GERALD R. HART, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS ONE OF THE EXECUTORS OF THE ESTATE OF T. S. HART, DECEASED,
v.
K. J. KAPNIAS
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This case addresses whether a trial court properly granted a temporary injunction without bond in a land dispute case, and whether the court properly transferred the case from equity to law for ejectment proceedings. The Florida Supreme Court held that the chancellor had discretion to transfer the case to the law side and that a bond requirement should be imposed on the injunction.
The court held that the chancellor did not err in transferring the case to the law side for trial of title in ejectment, as this was within the chancellor's discretion. However, the court reversed the issuance of the restraining order without bond, requiring that a good and sufficient bond be posted to indemnify the defendant for costs and damages if the plaintiff does not prevail.
“it is our view that the respondent here, pursuant to an appropriate order to be entered by the Chancellor below, should be required to give a good and sufficient bond in such an amount and according to such terms or conditions as will fully indemnify the petitioner here (defendant below) for all costs and damages which he may sustain in the event respondent does not finally prevail”
Establishes the court's holding that a bond must be required when issuing an injunction in equity to protect the defendant from potential damages.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceK. J. Kapnias filed a bill of complaint alleging that Gerald R. Hart had unlawfully trespassed upon and taken possession of certain lands at Jacksonvi…
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K. J. Kapnias filed his bill of complaint in the circuit court, alleging that he was the owner of certain lands described therein located at Jacksonville Beach; that defendant Gerald R. Hart, individually and as executor of the Estate of T. S. Hart, had unlawfully trespassed upon and taken possession of said lands and had dispossed the plaintiff of them. The bill prayed for temporary and permanent injunction.
The defendant answered the bill of complaint and denied its material allegations, alleged that he owned and was in possession of said lands, and demanded a trial by jury of his right of title. On final hearing, the trial court granted a temporary injunction without bond and transferred the cause to the law side of the docket to prepare issues in ejectment to be tried by jury. This appeal is by certiorari under rule 34 of the rules of this court from that decree. An appeal was also taken, but we do not consider it material.
The gist of appellant’s contention is that the bill of complaint should be dismissed because appellant had an adequate remedy at law. It is also urged that the chancellor committed error in granting the injunction without bond.
Appellee assents to granting certiorari but insists that the trial court should be affirmed as to that part of his decree granting injunction without bond but reversed as to that part transferring the cause to the law side of the docket.
On the face of the record, the questions raised might have been adjudicated under the doctrine of Board of Public Instruction v. Boehm, 138 Fla. 548, 189 So. 663, on the theory that an agreed boundary was the question at issue. It was a matter, however, in the discretion of the chancellor, and, since he found that a dispute as to title was at issue, we must decline to reverse him.
We fail to find error in the discretionary part of the order which transferred the cause to the law side of the Court for the trial of title in an ejectment proceeding. As to the issuance of a restraining order without bond, it is our view that *848the respondent here, pursuant to an appropriate order to be entered by the Chancellor below, should be required to give a good and sufficient bond in such an amount and according to such terms or conditions as will fully indemnify the petitioner here (defendant below) for all costs and damages which he may sustain in the event respondent does not finally prevail. The order fixing the terms and conditions of the bond shall be made and entered by the Chancellor below pursuant to notice duly given to counsel of record for the parties.
In the event the respondent fails or otherwise omits to give such bond in accordance with the terms and provisions of the order as shall be entered by the Chancellor below, then and in that event, the restraining order previously entered and challenged here shall immediately stand dissolved. The petition for certiorari is therefore granted in part and denied in part.
CHAPMAN, C. J., BUFORD and SEBRING, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Crow v. James, 349 So. 2d 827 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977)…e party seeking the temporary injunction was unable to post bond. It is, therefore, clear that the entry of the temporary injunction without requiring the posting of a bond was reversible error which the appellants in no way waived. Hart v. Kapnias, 157 Fla. 846, 27 So. 2d 145 (1946); Ginsberg v. City of Daytona Beach, 103 Fla. 168,137 So. 253 (1931); La Gran Familia, Inc., v. Cuba Pharmacy, Inc., 349 So. 2d 769 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977); Leopold v. Richard Bertram & Co., 265 So. 2d 710 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972); Hoffman…
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Fla. Sportservice, Inc. v. City OF Miami, 118 So. 2d 232 (Fla. 3d DCA 1960)…e relief sought in equity did not complete the judicial labor in the trial court when jurisdiction was reserved to determine and award damages, even though the cause was transferred to the law side of the court for that purpose. See Hart v. Kapnias, 157 Fla. 846, 27 So. 2d 145; Hodges v. Logan, Fla.1955, 82 So. 2d 885; Amatrudi v. Blake, Fla.App.1960, 117 So. 2d 416. Accordingly, appeal No. 60-127 is dismissed by this court sua sponte. The su-persedeas is granted in the interlocutory appeal No. 60-126, and…
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Muss v. Rosenberg, 353 So. 2d 203 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977)…ient assets to post a bond.1 See: Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.610(b). Therefore, under a long line of authorities, the trial judge erred in refusing to dissolve the injunction. Ginsberg v. City of Daytona Beach, 103 Fla. 168, 137 So. 253 (1931); Hart v. Kapnias, 157 Fla. 846, 27 So. 2d 145 (1946); Belk’s Department Store, Miami, Inc. v. Scherman, 117 So. 2d 845 (Fla. 3d DCA 1960); Metropolitan Dade County v. Polk Pools, Inc., 124 So. 2d 737 (Fla. 3d DCA 1960); Tampa Port Authority v. Deen, 179 So. 2d 416 (Fla. 2d DCA 19…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Bd. of Pub. Instruction of Broward Cnty. v. Boehm, 138 Fla. 548 (Fla. 1939)