JOE ANN YODER, APPELLANT,
v.
TELLAS ODELL YODER, JR., APPELLEE
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Joe Ann Yoder appealed a trial court's order quashing service of process on her former husband, Tellas Yoder, Jr., in an action to enforce a Texas divorce decree in Florida. The court affirmed, holding that Florida's long-arm statute does not apply to actions to enforce out-of-state divorce decrees because such actions are neither dissolution of marriage actions nor independent support actions.
Jurisdiction cannot be obtained over the defendant under Florida's long-arm statute because an action to enforce a Texas divorce decree is neither an action to dissolve a marriage nor an independent action for support of dependents, the only categories covered by the relevant statute.
[1] A Florida court cannot establish a monetary decree against a non-resident defendant without their appearance, answer, or return to Florida.
[2] The Florida long-arm statute, Section 48.193(1)(e), applies only to actions to dissolve a marriage or independent actions for support of dependents.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who personally or through an agent does any of the acts enumerated in this subsection thereby submits that person and, if he is a natural person, his personal representative to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state for any cause of action arising from the doing of any of the following [...] maintains a matrimonial domicile in this state at the time of the commencement of this action or, if the defendant resided in this state preceding the commencement of the action”
The court's quotation of the applicable long-arm statute provision regarding jurisdiction in matrimonial cases
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe parties were married and lived in Florida while appellee was in military service from 1969 to 1972. A divorce was decreed in Texas. Joe Ann Yoder …
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PER CURIAM.
Joe Ann Yoder appeals from an order quashing service of process on Tellas Yoder in an action to enforce a Texas divorce decree. Appellant contends that the long arm statute permits personal service on the non-resident husband, subjecting him to the trial court’s jurisdiction. Section 48.-193(1)(e), Florida Statutes (1977). The trial court ruled that the long arm statute was inapplicable and that the court could not establish a monetary decree against the defendant without his appearing or answering or returning to Florida. We agree with the trial court and affirm.
Appellant filed suit to establish the Texas divorce decree as a Florida judgment, adjudicate the current amount of alimony arrearage due, and enforce the decree through any means available for the enforcement of a Florida judgment. The ap- pellee was personally served in Nevada pursuant to Section 48.194, Florida Statutes (1977), but he has never entered an appearance in this action. The parties lived in Florida while appellee was in the military service from 1969 to 1972. Appellant argued that these three years of residency were sufficient to satisfy the minimal contact requirements of the long arm statute. However, the statute is clearly inapplicable for another reason.
Section 48.193(l)(e) states:
48.193 Acts subjecting persons to jurisdiction of courts of state.—
(1) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who personally or through an agent does any of the acts enumerated in this subsection thereby submits that person and, if he is a natural person, his personal representative to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state for any cause of action arising from the doing of any of the following:
(e) With respect to proceedings for alimony, child support, or division of property in connection with an action to dissolve a marriage or with respect to an independent action for support of dependents, maintains a matrimonial domicile in this state at the time of the commencement of this action or, if the defendant resided in this state preceding the commencement of the action, whether cohabiting during that time or not. This paragraph does not change the residency requirements for filing an action for dissolution of marriage.
Jurisdiction cannot be obtained over appellee because the action to establish the Texas decree is neither an action to dissolve a marriage nor is it an independent action for support of dependents.
Accordingly, the order quashing service of process on appellee is AFFIRMED.
• SMITH, Acting C. J., ERVIN, J., and MASON, ERNEST E., Associate Judge, concur.
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Schroeder v. Rolf H. Schroeder, 430 So. 2d 604 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983)…), clause (2). Upon entry of that decree she is no longer a spouse, thus, no longer a dependent and hence has no right to or cause of action for support; only for alimony. The first district has previously construed this statute. In Yoder v. Yoder, 363 So. 2d 409 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978), an ex-wife residing in Florida sought to enforce a foreign alimony decree. The first district held it did not have personal jurisdiction over the ex-husband who lived outside the state. In Soule v. Rosasco-Soule, 386 So. 2d 862…
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Murphy v. Murphy (Fla. 1st DCA 2022)…ction with an action to dissolve a marriage,” or it had to be “an independent action for support of dependents.” Id. The former wife’s suit was neither of these—it instead sought clarification and enforcement of a divorce decree. See Yoder v. Yoder, 363 So. 2d 409, 409–10 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978) (holding that a suit to establish an out-of-state divorce decree as a Florida judgment, adjudicate alimony arrearages due, and enforce the decree was neither category of suit described in the provision that is now subpara…