JAMES A. WONG AND SANDRA WONG, APPELLANTS,
v.
KARSTEN BODO VON WERSEBE, APPELLEE
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James and Sandra Wong appealed the denial of their motion to intervene in a mandamus action after a peremptory writ had already been entered expunging federal court restraining orders from Dade County public records. The Third District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's denial, holding that the motion to intervene was untimely and that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in denying it.
The court held that the Wongs' motion to intervene was untimely under the general rule that intervention cannot be granted after a final decree has been entered, and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion, as the Wongs failed to demonstrate that intervention was necessary in the interest of justice.
[1] A motion to intervene is generally untimely if filed after a final decree has been entered.
[2] A trial court's decision on a motion to intervene is reviewed for abuse of discretion.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the general rule is that it is too late to apply for intervention after a final decree has been entered”
Establishes the primary legal principle governing intervention timing
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceKarsten Bodo von Wersebe owned real property in Dade County conveyed to him by Select Builders of Florida, Inc. The Clerk of the Circuit Court had rec…
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PER CURIAM.
Appellants, James and Sandra Wong, seek review of an order denying their motion to intervene and to vacate peremptory writ of mandamus in an action to expunge from the public records copies of four restraining orders of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois.
Petitioner-appellee, Karsten Bodo von Wersebe, owned certain real property located in Dade County conveyed to him by Select Builders of Florida, Inc. The Clerk of the Circuit Court had accepted for recording copies of four orders of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois which had enjoined and restrained Select Builders and other named corporations from transferring or otherwise disposing of any assets located in the United States belonging to Select or to the other corporations. Karsten Bodo von Wersebe filed the instant petition for alternative writ of mandamus seeking to have these orders expunged from the public records of Dade County in that the orders had not been domesticated, registered or certified in Florida by any Florida court or by a United States Court having jurisdiction within Florida and, therefore, had been unlawfully recorded.
On November 4, 1977 the court entered a peremptory writ of mandamus directing the Clerk to expunge these improperly recorded orders from the public records of Dade County. Thereafter, on December 6, 1977 James and Sandra Wong, appellants herein (and plaintiffs in the Illinois District Court action), moved to intervene as parties respondent and to vacate the peremptory writ and alleged that they had caused the subject restraining orders to be recorded and, thus, were the real parties in interest as opposed to the Clerk of the Circuit Court, the named respondent. At the initial hearing on their motion, the Wongs were granted the opportunity to file any necessary pleadings to support their contention for intervention and another hearing was scheduled for December 28. Meanwhile the peremptory writ of mandamus was stayed. After hearing additional argument on December 28, the trial court found that the Wongs failed to submit any proof or justification which would require the court to vacate the writ of mandamus. Thereupon, the court entered an order denying Wongs’ motion to intervene and to vacate the peremptory writ of mandamus. The Wongs appeal therefrom.
We affirm.
Though there are cases where in the interest of justice leave to intervene has been granted after final decree, the general rule is that it is too late to apply for intervention after a final decree has been entered. Wags Transportation System v. City of Miami Beach, 88 So. 2d 751, 752 (Fla.956).
The Wongs in the case at bar moved to intervene 31 days after the court had entered the peremptory writ of mandamus and, therefore, their motion was untimely.
The trial court correctly afforded them adequate opportunity to prove that in the interest of justice they should be allowed to intervene as parties respondent. Intervention involves the exercise of the trial judge’s discretion and in absence of an abuse of that discretion, his determination will not be disturbed. Wogisch v. Tiger, 193 So. 2d 187 (Fla. 4th DCA 1966). From the record presented to this court, we find that the Wongs failed to demonstrate that the trial judge abused his discretion in denying their motion to intervene. See e. g. Leatherman v. Schwab, 98 Fla. 885, 124 So. 459 (1929) and Baskin v. State, ex rel. Tracy, 115 So. 392, 155 So. 655 (1934).
Affirmed.
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Select Builders OF Fla., Inc. v. Wong, 367 So. 2d 1089 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)…o question of fraud on the court was involved. Therefore, for the reasons above stated, the order under review be and the same is hereby affirmed. Affirmed. . See: Companion case between the appellees and a third-party plaintiff, Wong v. Wersebe, 365 So. 2d 429 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978).…
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Juanita v. Ramos, 743 So. 2d 24 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999)…ed in the [*27] complaint. Specific causation is whether second hand smoke did in fact cause the individual class members’ diseases and/or conditions. . See Union Cent. Life Ins. Co. v. Carlisle, 593 So. 2d 505, 507 (Fla.1992); Wong v. von Wersebe, 365 So. 2d 429, 430-31 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978). . See Levenson v. American Laser Corp., 438 So. 2d 179, 183 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983); Hardwicke Cos., Inc. v. Freed, 299 So. 2d 116, 118-19 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974), cert. denied, 310 So. 2d 738 (Fla.1975). . See Nixon v. Bryson, 4…
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Md. Cas. Co. v. Hanson Dredging, Inc., 393 So. 2d 595 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981)…ests of justice,” but declined “to extend it beyond the facts involved there.” Dickinson v. Segal, supra at 438. More recently the Third District Court of Appeal has applied the general rule and refused to extend the exception. Wong v. von Wersebe, 365 So. 2d 429 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1978). We are strongly inclined to the view that adherence to the rule rather than the exception will produce the best result in the great majority of cases. The record before us does not demonstrate an abuse of discretion nor is it…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Wags Transp. Sys., Inc. v. City OF Miami Beach, 88 So. 2d 751 (Fla. 1956)
- Leatherman v. Schwab, 98 Fla. 885 (Fla. 1929)
- Wogisch v. Tiger, 193 So. 2d 187 (Fla. 4th DCA 1966)