JEREMY COWELL PEER, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Jeremy Peer was convicted of two counts of leaving the scene of an accident—one causing death and one causing injury—and sentenced to 12 years in prison. The appellate court reversed and vacated the conviction for leaving the scene causing injury as a double jeopardy violation and remanded for resentencing after a pre-sentence investigation (PSI) was conducted.
The court held that the two convictions violated double jeopardy because they were different degrees of the same crime with nearly identical elements, differing only in the harm caused. The court also held that Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.710(a) mandates a pre-sentence investigation before sentencing a first felony offender to more than probation.
[1] Multiple convictions for separate crimes during a single episode are impermissible when the offenses require identical elements of proof, are degrees of the same crime, o…
[2] Convictions for leaving the scene of an accident causing death and leaving the scene of an accident causing injury arising from the same incident violate double jeopardy…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Multiple convictions for separate crimes during a single episode are permissible only when each offense contains an element which the other does not.”
Establishes the legal standard for permitting multiple convictions and the exceptions that apply.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceOn April 17, 2005, Peer was involved in a motor vehicle accident resulting in the death of Colleen Martin and injury to Monty Martin. Peer was charged…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Lesser Included Offense cases and more on FLexlaw
PER CURIAM.
The appellant, Jeremy Peer, was convicted of two offenses relating to a motor vehicle accident and sentenced to 12 years in prison. We reverse and vacate the appellant’s conviction for leaving the scene of an accident causing injury, and reverse and remand for resentencing.
On April 17, 2005, the appellant was involved in an accident resulting in the death of Colleen Martin and injury to Monty Martin. He was charged with one count of leaving the scene of an accident causing death, Count I, and one count of leaving the scene of an accident causing injury, Count II. Subsequently, the trial court convicted the appellant on both charges, his first felony offense. Without ordering a pre-sentence investigation (PSI), the trial court sentenced the appellant to 12 years in prison as to Count I only.
Although the trial court sentenced the appellant only on Count I, we find that a conviction on both counts violates double jeopardy. Multiple convictions for separate crimes during a single episode are permissible only when each offense contains an element which the other does not. Multiple convictions are not authorized when (1) the offenses require identical elements of proof; (2) the offenses are degrees of the same crime; or (8) one of the offenses is a lesser-included offense of the other. See State v. Florida, 894 So. 2d 941, 945 (Fla.2005). The offenses charged in Counts I and II are different degrees of the same crime and are described almost identically except for the harm caused to the victim. See §§ 316.027(1)(a)(b), Fla. Stat. (2005); Hardy v. State, 705 So. 2d 979, 980 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998). Thus, the appellant’s convictions were unauthorized and violated double jeopardy.
The trial court also sentenced the appellant to 12 years in prison on Count I without first ordering a PSI. Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.710(a) provides that:
no sentence or sentences other than probation shall be imposed on any defendant found guilty of a first felony offense or found guilty of a felony while under the age of 18 years, until after such investigation has first been made and the recommendations of the Department of Corrections received and considered by the sentencing judge.
Rule 3.710(a) clearly mandates that the trial court first order a PSI before sentencing a first felony offender to more than probation. Because the appellant was sentenced to more than probation on his first felony conviction, rule 3.710 required the trial court to order a PSI. Thus, the trial court erred when it sentenced the appellant without first ordering a PSI.
Accordingly, we vacate the appellant’s conviction for leaving the scene of an accident causing injury, and reverse and remand to the trial court for resentencing on Count I, leaving the scene of an accident causing death, after the preparation and consideration of a PSI.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
BROWNING, C.J., VAN NORTWICK and ROBERTS, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Hernandez v. State, 137 So. 3d 542 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014)…precise holdings in Hargrave and Brunson because those decisions do not expressly or necessarily hold that rule 3.710 is inapplicable in sentencing a first-felony offender where a court retains wide ranging sentencing discretion. See Peer v. State, 983 So. 2d 34, 35 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) (“Rule 3.710(a) clearly mandates that the trial court first order a PSI before sentencing a first felony offender to more than probation.”). The plain language of the second sentence of the rule requires the PSI for a first…
-
Slinger v. State, 268 So. 3d 922 (Fla. 5th DCA 2019)
-
State v. Deontae Palinski Johnson, 307 So. 3d 853 (Fla. 2022)…he crash.” (emphasis added). But in this context, the Legislature used the word “any” to mean “each,” which only confirms the statutory focus on each individual crash victim. -7- prosecution for section 316.027 is per crash scene. See Peer v. State, 983 So. 2d 34 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008); Hardy v. State, 705 So. 2d 979 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998); Hoag v. State, 511 So. 2d 401 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987). The fountainhead of that line of authority is the Fifth District’s decision in Hoag, which interpreted an earlier version of…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State v. Florida, 894 So. 2d 941 (Fla. 2005)
- Hardy v. State, 705 So. 2d 979 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)