WILLIAM C. RITTER, APPELLANT,
v.
AMY ANNE RITTER, APPELLEE
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The court held that the award of attorney's fees to the wife was an abuse of discretion given the disparity in assets and income.
The husband appealed a final judgment of dissolution of marriage, challenging the distribution of assets and the award of attorney's fees to the wife.…
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PER CURIAM.
The husband appeals a final judgment of dissolution of marriage. Two points are presented. The first claims an inequitable distribution of the joint assets. The second urges error upon the award of attorney’s fees to the wife.
A division of the joint assets was sought by both parties. The record shows that the wife furnished all of the assets and living expenses of the marriage. The husband’s sole contribution was the management of these assets. Under these circumstances, we hold that the award made has not been shown to be so inequitable as to constitute an abuse of discretion. See Hegel v. Hegel, 248 So. 2d 212 (Fla.3d DCA 1971).
The second point does present reversible error. See Ross v. Ross, 341 So. 2d 833 (Fla.3d DCA 1977); and Mertz v. Mertz, 287 So. 2d 691 (Fla.2d DCA 1973). Where, as here, the usable assets and income of the wife, as shown by the record, far exceed those of the husband, the basis for an award of attorney’s fees to the wife does not exist. Cf. Markland v. Markland, 155 Fla. 629, 21 So. 2d 145 (1945).
Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed, except for that portion of the judgment which determines that the wife is entitled to an award of attorney’s fees. That portion of the judgment is stricken and the judgment, as amended, is affirmed.
Judgment amended and affirmed.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
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Creel v. Creel, 378 So. 2d 1251 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)…ting one party’s need for, and the other party’s ability to pay, reasonable attorney’s fee.” Ludemann v. Ludemann, 317 So. 2d 860, 861 (Fla.4th DCA 1975). See generally, Speight v. Speight, 319 So. 2d 197 (Fla.3d DCA 1975); and cf. Ritter v. Ritter, 362 So. 2d 384 (Fla.3d DCA 1978). The seventh point on appeal urges that it was error to include in the judgment a provision that the husband should hold the wife harmless on a $13,500.00 note jointly executed by the parties to the husband’s father. A review of t…
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Burton A. Greenberg v. Greenberg, 397 So. 2d 1032 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)…ummings v. Cummings, 330 So. 2d 134 (Fla.1976); Deatherage v. Deatherage (Fla. 5th DCA) (opinion filed February 25, 1981); Hill v. Hill, 376 So. 2d 472 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979); Robinson v. Robinson, 366 So. 2d 1210 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979); Ritter v. Ritter, 362 So. 2d 384 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978); Butts v. Butts, 362 So. 2d 349 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978); Watterson v. Watterson, 353 So. 2d 1185 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977). Appellee’s argument is totally without merit. Because no formal order had been entered regarding attorney’s fees,…
Authorities Cited
- Markland v. Markland, 155 Fla. 629 (Fla. 1945)
- Hernandez v. Hernandez, 287 So. 2d 691 (Fla. 2d DCA 1973)
- Mertz v. Mertz, 287 So. 2d 691 (Fla. 2d DCA 1973)
- Hegel v. Hegel, 248 So. 2d 212 (Fla. 3d DCA 1971)
- Ross v. Ross, 341 So. 2d 833 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977)