ROBERT L. JANE, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Robert Jane was convicted of false imprisonment and battery arising from his restraint of Alice Williams in a grocery store parking lot during an attempted child abduction. The appellate court affirmed the false imprisonment conviction but reversed the battery conviction, holding that battery was a lesser included offense of false imprisonment and thus convicting him of both constituted error.
The court held that false imprisonment under Florida Statute § 787.02(1)(a) can be accomplished by force alone, without requiring threat or secret restraint, and that the evidence sufficiently established false imprisonment. The court also held that battery was a lesser included offense of false imprisonment in this case because the same bear hug act that constituted the restraint constituted the battery, making conviction on both counts error.
[1] False imprisonment can be committed by force alone, without the necessity of threat or secrecy.
[2] A battery committed during the course of a forcible restraint may constitute a lesser included offense of false imprisonment.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“A reading of subsection (1)(a) [787.-021(1)(a)] clearly indicates that it is written in the disjunctive with adverbs 'forcibly,' 'threat' and 'secretly' all being intended to modify the verbs 'confining,' 'abducting,' 'imprisoning' and 'restraining'.”
Establishes that false imprisonment can be accomplished by force alone, not requiring threat or secret restraint
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceJane and another man attempted to abduct Amy, a young child, from a grocery store parking lot. Jane grabbed Amy's stepmother, Alice Williams, in a bea…
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DOWNEY, Chief Judge.
Appellant was charged in two counts with false imprisonment and battery and convicted as charged on each count. On appeal appellant contends the trial court erred in adjudicating him guilty on both counts because a) the evidence was insufficient to prove false imprisonment, b) the battery in question was a lesser included offense of false imprisonment and c) the refusal of proffered defense testimony and limiting cross examination of the complaining witness prejudiced appellant’s case.
The charges arose out of a factual situation involving the custody of a young child. The victim, Alice Williams, was traversing a grocery store parking lot holding the hand of her stepdaughter, Amy. A car pulled up behind them, two men exited the car, one grabbed Amy, put her in the car and drove away. The other man turned out to be the appellant and he grabbed Alice in a bear hug. Alice struggled to get free but appellant restrained her for a short period of time and finally released her. Regarding the charge of false imprisonment, appellant contends that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of that crime because there was no proof of restraint by threat or in a secret manner. It is appellant’s view that, since the statute defining false imprisonment, Section 787.-02(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1977), provides:
“ ‘False imprisonment’ means forcibly, by threat, or secretly confining, abducting, imprisoning, or restraining another person without lawful authority and against his will with any purpose other than those referred to in § 787.01.”
in order to convict the restraint must have been imposed by threat or in a secret manner. We reject appellant’s contention upon authority of Brunelle v. State, 360 So. 2d 70, Florida Supreme Court opinion filed May 26, 1978, wherein the court said:
“A reading of subsection (1)(a) [787.-021(1)(a)] clearly indicates that it is written in the disjunctive with adverbs ‘forcibly,’ ‘threat’ and ‘secretly’ all being intended to modify the verbs ‘confining,’ ‘abducting,’ ‘imprisoning’ and ‘restraining’. The appellant’s contention that the transposition of ‘threat’ and ‘secretly’ has created an unconstitutionally vague and ambiguous statute is simply without merit.”
Thus, it now appears clear that the wording of that statute does not require that the restraint be secretly accomplished, or done by threat; it can be accomplished by force alone.
The other point we consider worthy of comment requires a reversal in part of the judgment and sentence under review. Appellant was charged with and convicted of false imprisonment and battery. Both crimes were committed in the course of the “bear hug”. In wrapping his arms around Alice appellant forcibly restrained her against her will and without lawful authority; that same act constituted the battery in question. Thus, it appears that the battery in this case was a Brown category four lesser included offense of false imprisonment. Therefore, it was error to adjudicate appellant guilty of the battery count.
We have considered appellant’s third point and find it to be without merit.
Accordingly, the judgment and sentence on Count I for false imprisonment is affirmed and the adjudication of guilty on Count II is reversed, and the cause is remanded with directions to vacate the adjudication of guilty on Count II.
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART, with directions.
MOORE, J., and RIVKIND, LEONARD, Associate Judge, concur.
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Miles v. State, 418 So. 2d 1070 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982)…he above constitutional double jeopardy concepts, appellant argued that he could not be convicted of both crimes “since each is a facet of the same criminal transaction,” citing Walker v. State, 386 So. 2d 630 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980), and Jane v. State, 362 So. 2d 1005 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978). The majority opinion fails to discuss appellant’s argument. I believe it should be dealt with openly. This argument, and the cases cited, refer to the “single transaction rule.” This legal argument is being made in the courts da…
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Proko v. State, 566 So. 2d 918 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990)…or this reason, there was sufficient evidence to submit the case to the jury. See State v. Horton, 442 So. 2d 408 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983) (disputed facts on whether restraint or confinement occurred should have been presented to the jury); Jane v. State, 362 So. 2d 1005 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978) (holding victim in a bear hug was sufficient evidence of false imprisonment). On the issue of intent, there are conflicting interpretations of section 787.-02(l)(a), Florida Statutes (1989). The Fourth District Court of Appeal i…
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Walker v. State, 386 So. 2d 630 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980)…e she was finally subdued. Appellant urges she should not be convicted of both crimes because one is factually included in the other and each is a facet or phase of the same criminal transaction. As authority for reversal, she cites Jane v. State, 362 So. 2d 1005 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978), which held under the facts of that case that battery and false imprisonment were part of the same transaction and thus Jane could not be convicted of both. In that case, the appellant embraced the victim in a bear hug and would…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Brunelle v. State, 360 So. 2d 70 (Fla. 1978)