JANET KILLIAN, APPELLANT,
v.
ROBERT P. LAWSON, ALSO KNOWN AS ROBERT PAUL LUTTMAN, APPELLEE
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The Fourth District Court of Appeal held that a divorced man paying $1,000 monthly alimony as the sole support of his ex-wife qualifies for wage garnishment exemption under Florida law. The court rejected prior cases distinguishing divorced men from 'heads of family' by focusing on the actual obligation to support rather than marital status or residence.
A divorced man paying alimony that constitutes the sole support of his ex-wife is entitled to the wage garnishment exemption under § 222.11. The court held that the obligation to support and the dependency on the wage earner, rather than marital status or co-residence, determines whether one qualifies as a 'head of family' for exemption purposes.
[1] A divorced ex-husband who provides the sole financial support for his ex-wife is entitled to the exemption of wages from garnishment under Florida Statutes § 222.11.
[2] The purpose of wage garnishment exemption statutes is to prevent debtors' families from becoming public charges.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Exemption statutes should be liberally construed in favor of the debtor. The very purpose of the statute is to preserve to the unfortunate debtor and his family a means of living without becoming a charge upon the public.”
Establishes the foundational principle guiding interpretation of wage exemption statutes
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceRobert P. Lawson, a divorced man, paid $1,000 per month in alimony that constituted the sole support of his ex-wife. Lawson's wages were subject to ga…
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LETTS, Judge.
This is an appeal from a ruling that a divorced man, who pays $1,000 a month alimony, which constitutes the sole support of his ex-wife, is entitled to the exemption of wages from garnishment under § 222.11 Fla.Stat. (1975). We affirm.
The appellant refers to several cases holding that a divorced man, with no minor children to support, is not the “head of a family.” Anderson v. Anderson, 44 So. 2d 652 (Fla.1950); In Re: Estate of Deem, 297 So. 2d 611 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974); In Re: Estate of Van Meter, 214 So. 2d 639 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1968), affirmed 231 So. 2d 524 (Fla.1970); and Jordan v. Jordan, 100 Fla. 1586, 132 So. 466 (1931). However, all of these cases can be factually distinguished from the one at bar. Thus in Anderson the ex-husband was seeking to establish homestead exemption on his real estate against a claim for support by his minor children. Likewise in Deem and Van Meter the opinions were interpretating the homestead status of real estate owned by deceased ex-husbands relative to the inheritance thereof. Finally in Jordan the court was considering whether a separated husband whose children no longer lived in his home, could continue to be classed as the head of the family and be thus restricted as to alienation of his residential real estate.
None of the foregoing cases concern themselves with the garnishment of an ex-husband’s wages when he provides the sole support for his ex-wife and we are of the opinion that for this purpose he should come within the purview of § 222.11 Fla. Stat. (1975). In so holding, we recognize a recent case from the Second District which, by inference, might be construed to suggest a contrary result. See Busot v. Busot, 354 So. 2d 1255 (Fla. 2nd DCA, filed February 10, 1978). Nonetheless, we choose to look to the obvious purpose of § 222.11 which is to prevent the families of debtors from becoming public charges. As was said in Elvine v. Public Finance Co., 196 So. 2d 25 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1967),
Exemption statutes should be liberally construed in favor of the debtor. The very purpose of the statute is to preserve to the unfortunate debtor and his family a means of living without becoming a charge upon the public. See Patten Package Co. v. Houser, 102 Fla. 603, 136 So. 353 (1931); Farland Loan & Savings Co. v. Pittman, 108 Fla. 442, 146 So. 554 (1933); Slatcoff v. Dezen, Fla.1954, 76 So. 2d 792. To us it makes little difference whether the wage earner is residing in the same house with a wife and/or family or whether he is living elsewhere in a divorced status. Rather it is the obligation to support that family, and their dependency on him, that should control, not the aggregation of all the parties under one roof, in a state of connubial bliss. See Lena v. Clinkenbeard, 172 Okl. 6, 44 P. 2d 2 (1935). For the purpose of support, under the facts of this case, the ex-husband is still, by the divorce court’s command, the principal breadwinner, and as such is very much the financial head of a family.
AFFIRMED.
CROSS, J., concurring.
MOORE, J., dissenting, with opinion.
MOORE, Judge,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. In my opinion there can be no head of a family when there is no family. If Section 222.11, Florida Statutes (1977) is to be expanded to provide an exemption for those divorced husbands who are required to support their former wives then I believe this to be the prerogative of the Legislature. I would reverse.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Killian v. Lawson, 387 So. 2d 960 (Fla. 1980)…at respondent is entitled to the exemption provided by section 222.11. Affirmed. SUNDBERG, C. J., and ADKINS, OVER-TON, ENGLAND and McDONALD, JJ., concur. ALDERMAN, J., dissents with an opinion, with which BOYD, J., concurs. . Killian v. Lawson, 362 So. 2d 1007 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978). . § 222.11 provides as follows: 222.11 Exemption of wages from garnishment.-No writ of attachment or garnishment or other process shall issue from any of the courts of this state to attach or delay the payment of any money or…
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Dena J. Ulisano v. Ulisano, 154 So. 3d 507 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015)…ction from garnishment in writing. § 222.11(2)(a)-(b), Fla. Stat. (2013). Since the exemption’s purpose “is to prevent the families of debtors from becoming public charges,” it should be liberally construed in favor of the debtor. Killian v. Lawson, 362 So. 2d 1007, 1007 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978). A debtor claiming the head of family exemption has the burden of proving entitlement to this statutory exemption. See Brock v. Westport Recovery Co., 832 So. 2d 209, 211 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002). The court looks at the totality…
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Maki v. Multibank 2009-1 RES ADC Venture, LLC, 310 So. 3d 1056 (Fla. 2d DCA 2020)…tute. See Ulisano, 154 So. 3d at 508 (stating that "the exemption's purpose 'is to prevent the families of debtors from becoming public charges' " and noting that "it should be liberally construed in favor of the debtor" (quoting Killian v. Lawson, 362 So. 2d 1007, 1007 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978))). For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the order overruling the Makis' objection. We remand for the circuit court to amend the final judgment to permit Multibank to garnish only 25% of the portion of Gregory Maki's dispo…
Authorities Cited (13 total)
- Anderson v. Anderson, 44 So.2d 652 (Fla. 1950)
- Jordan v. Jordan, 100 Fla. 1586 (Fla. 1931)
- In re Est. of Garrett Edwin van Meter v. van Meter, 214 So. 2d 639 (Fla. 2d DCA 1968)
- Morehead v. The First Nat'l Bank of Lake City, 102 Fla. 522 (Fla. 1931)
- In re the Est. of Frank C. Deem v. Shinn, 297 So. 2d 611 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974)
- Slatcoff v. Dezen, 76 So. 2d 792 (Fla. 1954)
- In re Est. of Garrett Edwin van Meter v. Garrett Oliver van Meter, 231 So. 2d 524 (Fla. 1970)
- Elvine v. Pub. Fin. Co., 196 So. 2d 25 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967)
- DeSoto Beach Improvement Co. v. Sias, 102 Fla. 603 (Fla. 1931)
- Patten Package Co. v. Houser, 102 Fla. 603 (Fla. 1931)