CITY OF PENSACOLA, PETITIONER,
v.
BOARD OF REVIEW, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, STATE OF FLORIDA & KENNETH K. CONREY, RESPONDENTS
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The court reversed summary judgment for one appellee (Music) and affirmed for another (Bank), finding that an indemnity agreement was independent of mutual releases, but also considering the effect of those releases on Saco's claims.
The court reversed summary judgment in favor of Music, finding Saco's indemnity claim was independent of the mutual releases, but affirmed summary judgment for the Bank, holding Saco's release discharged its claim against the Bank.
Saco Development, Inc. (appellant) filed a third-party complaint against W. E. Music and First National Bank of Live Oak for indemnity regarding a con…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
PER CURIAM.
Upon a review of the record and briefs filed in this cause, we find that the petitioner has failed to demonstrate reversible error. Therefore, the petition to review the order entered by the respondent relating to unemployment compensation benefits for Kenneth K. Conrey is denied.
SMITH, Acting C. J., and ERVIN and MELVIN, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Grossman v. Honorable Gordon A. Duncan, Jr., 371 So. 2d 142 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979)…78); Cole v. Wallace, 354 So. 2d 885 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977). The judicial referee’s reply to our order to show cause states that substantial compliance with the statutory procedures secured the panel’s continuing jurisdiction, citing Thames v. Melvin, 365 So. 2d 813 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979). The Thames opinion was limited strictly to its facts. In that case we held that a written order of the judicial referee, after a pre-trial conference held within the 120-day period, setting the final hearing for a day outside th…
-
Thames v. Melvin, 370 So. 2d 439 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979)…day period, however, a pre-trial conference was held and an order was entered setting the date for hearing outside the 120 days. We treated the order as an extension order and remanded the case to the panel for further proceedings. Thames v. Melvin, 365 So. 2d 813 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979). . Section 768.44(3), Florida Statutes (1977), requires that a hearing be concluded within 10 months after the claim is filed.…
-
State ex rel. Luebell Wilson v. Smith, 369 So. 2d 658 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979)…all parties were present at the hearing of July 7, 1978, prior to the expiration of the 120-day period, and participated in the setting of the time schedule for the proceedings. Limond v. Llanio, 349 So. 2d 214 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977); Thames v. Melvin, 365 So. 2d 813 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979). Accordingly, the petition is DENIED. McCORD, C. J., and MELVIN and BOOTH, JJ., concur.…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence