NANCY LEE KVITTEM, APPELLANT,
v.
BRADLEY M. KVITTEM, APPELLEE
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In this dissolution of marriage case, the Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's denial of permanent alimony to a wife of a 19-year marriage, finding that the wife's lack of earning capacity and the trial court's own recognition of future support needs through increased child support warranted an award of permanent alimony rather than just rehabilitative alimony.
The court held that the trial court erred in denying permanent alimony. Given the wife's current employment and lack of evidence that she would secure higher-paying employment in the future, combined with the trial court's own indication (through the increased child support provision) that the wife would need additional support after the rehabilitative alimony ceased, permanent alimony should have been awarded.
[1] Permanent alimony should be awarded when a spouse, after a long-term marriage, is unlikely to significantly increase her earning capacity.
[2] A trial court may err by awarding only rehabilitative alimony when a spouse's financial need is likely to persist beyond the rehabilitative period.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“if she needs alimony now she will need it just as much 24 months later”
Establishes the core rationale that rehabilitative alimony is inappropriate when there is no evidence of future earning capacity improvement
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe parties were married for 19 years and had two children, one still a minor. The husband is a successful orthodontist earning $56,000 in 1976. The w…
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LETTS, Judge.
This case involves the dissolution of a long-term marriage of nearly twenty years duration and two children. The trial judge awarded no permanent alimony. We reverse and remand.
The parties were married for nineteen years and had two children, one of whom is still a minor. The husband is a successful orthodontist and earned $56,000 in 1976. The wife who worked to help the husband through school, and during the period when he was first establishing his practice, is the income beneficiary of trusts controlled by her father from which she has been receiving about $10,000 a year. She currently holds a job paying approximately $9,100 a year. She is 41, able-bodied and capable of working, which she is in fact doing.
The final judgment awarded the wife $600 per month rehabilitative alimony for two years. No permanent alimony was awarded; however, at the end of the two year period the child support is to be increased by $200 per month until such time as that child reaches her majority.
We are of the opinion that this is a factual setting under which permanent alimony should have been awarded. The wife is already working and there is no evidence in the record that she is going to be capable of securing a job that pays any more than the one which she had at the time of the final hearing. Accordingly, if she needs alimony now she will need it just as much 24 months later. McCloskey v. McCloskey, 359 So. 2d 494, 497 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978). Moreover, we note in the final judgment, the judge apparently was of the opinion that the wife would need $200 more in child support, once the rehabilitative alimony ceased. To us, this would appear to indicate either that the child support is presently inadequate (which the sum awarded does not indicate) or that the judge is in effect recognizing that the wife herself will need some additional support after the rehabilitative alimony ceases.
As a consequence, we hold that the trial judge was in error and this cause is remanded in order that he may consider an award of permanent alimony although we do not seek to direct that a minimum of $600 must be awarded. We are not unaware of the wife’s uncertain income from the trusts controlled by her father which the husband suggests he (the father) may be manipulating to suit his own caprices. Nonetheless we feel that the husband’s rights in the future can be safeguarded. In the event the wife’s income increases substantially, then recourse may be had to the trial judge for a reconsideration of the alimony question. Wilson v. Wilson, 279 So. 2d 893 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978).
Under all the circumstances of this case we find the remaining points on appeal to be without merit.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
ANSTEAD and DAUKSCH, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
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Colucci v. Colucci, 392 So. 2d 577 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)…o. 2d 322 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975); Blass v. Blass, 316 So. 2d 308 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975); Lash v. Lash, 307 So. 2d 241 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975); Reback v. Reback, 296 So. 2d 541 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974), cert. denied, 312 So. 2d 737 (Fla.1975); see, Kvittem v. Kvittem, 365 So. 2d 791 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978) (no indication that existing earnings of wife would increase so as to justify termination of alimony after rehabilitation period or denial of permanent alimony); see also, Garrison v. Garrison, 380 So. 2d 473 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980)…
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Garrison v. Garrison, 380 So. 2d 473 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980)…suppose that the wife’s needs would be any different 5 years later than they were on the day of the final hearing. Accordingly, if she needs the equivalent of $100,000 now, she would also need it 5 years hence. See also, e. g., Kvittem v. Kvittem, 365 So. 2d 791 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978); West v. West, 345 So. 2d 756 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977). We acknowledge the possibility that the able trial judge was misled by our rather broad hint in the prior opinion that a combination of rehabilitative and permanent alimony “may…
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Wagner v. Wagner, 383 So. 2d 987 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980)…there is no “rehabilitation” possible nor “habilitation” to greater financial success reasonably to be anticipated. The award should have been for permanent alimony. McAllister v. McAllister, 345 So. 2d 352 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977); Kvittem v. Kvittem, 365 So. 2d 791 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978). Application of the correct legal rule is not a matter of discretion; consequently, characterizing the alimony award as rehabilitative is erroneous as a matter of law. Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197, 1980 FLW 59 (Fla. J…
Previewing 3 of 10 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Mazel & Broche, Inc. v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n OF Miami, 279 So. 2d 893 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973)
- McCLOSKEY v. McCLOSKEY, 359 So. 2d 494 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978)