ROBERT TRAVIS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Travis pleaded nolo contendere to escape and appealed, arguing the trial court erroneously denied his motion for discharge under the speedy trial rule. The appellate court held that the speedy trial period commenced when Travis was recaptured, and because he was not brought to trial within one year, his conviction was reversed and he was discharged.
The court held that under Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.191(b)(1), the speedy trial period for a nonviolent felony commences when the person is taken into custody or when the charge is filed, whichever is earlier. Since Travis was taken into custody on June 8, 1977, the State had one year to bring him to trial, and his failure to be tried within that period entitled him to discharge.
[1] The speedy trial period for a prisoner charged with a nonviolent felony commences when the person is taken into custody as a result of the subject conduct or criminal epi…
[2] A defendant is entitled to discharge under the speedy trial rule if not brought to trial within the prescribed period, absent a court order granting an extension.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The period of time established by this rule shall commence when the person is taken into custody as a result of the subject conduct or criminal episode, or when the subject charge of crime is filed, whichever is earlier, . . .”
Establishes that the speedy trial period for nonviolent felonies commences at the earlier of arrest or filing of charges
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceTravis escaped from a state correctional institution on June 5, 1977, and was arrested as an escapee on June 8, 1977. An information charging escape w…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Nonviolent Felony cases and more on FLexlaw
PER CURIAM.
Travis pleaded nolo contendere to a charge of escape, reserving his right to appeal and to urge that the trial court erroneously denied his motion for discharge under the speedy trial rule, Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.191(b)(1). We hold the motion for discharge should have been granted and, accordingly, we reverse Travis’ conviction.
Travis was confined in a state correctional institution until his escape on June 5, 1977. On June 8, 1977, Travis was arrested as an escapee. An information charging escape was filed March 28, 1978. Travis filed his motion for discharge June 9, 1978 alleging he had been continuously available for trial since his arrest on June 8, 1977. At the hearing on Travis’ motion, the State argued that since the state attorney had not been aware of Travis’ recapture until shortly before the time the information was filed, the speedy trial period did not commence until the information charging escape was filed. Further, it was stipulated that the crime charged was a felony not involving violence.
Under Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.191(b)(1), a prisoner charged with a nonviolent felony is entitled to be brought to trial within one year. The rule provides “[t]he period of time established by this rule shall commence when the person is taken into custody as a result of the subject conduct or criminal episode, or when the subject charge of crime is filed, whichever is earlier, . . ..” Herein, the speedy trial period commenced June 8, 1977. Travis was recaptured on that date and the arrest report reflects a charge of escape. The State had one year from that date in which to bring Travis to trial. The State presented no evidence tending to show Travis’ nonavailability for trial. Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.191(e).
The State’s lack of knowledge concerning Travis’ recapture might have constituted an exceptional circumstance as set forth in Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.191(f).
However, there was no order of the court granting an extension of the speedy trial period.
Accordingly, an extension of time can not be presumed. Stuart v. State, 360 So. 2d 406 (Fla.1978). Since Travis was not brought to trial within one year from the date he was taken into custody as a result of the subject conduct, he was entitled to discharge under the speedy trial rule. Travis’ conviction is reversed with directions that he be discharged from the charge of escape.
BOYER, Acting C. J., and MILLS and BOOTH, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Strickland v. State, 435 So. 2d 934 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983)…ption contained in the Speedy Trial Rule covering escapees. Strickland was, therefore, required to be tried within 180 days from May 4, 1982. Since he was not, he was entitled under the Rule to discharge from the escape offense. See Travis v. State, 364 So. 2d 870 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978). The State urges as an alternative ground for denial of Strickland’s motion that he was not available when the case was called for trial on October 25, 1982. At the hearing, defense counsel vigorously contested the prosecutor’s…
-
State v. McKENZIE, 375 So. 2d 610 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979)…y trial rule, Fla.R. Crim.P. 3.191(b)(1). The trial court founded its order on the ground that the one year period specified by the rule commenced to run when appellee was recaptured on January 7, 1978. The circuit court considered Travis v. State, 364 So. 2d 870 (Fla.1st DCA 1978) as controlling. We disagree because Travis involved only a charge of escape, and our sister court properly held that the time within which trial on that charge must commence began to run when the defendant was recaptured. There is…
-
Harley v. State, 399 So. 2d 1107 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981)…h escape. There is a question as to the date of his apprehension, but even if we accept his view, speedy trial time had not run. Since appellant was a prisoner when he escaped, Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191(b)(1) applies, Travis v. State, 364 So. 2d 870, 871 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978), and trial must commence within one year from the date of his recapture or within 180 days of his demand for speedy trial. Neither period had run at the time appellant entered his plea. AFFIRMED. FRANK D. UPCHURCH and SH…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Alphonso Stuart v. State, 360 So. 2d 406 (Fla. 1978)