JANICE L. GRAY, APPELLANT,
v.
RONALD E. GRAY, APPELLEE
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Florida appellate court reversed denial of attorney's fees in dissolution modification case, holding that the proper standard is relative financial resources of the parties, not whether the husband had a legitimate question for court determination.
Attorney's fees in dissolution and modification cases must be determined based on the relative financial resources of the parties, not on whether the moving party had a legitimate question for court determination.
[1] Attorney's fees in dissolution and modification proceedings are determined by the relative financial resources of the parties under Florida Statutes Section 61.16, not by…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceIn a post-decretal interlocutory appeal of an order denying the husband's motion for modification of a final judgment of dissolution, the trial court …
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PER CURIAM.
The only point meriting discussion in this post-decretal interlocutory appeal of an order denying appellee/husband’s motion for modification of final judgment of dissolution is the trial court’s denial of appellant/wife’s motion for attorney’s fees.
Despite the fact that the record contains certain relevant information as to the financial resources of appellant and appellee in the form of their financial affidavits, the record is devoid of any affirmative showing that the trial court considered these affidavits as the basis for its order denying the wife’s attorney’s fees. Indeed, the order expressly based denial of attorney’s fees on the sole ground that “there existed a legitimate question for Court determination on the part of the husband in bringing his Motion for Modification of Final Judgment.”
Whether or not a legitimate question for court determination existed is not the appropriate standard for determining entitlement to attorney’s fees in dissolution and modification cases. The proper criterion is the relative financial resources of the parties. See Section 61.16, Florida Statutes (1977).
Accordingly, the order appealed from is reversed only insofar as it denies appellant/wife’s motion for attorney’s fees and the cause is remanded for appropriate consideration and determination of this issue. In all other respects, the order appealed from is affirmed.
GRIMES, Acting C. J., and OTT and RYDER, JJ., concur.
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Hudgens v. Hudgens, 411 So. 2d 354 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982)…the award of attorney’s fees in a dissolution proceeding depends not upon who wins but rather upon the relative financial circumstances of the parties. § 61.16, Fla.Stat. (1981); Johnson v. Johnson, 403 So. 2d 1388 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981); Gray v. Gray, 362 So. 2d 294 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978). Since the wife’s claim for modification was not spurious, the fact that she lost on this issue does not mean that she could not be a candidate to receive attorney’s fees. The husband has earned over $100,000 a year as a doctor…
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Julianne J. Droubie v. Droubie, 379 So. 2d 1331 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980)…o feel the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to award the wife attorney’s fees. The trial court is to consider the financial resources of both parties in determining an award of attorney’s fees. § 61.-16, Fla.Stat. (1977); Gray v. Gray, 362 So. 2d 294 (Fla.2d DCA 1978). Here the disparity in the parties’ relative financial positions justifies an award of attorney’s fees to the wife. Accordingly, the portion of the trial court’s order holding each party responsible for his or her own attorney’s f…
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Roslyn Wiseblatt v. Wiseblatt, 452 So. 2d 575 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984)…titlement to attorney’s fees is the relative financial resources of the parties, whether in an original proceeding, see Golden v. Golden, 410 So. 2d 945 (Fla.3d DCA), rev. denied, 419 So. 2d 1197 (Fla.1982) or post-judgment proceeding. Gray v. Gray, 362 So. 2d 294 (Fla.2d DCA 1978). Here there is no showing by clear and [*577] substantial evidence of appellant’s inability to pay, or appellee’s ability to pay. Jaffee v. Jaffee, 394 So. 2d 443 (Fla.3d DCA 1981) does not support the majority holding. Jaffee inv…