LAWRENCE SHUPNICK, APPELLANT,
v.
PERSHING AUTO LEASING, INC., APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Shupnick appeals a summary judgment in favor of Pershing Auto Leasing in a breach of contract action regarding a 1967 vehicle leasing agreement. The court reversed, finding that a release signed by Shupnick lacked consideration because the 1969 agreement that was supposed to replace the 1967 agreement was rescinded and held invalid, creating genuine issues of material fact requiring trial.
The release is not enforceable because there was a total failure of consideration. Since the 1969 agreement (which was the consideration for the release) was rescinded and held invalid, genuine issues of material fact remain regarding the alleged breach of the 1967 agreement that preclude summary judgment.
[1] A release executed in consideration of a subsequent agreement may be rescinded if there is a total failure of consideration for the release.
[2] Rescission of a subsequent agreement does not automatically revive prior agreements that were expressly released.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Even though the May, 1969 agreement was rescinded and held to be invalid (see Pershing, supra), there was a total failure of consideration for the release, justifying its rescission.”
Establishes the court's primary holding that the release lacks valid consideration and is therefore voidable because the 1969 agreement upon which it was based was invalid.
Previewing 1 of 2 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceIn 1967, Shupnick entered into an agreement with Pershing Auto Leasing for the supply of two new fully insured and serviced Cadillacs per year. In 196…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Failure Of Consideration cases and more on FLexlaw
PER CURIAM.
Lawrence Shupnick, appellant, here appeals a summary judgment entered for appellee in a breach of contract action.
In 1967, Shupnick entered into an agreement with Pershing Auto Leasing (Pershing). This agreement provided that Pershing supply Shupnick with two new fully insured and serviced Cadillacs per year for his use during the term of the agreement.
Thereafter Pershing became a wholly owned subsidiary of Pershing Industries, Inc., which entered into an agreement on May 14, 1969 with Shupnick. At that time Shupnick signed a release with respect to the 1967 agreement in consideration of Pershing Industries, Inc. entry into the transfer agreement. Nevertheless, the 1969 agreement became the subject matter of ensuing litigation and was rescinded and held to be invalid by the Circuit Court, affirmed by this Court. See Pershing Industries, Inc. v. Shupnick, 325 So. 2d 410 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976). Subsequently, Pershing, which had ceased to be a wholly owned subsidiary of Pershing Industries, Inc., failed to furnish Shupnick with the Cad-illacs pursuant to the 1967 agreement and Shupnick filed the present action for breach of this agreement. Following pretrial hearing, Shupnick moved for summary judg ment. Pershing also filed a motion for summary judgment on the ground that Shupnick had executed in its favor a release with respect to this 1967 agreement, which is the subject of this suit. The Circuit Judge entered summary judgment for Pershing and Shupnick appeals therefrom. We reverse.
Even though the May, 1969 agreement was rescinded and held to be invalid (see Pershing, supra), there was a total failure of consideration for the release, justifying its rescission. See Diesel Heat & Power v. Dixon Marine Indus. Pow. Trans., 232 F. 2d 217 (5th Cir. 1956). We therefore conclude that there remain genuine issues of material fact to be resolved with regard to the alleged breach of the 1967 agreement. See Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Centex Homes Corporation, 327 So. 2d 837 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976). Accordingly, the summary judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded to the Circuit Court for further proceedings.
Reversed and remanded.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Shupnick v. Pershing Auto Leasing, Inc., 383 So. 2d 1164 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)…erest. For the reasons cited, the $7,200 final judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded for a new trial on the issue of damages in accordance with the views expressed herein. Reversed and remanded. . Shupnick v. Pershing Auto Leasing, Inc., 363 So. 2d 198 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978). . See Pershing Industries, Inc. v. Shupnick, 325 So. 2d 410 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976).…
Authorities Cited
- Pershing Indus., Inc. v. Shupnick, 325 So. 2d 410 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976)
- Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Centex Homes Corp., 327 So. 2d 837 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976)
- Diesel Heat & Power, Inc. v. Dixon Marine Indus. Power Transmission, Inc., 232 F.2d 217 (5th Cir. 1956)