ANSELL JEFFERIES, JR., GLORIA D. JEFFERIES AND FIRST FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION OF THE PALM BEACHES, APPELLANTS,
v.
H. RAYMOND CORWIN AND J. DENHAM CORWIN, APPELLEES
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In this vendor's lien foreclosure appeal, the Florida Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed summary judgment for the lienholders, holding that the five-year statute of limitations under Florida Statute § 95.281 applies to foreclosure actions on vendor's liens unless strong equitable factors compelling a different rule are demonstrated.
The court held that although equitable proceedings are generally governed by laches rather than strict statutes of limitation, when no strong equities favoring the party seeking equitable relief are present, courts of equity must apply the statute of limitations with the same effect and construction as it would receive at law. Here, the five-year statute of limitations applied to bar the lien foreclosure.
[1] A court of equity should apply the statute of limitations in an equity suit with the same substantial effect and construction as it would receive at law, absent strong eq…
[2] A trial court abuses its discretion by failing to apply the statute of limitations in an equitable action when no strong equities favor the plaintiff.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“While we recognize that equitable proceedings are governed by laches rather than a strict application of the statute of limitations, the facts of the cause were stipulated to and no strong equities favoring appellees are apparent from the record.”
Establishes the court's recognition of the general rule regarding equitable proceedings while identifying the key limitation when facts are stipulated and no strong equities exist.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceBertha Corwin conveyed property to Rosa McCray in 1967 by warranty deed, subject to a vendor's lien payable six months later. McCray transferred the p…
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BERANEK, Judge.
This is an appeal from an order granting summary final judgment in favor of the plaintiffs/appellees. All parties here stipulated to the facts before the trial court and submitted to a resolution of the cause by summary judgment. The cause of action involved the foreclosure by the appellees of a vendor’s lien on real property. The Jef-feries, appellants, are the current owners of the property to which the lien is attached and First Federal Savings as holder of a mortgage on the land has joined as appellant. On October 5, 1967, Bertha Corwin conveyed the subject property to one Rosa McCray by warranty deed subject to a vendor’s lien payable six months later. In 1969 Rosa McCray deeded the property to the Jefferies and in 1970 the Jefferies secured a mortgage loan on the property from First Federal Savings. In October, 1976, Bertha Corwin assigned her vendor’s lien to the appellees herein who filed a complaint to foreclose the lien on November 11, 1976. Appellants asserted at summary judgment that § 95.281 Fla.Stat. limited action on the lien to five years from its date of maturity. The appellees countered that the foreclosure was an equitable proceeding governed by the doctrine of laches and not bound by statutes of limitation. The court granted summary judgment to the appellees foreclosing the lien. We reverse.
While we recognize that equitable proceedings are governed by laches rather than a strict application of the statute of limitations, the facts of the cause were stipulated to and no strong equities favoring appellees are apparent from the record. Unless strong equities compelling application of a different rule are made to appear, a court of equity should apply the statute of limitations in an equity suit with the same substantial effect and construction as it would receive at law. Tower v. Moskowitz, 262 So. 2d 276 (Fla.3d DCA 1972). The trial court abused its discretion here in not applying the statute of limitations where no strong equities were present favoring appellees.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
DOWNEY, C. J., and DAUKSCH, J., concur.
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Citator
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Rigby v. Vernie G. Liles, 505 So. 2d 598 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987)…are made to appear, a court of equity should apply the statute of limitations in an equity suit with the same substantial effect and construction it would receive at law. H.K.L. Realty Corp. v. Kirtley, 74 So. 2d 876 (Fla.1954); Jeff enes v. Corwin, 363 So. 2d 600 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978); Tower v. Moskowitz, 262 So. 2d 276 (Fla. 3d DCA), cert, denied, 268 So. 2d 906 (Fla.1972). This principle is tempered, however, by the proposition that [ljaches, even when measured by a statutory yardstick, does not necessarily…
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Corona Props. OF Fla., Inc. v. Monroe Cnty., 485 So. 2d 1314 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986)…re to actions in law. Steketee v. Ballance Homes, Inc., 376 So. 2d 873 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979), cert. denied, 385 So. 2d 754 (Fla.1980); Shew v. Kirby, 135 So. 2d 770 (Fla. 2d DCA 1961); see Wall v. Johnson, 78 So. 2d 371 (Fla.1955); Jefferies v. Corwin, 363 So. 2d 600 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978); Tower v. Moskowitz, 262 So. 2d at 279. Laches acts as a shield to an action, therefore, it has no application to the case at bar where appellant Corona Properties is seeking to use it as a sword. For the foregoing reasons and b…
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Briggs v. The Est. OF Pauline Geelhoed, 543 So. 2d 332 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989)…both the mortgagor and the attorney who drew the note and mortgage were deceased. It has generally been held that lach-es does not come into play until the period prescribed by the applicable statute of limitations has expired. Jefferies v. Corwin, 363 So. 2d 600 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978). An exception to this rule applies when the equities of the situation demand that enforcement be barred. This occurs when an unreasonable delay results in prejudice to the rights of the party against whom enforcement of a debt or…
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- Tower v. Moskowitz, 262 So. 2d 276 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972)