TROY EDWARD STYRON, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Troy Styron appealed the denial of a motion to dismiss the armed robbery charge, which he had joined on his codefendant's motion. The First District Court of Appeal affirmed the denial because the motion to dismiss failed to comply with Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.190(c)(4) by not being sworn to, a requirement fatal to such motions.
The circuit court's denial of the motion to dismiss was proper because the motion did not comply with Rule 3.190(c)(4), which explicitly requires that the facts on which the motion is based be specifically alleged and the motion be sworn to. Failure to swear to a 3.190(c)(4) motion to dismiss is fatal.
[1] A motion to dismiss under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.190(c)(4) must be sworn to.
[2] Failure to swear to a motion to dismiss under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.190(c)(4) is fatal to the motion.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“there are no material disputed facts and the undisputed facts do not establish a prima facie case of guilt against the defendant.”
The court's statement of the legal standard governing Rule 3.190(c)(4) motions to dismiss
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceStyron was charged with attempted murder and armed robbery. He joined a codefendant's motion to dismiss the armed robbery count. Neither the motion to…
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PER CURIAM.
Charged with attempted murder and armed robbery, Troy Edward Styron joined a codefendant’s motion to dismiss the armed robbery count. After a hearing, the circuit court denied the motion. Styron then entered a nolo contendere plea to aggravated battery and armed robbery, specifically reserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss. Because the motion to dismiss did not comply with the requirements of Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.190(c)(4), we affirm the circuit court’s denial of the motion.*
Neither the motion to dismiss nor appellant’s notice of joinder was sworn to. While citing only Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.190(b), the motion is of the type authorized by Rule 3.190(c)(4), which directs that a motion to dismiss should be granted where:
[tjhere are no material disputed facts and the undisputed facts do not establish a prima facie case of guilt against the defendant.
This court has previously discussed the nature and purpose of a 3.190(c)(4) proceeding which is
“to permit a pretrial determination of the law of the case where the facts are not in dispute, in a sense somewhat similar to summary judgment proceedings in civil cases (except that a dismissal under the rule is not a bar to a subsequent prosecution).”
Ellis v. State, 346 So. 2d 1044, 1045 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977), cert. denied, State v. Ellis, 352 So. 2d 175 (Fla.1977) quoting State v. Giesy, 243 So. 2d 635 (Fla. 4th DCA 1971). More recently, the Fifth District Court of Appeal has stated:
The function of a “(c)(4)” motion to dismiss is to ascertain whether or not the facts which the State relies upon to constitute the crime charged, and on which it will offer evidence to prove it, do, as a matter of law, establish a prima facie case of guilt of the accused.
State v. Upton, 392 So. 2d 1013 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981) citing State v. Davis, 243 So. 2d 587 (Fla.1971). Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.190(c)(4) explicitly requires that “[t]he facts on which such motion is based should be specifically alleged and the motion sworn to.” Failure to swear to a “(e)(4)” motion to dismiss is fatal. E.g., State v. Crafton, 575 So. 2d 777 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991); State v. Smith, 575 So. 2d 314 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991); State v. Huggins, 368 So. 2d 119 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979).
Affirmed.
BOOTH, JOANOS and BENTON, JJ., concur. *
We affirm on this ground even though it was not raised by either party. See Dungan v. Ford, 632 So. 2d 159, 164 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); Maddry v. State, 585 So. 2d 359, 364 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). We recognize that in Archie v. State, No. 94-2263, 660 So. 2d 348, 348 n. 1 (Fla. 1st DCA September 5, 1995), this court recently "declined] to affirm based on the insufficiency of the oath” on a Rule 3.190(c)(4) motion to dismiss where the issue was not raised by the state. In Archie, however, "[a]t trial, the facts as laid out in the defendant's motion were essentially shown to be true.” Id. Styron, on the other hand, did not proceed to trial and the facts of this case have never been established under oath.
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State v. Pasko, 815 So. 2d 680 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002)…prima facie case of guilt should a Rule 3.190(c)(4) ... motion to dismiss be granted.” Id. at 215-16. The purpose of a motion to dismiss is to allow a pretrial determination of the law of the case when the facts are not in dispute. Styron v. State, 662 So. 2d 965 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995). Accordingly, the standard of our review of the trial court’s order is de novo. We recognize that nudity alone does not constitute sexual conduct. See Schmitt v. State, 590 So. 2d 404, 409 (Fla.1991). However, our review here re…
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Crews v. State, 183 So. 3d 329 (Fla. 2015)…dant.” The purpose of a motion to dismiss under rule 3.190(c)(4) is to determine whether-the facts which the State has alleged and upon which it will, offer evidence show a prima facie case of guilt on the part of the defendant. See Styron v. State, 662 So. 2d 965, 966 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995). The State filed traverses to the motions to dismiss. The State’s’traverses disputed Petitioner’s claim that the undisputed facts showed that the statute of limitations had expired. The State’s traverses disputed certain fa…
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Hudson v. State, 745 So. 2d 997 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999)…State rely do not establish a prima facie case of guilt. Thus, his motions should have been brought pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.190(c)(4) and were technically deficient for failing to comply with that rule. See Styron v. State, 662 So. 2d 965 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995). At the hearing on the motions, both Mr. Hudson and the State agreed that the probable cause affidavit and attached materials set forth the essential facts the State would present at trial. The parties’ agreement as to the facts…
Previewing 3 of 9 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Ellis v. State, 346 So. 2d 1044 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977)
- State v. Upton, 392 So. 2d 1013 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981)
- State v. Davis, 243 So. 2d 587 (Fla. 1971)
- State v. Giesy, 243 So. 2d 635 (Fla. 4th DCA 1971)
- State v. Huggins, 368 So. 2d 119 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979)
- Dungan v. Ford, 632 So. 2d 159 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)
- Maddry v. State, 585 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)
- State v. Smith, 575 So. 2d 314 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991)
- Archie v. State, 660 So. 2d 348 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995)
- State v. Crafton, 575 So. 2d 777 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991)