TREVOR RYAN STANCLIFF, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Trevor Stancliff appeals his sentences for DUI with serious bodily injury and DUI manslaughter, arguing the trial court abused its discretion by denying his request for a downward departure from the Criminal Punishment Code sentencing range. The appellate court affirms, holding that Florida law does not grant appellate courts authority to review a trial court's discretionary decision to deny a downward departure when the imposed sentence falls within the CPC range.
The court lacks authority to review the trial court's discretionary decision to deny a downward departure when the sentence imposed falls within the CPC sentencing range. A sentence may be appealed only if it departs below the lowest permissible sentence under the CPC or as otherwise enumerated in the statute, but a trial court's discretion to deny a downward departure is not reviewable on appeal.
[1] A sentence imposed within the Criminal Punishment Code (CPC) sentencing range is not appealable on the basis that the trial court denied a request for a downward departur…
[2] Appellate courts lack the statutory authority to review a trial court's discretionary decision to deny a downward departure sentence when the imposed sentence falls withi…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“A sentence may be appealed on the basis that it departs from the Criminal Punishment Code only if the sentence is below the lowest permissible sentence or as enumerated in s. 924.06(1).”
Establishes the statutory basis for appellate review of CPC sentences
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceStancliff was convicted of driving under the influence with serious bodily injury and DUI manslaughter. The trial court imposed a sentence that fell w…
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Trevor Ryan Stancliff appeals the sentence imposed following his convictions for driving under the influence (DUI) with serious bodily injury and DUI manslaughter, see sections 316.193(3)(c) 2 and 3, Florida Statutes (2005), arguing that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his request for a downward departure from the sentencing range indicated by the Criminal Punishment Code (CPC) score-sheet. Because we lack the authority to review the sentence imposed below, we affirm.
The trial court here imposed a sentence within the CPC scoresheet sentencing range. Section 921.002(l)(h), Florida Statutes (2005), provides that “[a] sentence may be appealed on the basis that it departs from the Criminal Punishment Code only if the sentence is below the lowest permissible sentence or as enumerated in s. 924.06(1).” Under sections 924.06(l)(d) and (e), Florida Statutes (2005), a defendant is authorized to appeal an illegal sentence or a sentence imposed under section 921.0024 which exceeds the statutory maximum penalty. There is no express statutory authority under which a defendant may challenge a sentence imposed under the CPC when the sentence falls within the CPC sentencing range. The courts of Florida have consistently held that the statutory scheme does not give the appellate courts the authority to review a trial court’s decision to deny a request for a downward departure sentence. See Marshall v. State, 978 So. 2d 279 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) (explaining that the current statutory scheme does not give an appellate court the power to review a trial court’s discretionary decision to deny a downward departure); Gisi v. State, 948 So. 2d 816 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) (“[A] decision not to depart is generally not reviewable on appeal as it is discretionary with the trial court, provided only that the statutory maximum is not exceeded.”), rev. granted, 952 So. 2d 1189 (Fla.2007); Wyden v. State, 958 So. 2d 540 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007) (“We lack even the authority to consider the trial court’s failure to downward depart.”).
AFFIRMED.
KAHN and PADOVANO, JJ., concur.
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Whitmore v. State, 27 So. 3d 168 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010)…unsel). . Williamson v. Dugger, 651 So. 2d 84, 86 (Fla.1994); see also Downs v. Moore, 801 So. 2d 906, 910 (Fla.2001) (appellate counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to raise non-meritorious claims on appeal). . See Stancliff v. State, 996 So. 2d 259 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) (District Court of Appeal lacked [*174] authority to review defendant's sentence despite his contention that trial court abused its discretion by denying his request for a downward departure, where sentence was within the sentenc…
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Patrizi v. State, 31 So. 3d 229 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010)…s recognized that “[t]he courts of Florida have consistently held that the statutory scheme does not give the appellate courts the authority to review a trial court’s decision to deny a request for a downward departure sentence.” Stancliff v. State, 996 So. 2d 259, 260 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008); see also, Wyden v. State, 958 So. 2d 540 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007); Jorquera v. State, 868 So. 2d 1250 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004); Patterson v. State, 796 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001); Melton v. State, 678 So. 2d 434, 435 (Fla. 1st DCA…
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Rudd v. State, 177 So. 3d 1015 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015)…r. Rudd would be entitled to be resentenced. See Childers, 171 So. 3d at 173-74; Camacho v. State, 164 So. 3d 45, 48 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015). Although the failure of a trial court to depart downward may not ordinarily be appealed, see Stancliff v. State, 996 So. 2d 259, 259-60 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008), appellate courts have “remanded for resentencing where the defendant received a legal sentence but the trial court failed to exercise the discretion it had under the statutes.” Colletta v. State, 126 So. 3d 1090, 1091 (F…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Broom v. State, 948 So. 2d 816 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007)
- Gisi v. State, 948 So. 2d 816 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007)
- Floridians for a Level Playing Field v. Floridians Against Expanded Gambling, 952 So. 2d 1189 (Fla. 2007)
- Marshall v. State, 978 So. 2d 279 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008)
- Ienco v. Fla. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 958 So. 2d 540 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007)
- Vander Wyden v. State, 958 So. 2d 540 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007)