STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
JONATHAN CHESTER HUGGINS, APPELLEE
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The State appealed the dismissal of a criminal information against Huggins based on the trial court's finding that the State's response lacked sufficient specificity. The appellate court reversed, holding that the State's specific denial of material facts under oath was sufficient under Florida criminal procedure rules, and that the motion to dismiss itself failed to comply with procedural requirements.
The court reversed the dismissal order, holding that the State's specific denial under oath of material facts was sufficient to withstand the motion to dismiss under Rule 3.190(d). The court also found the motion to dismiss failed to comply with Rule 3.190(c)(4) because it was not sworn, did not allege undisputed facts, and did not demonstrate that undisputed facts failed to establish a prima facie case.
[1] A motion to dismiss an information under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.190(c)(4) must be sworn to by the defendant, allege that the material facts are undisputed,…
[2] A motion to dismiss an information is properly denied if the State's traverse, under oath, specifically denies the material facts alleged in the motion.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“a motion to dismiss shall be denied if the State's traverse with specificity denies under oath the material facts alleged in the motion”
Establishes the standard under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.190(d) for denying a motion to dismiss
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe State filed an information against Huggins. Huggins filed a motion to dismiss the information claiming the State's traverse (response) was not suf…
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MILLS, Judge.
The State appeals from an order granting Huggins’ motion to dismiss its information on the ground that the State did not respond with sufficient specificity. The State contends the trial court erred. We agree and reverse.
Although the State's traverse is not a model pleading; although there is no authority for the allegation, “has no knowledge”; nevertheless, the State did specifically deny under oath the material facts alleged in the unsworn motion to dismiss. Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.190(d) provides that a motion to dismiss shall be denied if the State’s traverse with specificity denies under oath the material facts alleged in the motion.
However, the Court’s order dismissing the information is based on the State’s failure to respond with sufficient specificity. Apparently the court was of the opinion that the State was required to disclose in its traverse the ultimate facts upon which it would rely at trial in order to withstand the motion to dismiss filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.190(c)(4). This is contrary to our holding in Ellis v. State, 346 So. 2d 1044 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977). We stated in Ellis that a proceeding pursuant to Rule 3.190 “is designed to create neither a trial by affidavit nor a dry run of a trial on the merits, nor is it supposed to serve as a ‘fishing expedition.’ ” As the Court stated in State v. Wood, 299 So. 2d 111 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974), if a material fact in the motion is traversed by the State the information should not be dismissed. The trial court could have and should have denied Huggins’ motion to dismiss for its failure to comply with Rule 3.190(c)(4). The motion was not sworn to by Huggins, did not allege that the material facts of the case were undisputed and did not demonstrate that undisputed facts failed to establish a prima facie case. We stated in Ellis v. State, supra:
“Initially, the defendant in his sworn motion must allege that the material facts of the case are undisputed, describe what the undisputed material facts are, and demonstrate that the undisputed facts fail to establish a prima facie case . . . Obviously, if the undisputed facts as alleged in the motion to dismiss do not meet such burden then any response from the State would be superfluous, and the motion may be summarily denied.”
The order appealed is reversed and this case is remanded to the trial court for trial.
McCORD, C. J., and MELVIN, J., concur.
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Citator
Cited By (15 total)
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State v. Upton, 392 So. 2d 1013 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981)…s Law Dictionary, 5th Ed. (1979). This requires that the declarant state on oath that the fact alleged is true, to his knowledge, not that he believes it to be true because someone else has told him that it is. As the court said in State v. Huggins, 368 So. 2d 119 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979): The trial court could have and should have denied Huggins’ motion to dismiss for its failure to comply with Rule 3.190(cX4). The motion was not sworn to by Huggins.... Id. at 120. See also Ellis v. State, 346 So. 2d 1044 (Fla.…
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State v. Sedlmayer, 375 So. 2d 887 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)…of these three prerequisites is a legally insufficient motion to dismiss under Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.190(c)(4), and should be summarily denied by the trial court without regard to any traverse or demurrer which may be filed by the state. State v. Huggins, 368 So. 2d 119 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979). In the instant case, the defendant’s sworn motion to dismiss alleges at paragraphs four and six a mere legal conclusion that the false statements made by the defendant at the bond hearing and during a sworn deposition to the st…
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Styron v. State, 662 So. 2d 965 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995)…ould be specifically alleged and the motion sworn [*967] to.” Failure to swear to a “(e)(4)” motion to dismiss is fatal. E.g., State v. Crafton, 575 So. 2d 777 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991); State v. Smith, 575 So. 2d 314 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991); State v. Huggins, 368 So. 2d 119 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979). Affirmed. BOOTH, JOANOS and BENTON, JJ., concur. * We affirm on this ground even though it was not raised by either party. See Dungan v. Ford, 632 So. 2d 159, 164 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); Maddry v. State, 585 So. 2d 359, 364 (Fl…
Previewing 3 of 15 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Ellis v. State, 346 So. 2d 1044 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977)
- State v. Wood, 299 So. 2d 111 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974)