SELECT BUILDERS OF FLORIDA, INC., APPELLANT,
v.
JAMES A. WONG, SANDRA WONG AND RICHARD P. BRINKER, APPELLEES
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Select Builders sought to expunge a federal court injunction from Dade County public records to clear title to a condominium property. After obtaining an expungement order, the trial court discovered Select Builders may have perpetrated fraud on the court, vacated the order, and when Select Builders attempted a voluntary dismissal, the trial court struck the dismissal. The appellate court affirmed, holding that a trial court may prevent voluntary dismissal to protect its integrity when fraud is involved and the plaintiff has already obtained affirmative relief.
A trial court may strike a notice of voluntary dismissal and retain jurisdiction over a cause to protect its integrity when the plaintiff has obtained affirmative relief from an equity court and may have perpetrated fraud on the court. The trial court's inherent power as an equity court to prevent fraud outweighs the general right to voluntary dismissal.
[1] A plaintiff may not voluntarily dismiss an action after obtaining affirmative relief from the court.
[2] A court retains jurisdiction to prevent a fraud on the court, even after a notice of voluntary dismissal is filed.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The plaintiff had obtained the affirmative relief it sought, its actions in the cause in the trial court may have been fraudulent on the court and it certainly was within its inherent power [as an equity court] to protect its integrity.”
Establishes that a court's inherent power to protect integrity can override the right to voluntary dismissal when fraud is involved and affirmative relief has been obtained.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceSelect Builders filed suit to expunge a federal court injunction filed by the appellees (Wong and Brinker) that clouded title to Select Builders' cond…
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BARKDULL, Judge.
The question on appeal is whether the appellant had an absolute right to take a voluntary dismissal of its action, begun in the trial court.
Select Builders filed suit to expunge an Illinois Federal court injunction that was allegedly improperly filed in the Public Records of Dade County. The order stemmed from litigation between the parties in Illinois, Florida, and elsewhere. Part of the dispute between the parties involved a condominium development in Dade County, owned by Select Builders. As a result of the action of the appellees in filing the Federal court injunction, a cloud appeared on the title to the condominium development property. To remove the cloud from the property, the appellant sought to expunge the Federal injunction from the public records.
Legal skirmishes ensued between the parties, involving a procedural question regarding removal of the action to the Federal court in the Southern District of Florida. The case was never removed to the Federal court; instead, the trial court issued an order expunging the document from the public records, quieting title to the condominium property and enjoining the appel-lees from filing any like documents without domesticating them in Florida.
It later developed that the appellant may have perpetrated a fraud upon the trial court in obtaining the order expunging the document, and the trial court entered an order vacating its previous order. The appellees then moved for sanctions against the appellant, contending that it misled the court and committed certain procedural irregularities.
The trial court ordered that the appellant take immediate steps to place the parties and the real estate [the condominium development] in a status quo.
The trial court also required the appellant to deposit certain monies that it received from the sale of the property to a third party.1 At this juncture, the appellant filed its notice of voluntary dismissal, dismissing the action pursuant to Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.420. Upon the appellees’ motion to strike the voluntary dismissal, the trial court entered an order striking the appellant’s notice of voluntary dismissal and retaining jurisdiction over the cause. The appellant now takes this interlocutory appeal from that order. The trial court considered the motion for sanctions in the nature of a counterclaim and held this was a sufficient ground, pursuant to Section 1.420(a)(2) of the rule to prevent voluntary dismissal. Without reaching this point, we find the court to be correct in striking the voluntary dismissal and reinstating the matter to prevent a fraud on the court. The plaintiff had obtained the affirmative relief it sought, its actions in the cause in the trial court may have been fraudulent on the court and it certainly was within its inherent power [as an equity court] to protect its integrity. Columbus Hotel Corp. v. Hotel Management Co., 116 Fla. 464, 156 So. 893 (1934); Masilotti v. Masilotti, 158 Fla. 663, 29 So. 2d 872 (1947); Ryan v. Ryan, 277 So. 2d 266 (Fla.1973); 8 Fla.Jur., Courts, § 41. It is elementary that a trial judge may be right for the wrong reason. Choctawhatchee Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Green, 132 So. 2d 556 (Fla.1961); Saunders v. Saunders, 346 So. 2d 1057 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977); New Magnolia Baptist Church, Inc. of Branford v. Ellerker, 353 So. 2d 205 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).
