JANICE A. SMOLDER, APPELLANT,
v.
FORD LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, APPELLEE

Fla. 1st DCA | 1978-08-09
No. II-317
McCORD, C. J., and ERVIN, J., concur., MILLS, J., dissents.
361 So. 2d 222 Florida District Court of Appeal, First District (1978) Positive Treatment
Cited by 6 cases

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Synopsis

Appellant sought recovery of attorney's fees and costs after successfully suing an insurance company for payment of an automobile loan under a credit life insurance policy. The trial court denied her fees and ordered her to pay the company's costs, but the appellate court reversed, holding that appellant was entitled to recover her attorney's fees and costs because the insurance company wrongfully denied coverage and failed to effectively notify her of its decision to pay before she filed suit.


Holding

Appellant is entitled to recover her attorney's fees and costs because she was entitled to bring the suit in her individual capacity, was not required to wait for the company to deny coverage within 60 days, and the insurance company wrongfully denied coverage and failed to effectively notify her of its decision to pay before she instituted suit.


Headnotes

[1] A party may be entitled to recover attorney's fees and costs when an insurer wrongfully denies coverage under a policy, even if the insurer later reverses its decision.

[2] A plaintiff is not required to wait for the expiration of a contractual period for proof of loss if the insurer denies coverage before that period ends.

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Key Quotes

“It is clear that she was entitled to bring the suit in her individual capacity although she was not the primary beneficiary of the policy.”

Establishes appellant's standing to bring the action as a creditor-beneficiary despite not being the policy's primary beneficiary.

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Facts & Procedural History

Following her husband's death, appellant's creditor-beneficiary made a claim on a credit life insurance policy with appellee. Appellant received a let…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

The sole issue before us is whether appellant is entitled to recover attorney’s fees and costs in an action she brought against appellee for payment of an automobile loan under a credit life insurance policy. The trial court found that she was not, and in fact ordered her to pay appellee’s costs.

The record reveals that the creditor-beneficiary made a claim on the policy shortly following the death of appellant’s husband. Appellant instituted the suit after receiving a letter from appellee denying coverage under the policy. After certain discussions between the agent who had written the policy and appellee, appellee decided to pay the claim. There is no dispute that appellee issued its “claim draft” to the creditor before it received notice of appellant’s suit. It is also clear, however, that appellant did not receive word of the company’s decision to pay the claim before she brought her suit. Appellee’s agent testified that he called appellant’s home and left word of the company’s decision with her son or her babysitter but appellant denied receiving the message. The trial court made a specific finding of fact, not appealed, that appellant never actually received the message.

In view of this finding, we find no basis for the court’s denial of appellant’s costs and fees. It is clear that she was entitled to bring the suit in her individual capacity although she was not the primary beneficiary of the policy. Cincinnati Insurance Co. v. Palmer, 297 So. 2d 96 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974). It is also settled that appellant was not required to wait 60 days after the proof of loss claim to bring the suit when the company denied coverage before that period expired. Shuster v. New York Life Insurance Co., 351 So. 2d 62 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977).

Appellee invited appellant’s suit when it denied coverage under the policy. Although this decision was later changed, appellee failed to effectively notify appellant that the claim would be paid before the institution of her suit. While the sequence of events may be unfortunate for appellee, we find no basis for requiring appellant to pay her own costs and fees resulting from appellee’s wrongful denial of coverage. The judgment is reversed and the case remanded with instructions that judgment be entered in favor of appellant for her attorney’s fees and costs, including attorney’s fees for this appeal.

McCORD, C. J., and ERVIN, J., concur. MILLS, J., dissents.

Dissent
MILLS, Judge,

MILLS, Judge,

dissenting:

I dissent. I would affirm the trial court’s final judgment which I would adopt as the court’s opinion.

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Citator

Cited By

  • Wollard v. Lloyd's & Cos. OF Lloyd's, 439 So. 2d 217 (Fla. 1983)
    …f the Third District, Lloyd’s and Companies of Lloyd’s v. Wollard, 420 So. 2d 940 (Fla.3d DCA 1982), and decisions of all four other district courts of appeal. Gibson v. Walker, 380 So. 2d 531 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980); Smolder v. Ford Life Insurance Co., 361 So. 2d 222 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978), cert. denied, 373 So. 2d 458 (Fla.1979); Cincinnati Insurance Co. v. Palmer, 297 So. 2d 96 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974); Employers’ Liability Assurance Corp. v. Royals Farm Supply, Inc., 186 So. 2d 317 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966). We have jurisdi…
  • Brown v. Vt. Mut. Ins. Co., 614 So. 2d 574 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993)
    …); Fitzgerald & Co. v. Roberts Electrical Contractors, Inc., 533 So. 2d 789 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988); Prygrocki v. Industrial Fire and Cas. Ins. Co., 407 So. 2d 345 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981), approved, 422 So. 2d 314 (Fla. 1982); Smolder v. Ford Life Ins. Co., 361 So. 2d 222 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978); Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Palmer, 297 So. 2d 96 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974). Once an attorney has appeared in pending litigation to represent a party, that attorney cannot withdraw from the case pursuant to discharge by the client without…
  • Mercury Ins. Co. OF Fla. v. Cletus Cooper, 919 So. 2d 491 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005)
    …d 940 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982) decision quashed by Wollard v. Lloyd's & Cos. of Lloyd’s, 439 So. 2d 217 (Fla. 1983) and contrary decisions from each of our sister courts. Gibson v. Walker, 380 So. 2d 531 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980); Smolder v. Ford Life Ins. Co., 361 So. 2d 222 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978); Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Palmer, 297 So. 2d 96 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974); Employers' Liab. Assurance Corp. v. Royals Farm Supply, Inc., 186 So. 2d 317 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966). All five of these cases are classic first-party cases in which an…

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