MISSION EAST COMPANY, A FLORIDA CORPORATION, APPELLANT,
v.
STEPHANIE WYSZATYCKI, APPELLEE
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Mission East Company appealed a final judgment entered against it following a default in a promissory note recovery action. The trial court denied appellant's motion to vacate the default because appellant failed to demonstrate a meritorious defense, and the appellate court affirmed, holding that a bare general denial does not constitute a meritorious defense sufficient to set aside a default.
A general denial of the allegations in a complaint does not constitute a meritorious defense sufficient to warrant setting aside a default judgment. To obtain relief from a default, a party must demonstrate both a meritorious defense and a legal excuse for the failure to comply with the rules.
[1] A trial court may grant relief from a default judgment upon a showing of a meritorious defense and a legal excuse for failure to comply with rules.
[2] A general denial of the allegations in a complaint does not constitute a meritorious defense sufficient to set aside a default judgment.
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“[t]he general rule in respect to setting aside a default or final judgment consequent thereon is that relief may be granted within the sound discretion of the trial judge upon showing of the existence of [1] a meritorious defense and [2] a legal excuse for failure to comply with the rules.”
Establishes the two-part test for obtaining relief from a default judgment in Florida
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellee filed a complaint on September 12, 1977, seeking recovery on a promissory note against Mission East Company. On October 11, 1977, a motion fo…
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KEHOE, Judge.
Appellant, defendant below, brings this appeal from a final judgment dated November 1, 1977, entered by the trial court pursuant to appellee’s, plaintiff below, motion for a final judgment after a default. We affirm.
Appellee filed a complaint on September 12,1977, against appellant seeking to recover on a promissory note. Thereafter, on October 11,1977, appellee filed a motion for default which was granted by the trial court. Subsequently, on October 13, 1977, appellee moved for the entry of a final judgment, based on the default, which was entered by the trial court. On October 18, 1977, appellant, after having filed an answer on October 12, 1977, moved to vacate the default. Appellant’s motion to vacate was denied by the trial court.
In its order denying appellant’s motion to vacate the default, the trial court stated, in pertinent part, as follows:
“THIS CAUSE came on to be heard on the Motion to Vacate Default filed herein by Mission East Co. [appellant herein], and after argument of the Counsel and it appearing to the Court that the defendant has failed to show that it has a meritorious defense, and the Court being otherwise duly advised, it is
“ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Motion to Vacate Default of Defendant, Mission East Co., a Florida Corporation, be, and the same is hereby denied.”
As stated by this court in Acme Fast Freight, Inc. v. Bell, 318 So. 2d 212, 213 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975), “[t]he general rule in respect to setting aside a default or final judgment consequent thereon is that relief may be granted within the sound discretion of the trial judge upon showing of the existence of a meritorious defense and a legal excuse for failure to comply with the rules.”
In the instant action, the only defense raised by appellant was set forth in its answer filed on October 12, 1977. This defense reads as follows: “The allegations of the complaint are denied.” As can be seen from the quoted portions, set forth above, of the trial court’s order denying appellant’s motion to set aside the default, the trial court exercised its discretion and found that, because appellant had shown no meritorious defense, it was not entitled to have the default set aside.
In making the finding, it was necessary for the trial court to determine that appellant’s general denial, set forth in its answer, was not a meritorious defense sufficient for the purpose' of setting aside the default. We agree with the trial court’s determination. See Bay Convalescent Center, Inc. v. Carroll, 352 So. 2d 900 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977); Perry v. University Cabs, Inc., 344 So. 2d 914 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977); and Associated Medical Institutions, Inc. v. Imperatori, 338 So. 2d 75 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976). See generally North Shore Hospital, Inc. v. Barber, 143 So. 2d 849 (Fla.1962); Florida Investment Enterprises, Inc. v. Kentucky Co., 160 So. 2d 733 (Fla. 1st DCA 1964); 46 Am.Jur.2d Judgments § 742 (1969); and Annot., 174 A.L.R. 10 (1948).
Affirmed.
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Caribbean Agencies, Inc. v. Agri-Export, Inc., 384 So. 2d 281 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980)…was obliged to consider the contents of the proposed answer filed with the court on the question of the existence of a meritorious defense. Bay Convalescent Center, Inc. v. Carroll, 352 So. 2d 900 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977); Mission East Co. v. Wyszatycki, 362 So. 2d 87 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978). That answer contained an allegation that appellant was the agent for a disclosed principal, which, if proven, would constitute a complete defense to the complaint. Appellant having demonstrated both a meritorious defense and exc…
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DeRUYTER v. State, 521 So. 2d 135 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988)…wn by either an unverified pleading or an affidavit. Gibraltar, 488 So. 2d at 584; Hall v. Byington, 421 So. 2d 817 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982). A general denial is not a meritorious defense sufficient to set aside a default. Mission East Co. v. Wyszatycki, 362 So. 2d 87 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978). While the state argued below that a motion to dismiss is not a recognized vehicle for raising a meritorious defense, such a pleading is perfectly proper for raising “defenses” such as lack of subject matter jurisdiction, lack of…
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Napco Paints, Inc. v. LaPORTE (U.S.), Inc., 490 So. 2d 1023 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986)…4th DCA 1982); Pedro Realty, Inc. v. Silva, 399 So. 2d 367, 369 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981), approved, 411 So. 2d 872 (Fla.1982); Tremblay v. Marck, 378 So. 2d 855 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979), cert. denied, 389 So. 2d 1116 (Fla.1980); Mission East Co. v. Wyszatycki, 362 So. 2d 87, 88 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978); Perry v. University Cabs, Inc., 344 So. 2d 914, 915 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977); and (2) the trial court had no jurisdiction to entertain the defendant Napco’s motion for rehearing on the denial of the motion to vacate, Francisco v. V…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- N. Shore Hosp., Inc. v. Barber, 143 So. 2d 849 (Fla. 1962)
- Fla. Inv. Enters., Inc. v. The Ky. Co., Inc., 160 So. 2d 733 (Fla. 1st DCA 1964)
- Perry v. Univ. Cabs, Inc., 344 So. 2d 914 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977)
- Crews v. The Dania Bank, 352 So. 2d 900 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977)
- State v. Norbert Lee Bandi, 338 So. 2d 75 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976)
- Acme Fast Freight, Inc. v. Bell, 318 So. 2d 212 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975)