We have examined the following authorities cited by the appellant and find them not to be applicable. Rich Motors, Inc. v. Loyd Cole Produce Express, Inc., 244 So. 2d 526 (Fla. 4th DCA 1970); Modular Construction, Inc. v. Owen, 270 So. 2d 753 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972); Fears v. Lunsford, 314 So. 2d 578 (Fla.1975). First, the plaintiff in the cited cases had not received affirmative relief from an equity court and, secondly, no question of fraud on the court was involved.
Therefore, for the reasons above stated, the order under review be and the same is hereby affirmed.
Affirmed.
. See: Companion case between the appellees and a third-party plaintiff, Wong v. Wersebe, 365 So. 2d 429 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978).
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Cited By (17 total)
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Pino v. The Bank OF NEW York, 121 So. 3d 23 (Fla. 2013)…dismissal rule 1.420(a) provides to litigants and concluded that none applied in this case. The “most applicable” exception to the right of voluntary dismissal, the Fourth District stated, was established in Select Builders of Florida, Inc. v. Wong, 367 So. 2d 1089 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979). Pino, 57 So. 3d at 952. In Select Builders, the trial court had granted the plaintiff relief by expunging a document from public records and quieting title to a parcel of real property. Select Builders, 367 So. 2d at 1090. After…1 / 2
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Tobkin v. State, 777 So. 2d 1160 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)…. 4th DCA 1970); see also Perez v. Winn-Dixie, 639 So. 2d 109 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994). An exception to this absolute right arises where the party taking the voluntary dismissal perpetrates a fraud on the court. See Select Builders of Fla., Inc. v. Wong, 367 So. 2d 1089 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979). Another exception involves cases where the court has assumed jurisdiction and significant child custody issues are left unresolved. See Chapnick v. Hare, 394 So. 2d 202 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981); Cooper v. Cooper, 194 So. 2d 278 (Fla.…
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Sanchez v. Sanchez, 435 So. 2d 347 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)…ainst an attorney as an exercise of the inherent power possessed by the courts. Coburn v. Domanosky, 257 Pa.Super. 474, 390 A. 2d 1335 (1978). See generally, Anderson v. State, 267 So. 2d 8, 9-10 (Fla.1972); Select Builders of Florida, Inc. v. Wong, 367 So. 2d 1089, 1091 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979); The Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Collazo, 329 So. 2d 333, 336 (Fla. 3d DCA), cert. denied, 342 So. 2d 1100 (1976); 13 Fla.Jur.2d Courts and Judges § 15 (1979). For the above reasons, we modify the award of attorney’s fee…
Previewing 3 of 17 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited (12 total)
- Columbus Hotel Corp. v. Hotel Mgmt. Co., 116 Fla. 464 (Fla. 1934)
- Fears v. Muriel Booth Lunsford & the Ins. Co. of N. Am., 314 So. 2d 578 (Fla. 1975)
- State v. Swanson, 116 Fla. 464 (Fla. 1934)
- Ryan v. Ryan, 277 So. 2d 266 (Fla. 1973)
- Masilotti v. Masilotti, 158 Fla. 663 (Fla. 1947)
- Wong v. Karsten Bodo von Wersebe, 365 So. 2d 429 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978)
- Choctawhatchee Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Green, 132 So. 2d 556 (Fla. 1961)
- Shands & Baker, Inc. v. Holmes Co., Inc., 244 So. 2d 526 (Fla. 2d DCA 1970)
- Rich Motors, Inc. v. Loyd Cole Produce Express, Inc., 244 So. 2d 526 (Fla. 4th DCA 1970)
- Smith v. State, 353 So. 2d 205 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977)