JOHNSON CASON AND CHRISTINE CASON, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS MAN AND WIFE, APPELLANTS,
v.
EUGENE SMITH AND INDUSTRIAL FIRE & CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, APPELLEES
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Johnson and Christine Cason appealed a jury verdict finding they failed to meet Florida's no-fault insurance threshold by establishing permanent injury or $1,000 in medical expenses. The court vacated and remanded because the trial judge improperly prevented plaintiffs from establishing whether medical bills had been paid, which would have allowed their admission under Garrett v. Morris Kirschman & Co., Inc.
The court vacated the judgment and remanded the case, directing the trial court to determine whether the medical bills in question had been paid as of the trial date. If paid, a new trial must be ordered; if not paid, judgment should be reentered for the defendants.
[1] Expert testimony is not necessary to justify the admission of medical bills when those bills have been paid.
[2] A party's failure to make a proffer demonstrating that proposed evidence was improperly excluded generally prevents appellate consideration of the exclusion.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The Garrett case does hold that expert testimony to this effect is not necessary to justify the admission of the bills, when, as in Garrett, they have been paid.”
Establishes the legal standard under Garrett v. Morris Kirschman that paid medical bills may be admitted without expert testimony as to reasonableness and necessity.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligencePlaintiffs Johnson and Christine Cason sought to introduce hospital and doctors' bills at trial as evidence of reasonable medical expenses under Flori…
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SCHWARTZ, Judge.
The plaintiffs appeal from a judgment entered for the defendants after the jury returned a verdict which revealed that it had found that the plaintiffs had failed to meet the then-applicable no-fault threshold of establishing permanent injury or $1,000.00 in reasonable medical expenses. They claim reversible error, on the authority of Garrett v. Morris Kirschman & Co., Inc., 336 So. 2d 566, 571 (Fla.1976), in the trial judge’s refusal to permit the introduction of various hospital and doctors’ bills on the basis of the plaintiffs’ testimony alone and without that of the treating physician that the expenses incurred were reasonable and necessary. The Garrett case does hold that expert testimony to this effect is not necessary to justify the admission of the bills, when, as in Garrett, they have been paid. See cases collected in Annot., Necessity and Sufficiency of Evidence as to Reasonableness of Medical Expenses, 12 A.L. R.3rd 1347, 1376-1384.
At the trial below, however, the plaintiffs’ counsel did not proffer that the bills in question had in fact been paid. Ordinarily, such a failure to make a proffer which would demonstrate that the proposed evidence was improperly excluded would prevent appellate consideration or acceptance of the point. E.g., Stager v. Florida East Coast R. Co., 163 So. 2d 15, 17 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1964), cert. disch., 174 So. 2d 540 (Fla.1965). In this case, however, this requirement cannot obtain because the record shows, for reasons that need not be detailed, that the trial judge effectively interfered with the plaintiffs’ ability to complete any proffer they wished to make. See Musachia v. Terry, 140 So. 2d 605, 607-608 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1962); Jones v. Clark, 418 P. 2d 792, 799 (Wyo.1966); Hepp v. Hepp, 420 P. 2d 118 (Wyo.1966).
Nevertheless, on this record, we simply cannot tell whether the bills had been paid, in which case the plaintiffs would be entitled to a new trial, or had not, in which case they would not be so entitled. Under these circumstances, we deem it appropriate to vacate the judgment and to remand the cause to the trial court, with directions to determine whether the bills in question had been paid as of the date of the trial, August 24, 1977. See In re Estate of Vallish, 431 Pa. 88, 244 A. 2d 745 (1968). If the court so finds, it is directed to order a new trial; if the court finds otherwise, judgment is to be reentered for the defendants.
Vacated and remanded with directions.
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Thunderbird Drive-In Theatre, Inc. v. Reed, 571 So. 2d 1341 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990)…it prevents a determination of the propriety of the trial court’s ruling by the reviewing court and is prejudicial to the party making the proffer and generally is reversible error. Davis v. Pfund, 479 So. 2d 230 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985); Cason v. Smith, 365 So. 2d 1042 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978); Musachia v. Terry, 140 So. 2d 605 (Fla. 3d DCA 1962). While there may be situations where the preclusion would constitute harmless error, this is certainly not one of them. The question of Reed’s contribution to the cause of his…
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McD. v. State, 422 So. 2d 336 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)…in agreement with those decisions, under the facts of the present case, we find no error. It is axiomatic that failure to proffer what the excluded evidence would have revealed precludes appellate consideration of the alleged error. Cason v. Smith, 365 So. 2d 1042 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978); Seaboard Air Line Railroad Co. v. Ellis, 143 So. 2d 550 (Fla. 3d DCA 1962). The Florida Evidence Code, Section 90.104, Florida Statutes (1979) provides: (1) A court may predicate error, set aside or reverse a judgment, or grant…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Garrett v. Morris Kirschman & Co., Inc., 336 So. 2d 566 (Fla. 1976)
- Musachia v. Terry, 140 So. 2d 605 (Fla. 3d DCA 1962)
- Stager v. Fla. E. Coast Ry. Co., 163 So. 2d 15 (Fla. 3d DCA 1964)
- Stager v. Fla. E. Coast Ry. Co., 174 So. 2d 540 (Fla. 1965)