CATHERINE R. CURRAN, APPELLANT,
v.
CHARLES C. CURRAN, APPELLEE
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A Florida appellate court reversed a judgment dissolving a marriage, holding that the trial court lacked jurisdiction because the husband failed to satisfy Florida's residency requirement under Section 61.021. The husband's brief stay in Florida in 1961-1962 with an intention to retire there later was insufficient to establish the actual presence and present intent required by law.
The court held that the trial court lacked jurisdiction because the appellee failed to satisfy the residency requirement. A brief stay in Florida with the intent to retire there in the future is insufficient; the statute requires actual presence in Florida coupled with an intention at that time to make Florida one's residence.
[1] A party seeking dissolution of marriage must reside in the state for the statutory period before filing the petition.
[2] Mere physical presence in a state for a short duration, coupled with a future intent to establish residency, is insufficient to satisfy statutory residency requirements f…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“It is not sufficient to stay in Florida for a short period of time with the intent to come back later and become a permanent resident.”
Establishes that future intent to reside in Florida, without present residency, fails to satisfy the statute.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellee, a U.S. Air Force serviceman stationed in Korea, filed for dissolution of marriage in September 1975 while a civilian resident in Korea. He c…
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DAUKSCH, Judge.
We have on appeal a judgment dissolving a marriage. The question is one of jurisdiction and Section 61.021, Florida Statutes which requires residency.1
Appellee was a military serviceman, United States Air Force, stationed in Korea until his discharge in either March, 1975, according to his testimony at trial, or April, 1976, according to his answer to interrogatories. In September, 1975 the appellee filed suit for dissolution of his marriage to appellant. He obtained service of process upon her where she resided in Virginia and she filed her answer. Appellee alleged he was a Florida resident in his petition for dissolution of marriage. In support of this allegation he testified he came to Florida while in the service and stayed here from March or April 1961 to nearly March of 1962, “excluding TDY.” 2 He claimed his official address for residency purposes to be his first ex-wife’s Apopka, Florida address. He registered to vote in Orange County, listing that address. He testified he had last been there in 1963. His previous wife testified he had never resided at her address but they had stayed together in a trailer in Orlando.
Without setting out all of the testimony we cite in example that he was a civilian residing in Korea at the time of the trial, living with a lady who is the mother of his child; he has no Florida driver license but has a Virginia license; he entered the service from either New York or Connecticut; he files his income tax returns and does his banking in California; and he and his wife never lived together in Florida but did live together in California.
Based upon his testimony he was in Florida for less than a year in 1961—1962 and intended to retire to Florida after his discharge from the military, the trial court found jurisdiction.
We must determine the evidence to be insufficient to satisfy the requirements of the residency statute. It is not sufficient to stay in Florida for a short period of time with the intent to come back later and become a permanent resident. As was said in Campbell v. Campbell, 57 So. 2d 34 (Fla.1952) there must be an actual presence in Florida coupled with an intention at that time to make Florida his residence.
Judgment REVERSED.
DOWNEY, C. J., and ANSTEAD, J., concur. . § 61.021, Fla.Stat.: Residence required.—To obtain a dissolution of marriage the party filing the proceeding must reside 6 months in the state before filing the petition, but this does not affect any suit filed before October 1, 1957.
. Temporary duty away from his assigned station.
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Gillman v. Anne Gillman, 413 So. 2d 412 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982)…in this state for the six months next preceding the filing of the petition. Residence for purposes of dissolution of marriage means an actual presence in Florida coupled with an intention at that time to make Florida the residence. Curran v. Curran, 362 So. 2d 1042 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978). Thus, the residence requirement is not satisfied by the mere maintenance of a vacation or other temporary home in this state. Nor does the establishment of six months bona fide Florida residence forever after entitle the petitio…
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Georg Arthur Josef Maria Beaucamp v. Beaucamp, 508 So. 2d 419 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987)…ncy for that purpose means an actual presence in Florida, coupled with an intention at the time to make Florida one’s residence. Campbell v. Campbell, 57 So. 2d 34 (Fla.1952); Gillman v. Gillman, 413 So. 2d 412 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982); Curran v. Curran, 362 So. 2d 1042 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978). Residency for purposes of domicile is deemed to mean both residence and domicile. Gillman; see also McDougald v. Jenson, 596 F.Supp. 680 (N.D.Fla.1984). The general rule is that a wife’s domicile follows that of her husband. McI…
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Celisseule Nicolas v. Nicolas, 444 So. 2d 1118 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984)…tention of removing therefrom.” Fowler v. Fowler, 156 Fla. 316, 319, 22 So. 2d 817, 818 (1945); see also Kiplinger v. Kiplinger, 147 Fla. 243, 2 So. 2d 870 (1941); accord Gillman v. Gillman, 413 So. 2d 412, 413 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982); Curran v. Curran, 362 So. 2d 1042, 1043 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978); Bowers v. Bowers, 287 So. 2d 722, 724 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974), cert. discharged, 326 So. 2d 172 (Fla.1976). A person may, however, be a legal resident of Florida within the meaning of the above statute without being an Americ…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Campbell v. Campbell, 57 So. 2d 34 (Fla. 1952)