LEATHERBY INSURANCE COMPANY, A FOREIGN CORPORATION, VERNEL JACKSON AND LINDA JOHNSON TYLER, APPELLANTS,
v.
RAYMOND ECKERSON, FERNANDO RAPHAEL CRUZ AND RANDLE-EASTERN AMBULANCE SERVICE, INC., A FLORIDA CORPORATION, APPELLEES
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In this negligence action arising from a vehicular collision, the trial court voided two separate jury verdicts finding liability, declared a mistrial when the jury could not agree on damages using corrected verdict forms, and then entered judgment by resurrecting the voided verdicts and apportioning damages without a proper jury verdict. The appellate court reversed, holding that once verdicts are voided and a mistrial is declared with no proper verdict rendered, the trial court cannot resurrect the improper verdicts to enter judgment.
The trial judge erred by entering judgment based on voided, improper verdicts. While the judge correctly determined that separate verdicts against joint-tortfeasors were improper and properly declared a mistrial when the jury could not agree, once no proper verdict had been rendered, the judge could not resurrect the voided verdicts to enter judgment.
[1] A trial court errs by entering a judgment assessing and apportioning damages in the absence of a proper jury verdict.
[2] Separate jury verdicts against joint tortfeasors are improper absent the use of special verdicts.
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Statement of the sole issue on appeal
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceA jury in a vehicular negligence case returned two separate verdicts: $3,500 against Jackson, Tyler, and Leatherby Insurance, and $31,500 against Rand…
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HENDRY, Judge.
This appeal, taken from a “corrected final judgment” for damages in a negligence action, challenges the correctness of certain rulings of the trial judge which, inter alia, reinstated two verdicts of the jury and apportioned the damages against the joint-tortfeasors after the court had formerly rejected the verdicts, declared a mistrial and discharged the jury. Appellants Jackson, Tyler and their insurance carrier, Leatherby Insurance Company, were defendants in the trial court. Appellee Eck-erson was the plaintiff while appellees Ran-dle-Eastern Ambulance Service, Inc. and its driver, Cruz, were co-defendants.
The facts surrounding the alleged negligence in this case need not be discussed, as the merits of the appeal rest in procedural rulings of the trial judge. Suffice it to say that at the termination of a personal injury action stemming from a vehicular collision, the jury, after deliberation, returned two separate verdicts (on two verdict forms) in favor of plaintiff Eckerson. In the first verdict, the jury found against Jackson, Tyler and Leatherby in the sum of THREE THOUSAND, FIVE HUNDRED ($3,500.00) DOLLARS and in the second verdict, the jury found against Randle Eastern and Cruz in the sum of THIRTY-ONE THOUSAND, FIVE HUNDRED ($31,500.00) DOLLARS.
The trial judge, after determining that the two separate verdicts against the joint-tortfeasors were improper, marked the verdicts void and instructed the jury that if they found against both defendants, they should assess the amount of damages against both defendants in one verdict form. After a second deliberation, the jury returned unable to agree upon the amount of damages to be assessed against the joint tortfeasors. After questioning the individual jurors as to the possibility of their reaching an agreement on the amount of damages, the trial judge, apparently convinced that no agreement could be reached, declared a mistrial and discharged the jury. Subsequently, upon motion, the trial judge in two orders (1) entered judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants for the total amount of the two voided verdicts and (2) then apportioned the judgment, assessing seventy (70%) percent against Randle Eastern and thirty (30%) percent against Jackson, Tyler and their insurer. These orders were subsequently embodied in the “corrected final judgment” now under appeal.
There is but one issue in this appeal, to-wit: whether the trial judge erred in entering a judgment which assessed and apportioned damages in the absence of a proper jury verdict. We believe that the trial judge did so err and accordingly, we reverse.
Firstly, with regard to the separate verdicts returned against the joint-tortfeasors, the trial judge correctly determined that absent the use of “special verdicts,” the separate verdicts were improper pursuant to then controlling Section 768.-31(3)(a) & (c), Florida Statutes (1975). Lincenberg v. Issen, 318 So. 2d 386 (Fla.1975); Kennedy and Cohen, Inc. v. Van Eyck, 347 So. 2d 1085 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977); Moore v. St. Cloud Utilities, 337 So. 2d 982 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976). Secondly, when the jury returned from deliberating a second time (after having been instructed by the trial judge as to the use of the corrected verdict forms) and announced that no decision could be reached as to the amount of damages to be awarded to the plaintiff, the trial judge properly granted a mistrial. Dehon v. Heidt, 38 So. 2d 39 (Fla.1948). However, as no proper verdict had been rendered by the jury, it was error for the trial judge to resurrect the voided, improper verdicts and enter judgments in accordance therewith. See Dehon v. Heidt, supra.
Accordingly, after a careful review of the record, in light of the briefs and arguments of counsel, it is our opinion that the “corrected final judgment” must be reversed and the cause remanded for new trial.
Reversed and remanded for new trial.
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Madsen v. Leaman, 686 So. 2d 780 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)…equal to the precise amount of income tax the Leamans paid following the sale of the marina. The firm argues the court’s charges following the jury’s announced deadlock led it to believe it must reach a verdict. See Leatherby Ins. Co. v. Eckerson, 362 So. 2d 320 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978) (affirming mistrial where jury’s first verdict was inconsistent, and jury continued deliberating, ultimately advising court it was unable to agree on a damage amount). It argues the ultimate verdict constituted a compromise, as ev…
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Brod v. Ira L. Adler, 570 So. 2d 1312 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990)…sessed damages against the defendants separately, it could have corrected the verdict on new forms, and would have been free to change the total damage award. On the precise question raised by this appeal we held, in Leatherby Ins. Co. v. Eckerson, 362 So. 2d 320 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978), that a trial judge has no authority to combine damage awards where a jury has returned separate verdicts against joint tortfeasors — even if the jury verdicts are contrary to the law. All that the aggrieved party would be entitle…1 / 2
Authorities Cited
- Lincenberg v. Issen, 318 So. 2d 386 (Fla. 1975)
- Dehon v. Heidt, 38 So.2d 39 (Fla. 1948)
- Erick S. Moore v. ST. Cloud Utils., 337 So. 2d 982 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975)
- Kennedy & Cohen, Inc. v. van Eyck, 347 So. 2d 1085 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977)