the court reporter read back testimony of witnesses upon request of the jury. Simmons v. State, 334 So. 2d 265, 267 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976). We agree that a reading back of all the eyewitness’ testimony in the instant case was impractical, as well as having the court reporter search the entire record and have only those portions of the eyewitness’ testimony containing the description of the robber read back to the jury. There being no abuse of discretion, we find no error. See Simmons, supra, and Matire v. State, 232 So. 2d 209, 211-12 (Fla. 4th DCA 1970).

Affirmed.

. “Rule 3.410. Jury Request to Review Evidence or for Additional Instructions

“After the jurors have retired to consider their verdict, if they request additional instructions or to have any testimony read to them they shall be conducted into the courtroom by the officer who has them in charge and the court may give them such additional instructions or may order such testimony read to them. Such instructions shall be given and such testimony read only after notice to the prosecuting attorney and to counsel for the defendant.” [Emphasis Supplied]


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Citator

Cited By

  • Carlton A. Francis v. State, 808 So. 2d 110 (Fla. 2001)
    …al of a jury’s request for a read back when doing so would not be practical. See, e.g., Miller v. State, 605 So. 2d 492, 495 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992) (finding no abuse of discretion where court reporter did not have her notes with her); DeCastro v. State, 360 So. 2d 474 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978) (finding no abuse of discretion where it was not practical because testimony was extensive and court reporter was physically exhausted). In this case, the trial court did not refuse to provide a read back of C.J.’s testimony. Alt…
  • Kelley v. State, 486 So. 2d 578 (Fla. 1986)
    …tion that the court below acted improperly in this respect, we finally note that Florida law has given the trial court a wide latitude in deciding whether or not to have testimony re-read to jurors upon request. Fla.R.Cr.P. 3.410; DeCastro v. State, 360 So. 2d 474 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978), cert. denied, 368 So. 2d 1365 (Fla.1979); Simmons v. State, 334 So. 2d 265 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976). In his fourth point on appeal, appellant contends that the trial court erred in allowing the jurors to take notes during the trial an…
  • …Riechmann, 777 So. 2d 342 (Fla.2000); Henry v. State, 649 So. 2d 1361, 1365 (Fla.1994); Miller v. State, 605 So. 2d 492, 495 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992) (finding no abuse of discretion where court reporter did not have her notes with her); DeCastro v. State, 360 So. 2d 474 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978) (finding no abuse of discretion where it was not practical because testimony was extensive and court reporter was physically exhausted). We conclude that trial judges should continue to have broad discretion in denying read-back r…

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