STATE EX REL. LUEBELL WILSON, ETC., PETITIONER,
v.
V. Y. SMITH AND HONORABLE RICHARD O. WATSON, RESPONDENTS
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A medical mediation panel extension of time was challenged because the written order memorializing the extension was entered after the 120-day statutory deadline, though the motion and oral grant occurred within that period. The court held that Florida law does not require the written order to be entered within 120 days, only that the motion be made and decided within that timeframe.
The extension was properly granted and the jurisdiction of the medical mediation panel has not terminated. Florida Statute section 768.44 and Medical Mediation Rule 20.160(e) do not require that a written order of extension be entered within the 120-day period; it is sufficient that the motion be made and decided within that time.
[1] A medical mediation panel's jurisdiction does not terminate if a motion for an extension of time to hold the final hearing is made within the statutory 120-day period, ev…
[2] Statutory and rule requirements for medical mediation proceedings do not mandate that a court's order granting an extension of time must be reduced to writing within the…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Neither Florida Statute section 768.44 nor Rule 20.160(e), Medical Mediation Rules, require that the court enter a written order within that time period.”
Establishes that written orders need not be entered within the statutory 120-day deadline for a time extension to be valid.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceA medical mediation claim was filed and a motion to extend the final hearing deadline was made and orally granted at a hearing on July 7, 1978, which …
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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PER CURIAM.
This cause is before us on an order to show cause in a medical mediation proceeding. The question presented is whether an extension of time for holding the final hearing, moved for and granted within the 120 days of filing the claim, was invalid because not reduced to writing by the court until after the 120-day period had expired. The trial court’s order on motion to terminate is in pertinent part as follows:
“ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Notice/Motion of the Claimant to Terminate Jurisdiction is denied and the time period within which the Mediation Panel herein may hear the claim herein on the merits is in writing extended to six months period nunc pro tunc, which latter Order evidences in writing the Court’s oral Order and intention to extend the time given at the hearing on July 7, 1978.”
After argument and on consideration of the briefs and record before us, we hold that the extension was properly granted and that jurisdiction of the medical mediation panel has not terminated. The motion for extension was made within the 120-day period. Neither Florida Statute section 768.44 nor Rule 20.160(e), Medical Mediation Rules, require that the court enter a written order within that time period. No prejudice to any party is claimed by virtue of the court’s entry of the order of extension after the expiration of the 120-day period. Counsel for all parties were present at the hearing of July 7, 1978, prior to the expiration of the 120-day period, and participated in the setting of the time schedule for the proceedings. Limond v. Llanio, 349 So. 2d 214 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977); Thames v. Melvin, 365 So. 2d 813 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979).
Accordingly, the petition is DENIED.
McCORD, C. J., and MELVIN and BOOTH, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
State ex rel. Richard L. McCLURE v. The Honorable William Clayton Johnson, 376 So. 2d 43 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979)…tson Clinic Foundation, Inc., 360 So. 2d 12 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1978); Johnson v. Crawford, 361 So. 2d 741 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978). . Thames v. Melvin, 365 So. 2d 813 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979); Limond v. Llanio, 349 So. 2d 214 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1977); Wilson v. Smith, 369 So. 2d 658, 3rd DCA 1979.…
Authorities Cited
- Dr. Richard v. Limond, 349 So. 2d 214 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977)
- City OF Pensacola v. Bd. OF Review, 365 So. 2d 813 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979)
- Thames v. Melvin, 365 So. 2d 813 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979)