RICHARD STRICKLAND, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Strickland appealed the trial court's denial of his motion for discharge under Florida's Speedy Trial Rule after pleading nolo contendere to escape. The appellate court reversed, holding that the 180-day speedy trial period commenced when Strickland was arrested on May 4, 1982, not when the capias was served on July 12, and that the State's motion for continuance did not waive Strickland's speedy trial rights.
The 180-day speedy trial period commenced on May 4, 1982, when Strickland was arrested as a result of the conduct giving rise to the escape charge. The State's motion for continuance does not automatically waive speedy trial rights unless the trial court expressly extends the speedy trial period and makes findings of exceptional circumstances.
[1] The speedy trial period commences when a person is arrested as a result of the conduct or criminal episode which gave rise to the crime charged.
[2] An arrest for escape triggers the speedy trial period for the escape offense.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The time periods established by this section shall commence when such person is taken into custody as defined under (a)(4).”
Establishes that the 180-day speedy trial period begins upon custody, not upon service of capias.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceStrickland escaped from Lawtey Correctional Institution on May 4, 1982, and was arrested the same day by a Putnam County Deputy Sheriff on charges of …
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Exceptional Circumstances For Continuance cases and more on FLexlaw
NIMMONS, Judge.
Strickland entered a plea of nolo conten-dere to the offense of escape reserving the right to appeal an order denying his motion for discharge under the Speedy Trial Rule. We reverse the trial court’s denial of the motion for discharge.
Strickland escaped from the Lawtey Correctional Institution on May 4, 1982. According to an arrest report, which was completed and signed by a Putnam County Deputy Sheriff and which was received in evidence at the hearing on the motion for discharge, Strickland was arrested on May 4,1982, by the deputy on a charge of escape under Section 944.40, Florida Statutes. No evidence was offered purporting to question the accuracy of the arrest report.
An information for escape was filed on June 8, 1982, and a capias was served on July 12, 1982. On November 5, 1982, Strickland filed his motion for discharge claiming entitlement to discharge. The trial court denied the motion on the grounds that the 180-day speedy trial period did not commence to run until July 12 when the capias was executed.
Fla.R.Cr.Pr. 3.191(a)(1) provides in pertinent part:
The time periods established by this section shall commence when such person is taken into custody as defined under (a)(4).
Section (a)(4) of the Rule defines “custody”:
For purposes of this Rule, a person is taken into custody, (i) when the person is arrested as a result of the conduct or criminal episode which gave rise to the crime charged, or (ii) when the person is served with a notice to appear in lieu of physical arrest.
It is clear from the facts in this case that Strickland on May 4,1982, was “arrested as a result of the conduct or criminal episode which gave rise to the crime charged.” There is no special provision or exception contained in the Speedy Trial Rule covering escapees. Strickland was, therefore, required to be tried within 180 days from May 4, 1982. Since he was not, he was entitled under the Rule to discharge from the escape offense. See Travis v. State, 364 So. 2d 870 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).
The State urges as an alternative ground for denial of Strickland’s motion that he was not available when the case was called for trial on October 25, 1982. At the hearing, defense counsel vigorously contested the prosecutor’s representation that the Strickland case was on the court’s October 25 trial calendar and that it had to be continued because of the defendant’s unavailability on that date. The contrary recollections of defense counsel and the trial judge were borne out by the Clerk’s court calendar for October 25 showing that the Strickland case was not in fact on the calendar that day.
Finally, the State asserts that Strickland, in effect, waived his rights under the Speedy Trial Rule by reason of his offering no objection to the court’s granting the State’s motion for continuance of the trial which had been scheduled for September 13, 1982. Although a defendant’s motion for continuance has been held to constitute a waiver of the 180-day provision of the Speedy Trial Rule, e.g. Butterworth In and For Broward County v. Fluellen, 389 So. 2d 968 (Fla.1980); State v. McCrery, 429 So. 2d 739 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983), no such automatic waiver is recognized where the State moves for continuance. Here, the trial court neither specifically ordered an extension of the speedy trial period nor made any express finding that exceptional circumstances existed which would justify entry of such an order. See State v. Burris, 424 So. 2d 128 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); Brunson v. State, 422 So. 2d 956 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982).
Accordingly, we reverse and remand to the trial court for the entry of an order vacating judgment and sentence and discharging appellant.
Reversed and remanded.
ROBERT P. SMITH, Jr. and SHIVERS, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Perkins v. State, 457 So. 2d 1053 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984)…iginal opinion did not consider the effect of the booking officer’s report. This case, involving an arrest report revealing that the specific charge of escape had been filed against appellant, is similar in its facts to those in Strickland v. State, 435 So. 2d 934 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983), wherein the court held that the time for speedy trial began to run from the date the arrest report stated defendant had been arrested for escape in Putnam County, rather than the date a capias was later served on the defendant f…
-
Small v. State, 454 So. 2d 771 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984)…rt did not intend to charge the state with the defense’s June 3 motion for continuance. The rule is well settled in Florida that a defense-requested continuance takes the matter out of the operation of the speedy trial rule. See Strickland v. State, 435 So. 2d 934 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983); State v. Nieman, 433 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983); Ehn v. Smith, 426 So. 2d 570 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983); and see also State v. McCrery, 429 So. 2d 739 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983); State v. Brown, 394 So. 2d 218 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981); Butterw…
-
Little v. State, 459 So. 2d 1165 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984)…gust 29, 1981, due to no fault on his part as he was available for trial during this entire time. He should have been discharged by the trial court under Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.191(a)(1) upon proper motion filed below by the defendant. Strickland v. State, 435 So. 2d 934 (Fla. 1st DCA), pet. for review denied, 441 So. 2d 633 (Fla.1983); State v. McKenzie, 375 So. 2d 610 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979); Travis v. State, 364 So. 2d 870 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978). The state argues that the defendant was not taken into custody for purpos…
Authorities Cited
- Honorable Robert A. Butterworth v. Fluellen, 389 So. 2d 968 (Fla. 1980)
- State v. McCRERY, 429 So. 2d 739 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983)
- Brunson v. State, 422 So. 2d 956 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982)
- State v. Burris, 424 So. 2d 128 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982)
- Travis v. State, 364 So. 2d 870 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978)