JOHN S. WINNIE AND ELIZABETH ANN WINNIE, HIS WIFE, AND FRANK SARVER, D/B/A CRAFTMAN BUILDERS, INC., APPELLANTS,
v.
JOHN BUCKHALTER, D/B/A BUCKHALTER HEATING AND AIR CONDITIONING, APPELLEE

Fla. 1st DCA | 1978-10-03
No. HH-498
McCORD, C. J., and MILLS, J., concur.
362 So. 2d 1014 Florida District Court of Appeal, First District (1978) Caution
Cited by 18 cases

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Synopsis

In a mechanics' lien foreclosure case with counterclaim, the trial court denied attorney's fees to both parties. The appellate court reversed, holding that the defendant who successfully resisted the lien foreclosure was the prevailing party entitled to recover reasonable attorney's fees under Section 713.29, Florida Statutes, but limited to fees incurred on the lien aspect of the case.


Holding

Winnie was entitled to recover reasonable attorney's fees as the prevailing party under Section 713.29 since he successfully resisted the mechanics' lien foreclosure action and was not found otherwise liable. However, the recovery is limited to attorney's fees for services rendered incident to the mechanics' lien aspect of the case only, not the counterclaim.


Headnotes

[1] A party who successfully defends against a mechanics' lien foreclosure action is the prevailing party entitled to attorney's fees under Section 713.29, Florida Statutes.

[2] Attorney's fees awarded under Section 713.29, Florida Statutes, are limited to services rendered incident to the mechanics' lien aspect of the case.

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Key Quotes

“In any action brought to enforce a lien under part I of this chapter, the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover a reasonable fee for the services of his attorney, to be determined by the court, which shall be taxed as a part of his costs.”

Establishes the statutory basis for attorney's fees recovery in mechanics' lien cases

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Facts & Procedural History

Buckhalter brought suit against Winnie to foreclose a mechanics' lien. Winnie answered denying compliance with the mechanics' lien law and counterclai…

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Opinion of the Court
BOYER, Judge.

BOYER, Judge.

This is an appeal from an order which denied attorney’s fees under Section 713.29, Florida Statutes (1975). Buckhalter brought suit against Winnie to foreclose a mechanics’ lien. Winnie answered denying that the mechanics’ lien law had been complied with and counterclaimed for damages alleging in part a material breach of contract. The trial court determined that neither party had established his claim by a preponderance of the evidence. Further, the trial court held that each party should be responsible for his own attorney’s fees.

Section 713.29, Florida Statutes (1975) of the mechanics’ lien law provides:

In any action brought to enforce a lien under part I of this chapter, the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover a reasonable fee for the services of his attorney, to be determined by the court, which shall be taxed as a part of his costs.

Winnie was entitled to recovery of attorney’s fees under Section 713.29 as the prevailing party since he successfully resisted the mechanics’ lien foreclosure action and was not found otherwise liable for damages in the same case. See, e. g., Charter Development Corp. v. Eversole, 342 So. 2d 143 (Fla.lst DCA 1977); Falovitch v. Gunn & Gunn Construction Co., 348 So. 2d 560 (Fla.3d DCA 1977); Mardan Kitchen Cabinets, Inc. v. Bruns, 312 So. 2d 769 (Fla.3d DCA 1975); Dominguez v. Benach, 277 So. 2d 567 (Fla.3d DCA 1973); H. D. McPherson, Inc. v. Metro Electric of Orlando, Inc., 253 So. 2d 878 (Fla.4th DCA 1971). Contrast, Emery v. International Glass & Mfg. Inc., 249 So. 2d 496 (Fla.2d DCA 1971). However, Winnie is only entitled to attorney’s fees for the services rendered incident to the mechanics’ lien aspect of the case. Kinard Enterprises, Inc. v. Johnson, 308 So. 2d 593 (Fla.lst DCA 1975); Planas & Franye Engineers, Inc. v. Padilla, 310 So. 2d 354 (Fla.3d DCA 1975); Jackson v. Hatch, 288 So. 2d 564 (Fla.2d DCA 1974).

Accordingly, that portion of the final judgment denying Winnie attorney’s fees is reversed and the cause is remanded for a determination by the trial court of a reasonable fee for Winnie’s attorney’s services incident to the mechanics’ lien aspect of the case.

McCORD, C. J., and MILLS, J., concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Ferrell v. Ashmore, 507 So. 2d 691 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987)
    …, we do not see why the result should be any different under the circumstances of the instant case, i.e., where the owner’s counterclaim effectively defeats enforcement of the contractor’s otherwise valid lien. We believe that Winnie v. Buckhalter, 362 So. 2d 1014 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978) and Snaidman v. Harrell, 432 So. 2d 809 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983), relied upon by appellant, are materially distinguishable from the instant case. Both cases involved situations where the contractor brought a mechanic’s lien foreclosur…
  • Robert W. Snaidman and wife v. Harrell, 432 So. 2d 809 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983)
    …entitled to recover a reasonable attorney’s fee for “services rendered incident to the mechanic’s lien aspect of the case” even though judgment was entered against them on their breach of contract action against the contractor. Winnie v. Buckhalter, 362 So. 2d 1014, 1015 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978). Neither the circuit court’s order nor the appellate briefs filed by the parties rely on the change in statutory language. They do not cite Winnie v. Buckhalter, supra, and do not contend that the 1977 amendment effectivel…
  • T.A.S. Heavy Equip., Inc. v. Delint, Inc., 532 So. 2d 23 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988)
    …he trial court should determine and award to Delint a reasonable attorney’s fee as the prevailing party for the successful defense of T.A.S.’s complaint to foreclose a mechanic’s lien under chapter 713, Florida Statutes (1987). Winnie v. Buckhalter, 362 So. 2d 1014 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978). We also award Delint an attorney’s fee for the defense of that aspect of this appeal and remand for determination of the amount by the trial court. AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART. WALDEN and GUNTHER, JJ., concur.…

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