PALM BEACH COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT AND F.A. RICHARD & ASSOCIATES, APPELLANTS,
v.
FRANCES FERRER, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
In this workers' compensation appeal, the court reversed the Judge of Compensation Claims' denial of the Employer/Carrier's motion to tax costs, holding that the Employer/Carrier became the prevailing party when the Claimant voluntarily dismissed all her petitions for benefits, entitling it to recover reasonable costs under Florida Statute section 440.34(3).
Yes. The Employer/Carrier is the prevailing party and is entitled to recover its reasonable costs. Under the plain meaning of section 440.34(3), the prevailing party in workers' compensation proceedings is entitled to recover reasonable costs, and a defendant generally becomes the prevailing party when a plaintiff dismisses its action, regardless of whether the dismissal is with or without prejudice.
[1] A party is considered the prevailing party for the purpose of recovering costs when the opposing party voluntarily dismisses its action.
[2] The plain meaning of a statute is controlling in its interpretation.
Previewing 2 of 6 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“If any party should prevail in any proceedings before a judge of compensation claims or court, there shall be taxed against the nonprevailing party the reasonable costs of such proceedings, not to include attorney's fees.”
Establishes the statutory basis for awarding costs to the prevailing party in workers' compensation proceedings.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe Claimant filed seven petitions for workers' compensation benefits against the Employer/Carrier. One day before the scheduled final merits hearing,…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Dismissal Of Action cases and more on FLexlaw
THOMAS, J.
In this workers’ compensation appeal, Employer/Carrier (E/C) appeals the order of the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) denying its motion to tax costs. We agree with E/C that the JCC erred in denying its motion, and reverse.
As it argued below, E/C argues here that it was the prevailing party as a result of Claimant’s voluntary dismissal of all seven of her petitions for benefits one day before the scheduled final merits hearing. The JCC denied E/C’s motion, finding that Claimant had not filed any petitions for benefits after she voluntarily dismissed her petitions; therefore, E/C’s motion was premature. The JCC reasoned that there had been no adjudication on the merits of Claimant’s petitions, as Claimant was permitted to dismiss her petitions any time before the final hearing under rule 60Q-6.116(2), Florida Administrative Code (2007). Only after a second dismissal would Claimant’s claims be deemed denied, and only then would E/C be the prevailing party, thus entitled to recover its costs.
Determining whether the JCC correctly denied E/C’s motion presents an issue of statutory interpretation; therefore, we review the JCC’s ruling under the de novo standard of review. See Lakeland Reg’l Med. Ctr., Inc. v. State, Agency for Healthcare Admin., 917 So. 2d 1024, 1029 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006).
Section 440.34(3), Florida Statutes (2006), states, “If any party should prevail in any proceedings before a judge of com pensation claims or court, there shall be taxed against the nonprevailing party the reasonable costs of such proceedings, not to include attorney’s fees.”
One of the first rules of statutory construction is that the plain meaning of the statute is controlling. Jackson County Hosp. Corp. v. Aldrich, 835 So. 2d 318, 328-29 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002). Based on the plain meaning of section 440.34(3), the prevailing party is entitled to the reasonable costs it incurred in the proceedings before the JCC. Whether the dismissal was taken with or without prejudice has no bearing on this result. See Rose Printing Co., Inc. v. Wilson, 602 So. 2d 600, 603 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992).
A defendant generally becomes the prevailing party when a plaintiff dismisses its action. Thornber v. City of Fort Walton Beach, 568 So. 2d 914, 919 (Fla.1990); Stuart Plaza, Ltd. v. Atl. Coast Dev. Corp. of Martin County, 493 So. 2d 1136, 1137 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986). E/C is therefore the prevailing party here. As such, it is entitled to recover its reasonable costs, and the JCC erred in denying its motion. Accordingly, we quash the order under review, and reverse and remand with directions for the JCC to grant E/C’s motion and determine the amount of E/C’s reasonable costs.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
WOLF and ROBERTS, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (12 total)
-
Punsky v. Clay Cnty. Bd. OF Cnty. Comm'rs & Scibal Assocs., 60 So. 3d 1088 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011)…hich amount must be deducted from any compensation allowed or awarded to the employee under this chapter. To the extent the issues raised by claimant concern statutory construction, our review is de novo. See Palm Beach County Sch. Dist. v. Ferrer, 990 So. 2d 13, 14 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008). Contrary to claimant’s contention, section 440.19(6) applies only when a claimant first proceeds against an employer at law or in admiralty, and such relief is denied on the basis of workers’ compensation exclusivity/immunit…
-
Hillsborough Cnty. Sheriff's Off. & N. Am. Risk Servs. v. Roseanne Hilsman, 23 So. 3d 743 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009)…deny costs is generally reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See Morris v. Dollar Tree Store, 869 So. 2d 704, 707 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004). We review the JCC’s interpretation and application of the law de novo. See Palm Beach County Sch. Dist. v. Ferrer, 990 So. 2d 13, 14 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008). Section 440.34(3), Florida Statutes (2004), mandates that “[i]f any party should prevail in any proceeding before a [JCC], there shall be taxed against the non-prevailing party the reasonable costs of such proceedings.” A mo…
-
Jennings v. Habana Health Care Ctr. & Gallagher Bassett, 183 So. 3d 1131 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015)…retation question is de novo. See Punsky v. Clay Cty. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 60 So. 3d 1088, 1092 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) (citing Delgado v. A. Garcia Harvesting, Inc., 913 So. 2d 78, 79 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005)); see also Palm Beach Cty. Sch. Dist. v. Ferrer, 990 So. 2d 13, 14 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) (deciding whether judge of compensation claims erred in awarding costs was question of statutory construction, subject to review de novo). Section 440.34(3) provides that “the prevailing party is entitled to reasonable costs…
Previewing 3 of 12 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Thornber v. City OF Fort Walton Beach, 568 So. 2d 914 (Fla. 1990)
- Jackson Cnty. Hosp. Corp. v. Aldrich, 835 So. 2d 318 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002)
- Stuart Plaza, Ltd. v. Atl. Coast Dev. Corp. OF Martin Cnty., 493 So. 2d 1136 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986)
- Rose Printing Co., Inc. v. Wilson, 602 So. 2d 600 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)
- Lakeland Reg'l Med. Ctr., Inc. v. State, 917 So. 2d 1024 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006)