RUTH M. MITCHELL, APPELLANT,
v.
RALPH E. MITCHELL, APPELLEE
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In a dissolution of marriage case, the court addressed whether a wife had a special equity interest in property owned as tenants by the entireties when the husband supplied all consideration from funds unrelated to the marriage. The court affirmed the trial court's decision denying the wife's claims but certified the novel application of the Ball rule to personal property to the Florida Supreme Court.
The trial court correctly found that the wife had no special equity in either the home or the certificate of deposit. The wife's contributions to joint living expenses were non-recoverable contributions to the marriage. Regarding the certificate of deposit, the husband's premarital funds without intent to gift entitled him to a special equity. The court agreed the Ball rule should apply to personalty but certified the question to the Florida Supreme Court.
[1] Contributions to general living expenses from a joint account during a marriage are considered non-recoverable contributions to the marriage, particularly when the marita…
[2] A special equity may be created in personal property when all of the consideration for the property, held as tenants by the entireties, is supplied by one spouse from a s…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the wife's contributions to the general living expenses of the parties via the joint account were simply non-recoverable contributions to the marriage”
Establishes the principle that spousal contributions to living expenses during marriage are not recoverable, supporting the trial court's denial of the wife's claim regarding the home
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe parties were married for three years with no children. Prior to marriage, the husband owned a home that became the marital home, though title rema…
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DOWNEY, Chief Judge.
The parties to this dissolution of marriage proceeding were wed but for three years and no children were born. Prior to the marriage the husband owned a home which the parties eventually occupied as the marital home. Title remained in the husband’s name alone. Prior to the marriage the husband had accumulated some money which he used during the marriage to purchase a $20,000 certificate of deposit, title to which was taken in the joint names of husband and wife.
The wife claimed she was entitled to one-half of the certificate of deposit and a special equity in the marital home because they both worked during the marriage and deposited their respective salaries into a joint account from which their living expenses were paid including the monthly mortgage payment on the home.
The trial court found from the evidence that the home was purchased by the husband with his funds prior to the marriage and the wife’s contributions to the general living expenses of the parties via the joint account were simply non-recoverable contributions to the marriage. We believe the finding is adequately supported factually by the record and legally by the rule set forth in Steinhauer v. Steinhauer, 252 So. 2d 825 (Fla. 4th DCA 1971).
With regard to the certificate of deposit the trial court found that the source of the money used to purchase the certificate of deposit came from the husband’s funds which were unconnected with the marriage and that there was no intention by the husband to make a gift to the wife. Therefore, the trial judge concluded the rule set forth in Ball v. Ball, 335 So. 2d 5 (Fla.1976), controls and the husband was entitled to a special equity therein to the extent of the wife’s one-half interest in the certificate of deposit. We agree with the trial court’s legal conclusion that, although the Supreme Court made it clear through a footnote that Ball involved only real property, there is no apparent reason why it should not apply equally to personalty. However, since the application of the Ball rule to personalty involves a question of great public interest and should be settled for the benefit of bench and bar, we certify the following question to the Supreme Court of Florida:
IS A SPECIAL EQUITY CREATED IN PERSONAL PROPERTY BY AN UN-REBUTTED SHOWING THAT ALL OF THE CONSIDERATION FOR PROPERTY HELD AS TENANTS BY THE EN-TIRETIES WAS SUPPLIED BY ONE SPOUSE FROM A SOURCE CLEARLY UNCONNECTED WITH THE MARITAL RELATIONSHIP?
The judgment appealed from is affirmed.
MOORE, J., and FARRINGTON, OTIS (Retired), Associate Judge, concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
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Gilda Amato v. Amato, 596 So. 2d 1243 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992)…1.075 had the effect of displacing Ball v. Ball, 335 So. 2d 5 (Fla.1976). Robertson makes that unarguable. And just as we could not previously distinguish Ball v. Ball on the basis of real property versus personal property, see Mitchell v. Mitchell, 368 So. 2d 628 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979), so we cannot now fairly do the same to Robertson, except as the statute specifically allows. The presumptive correctness of the trial judge’s decision now has the added interpretive weight of Robertson. AFFIRMED. DOWNEY and FA…
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Leonard v. Leonard, 389 So. 2d 256 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)…ed by a showing that “the consideration for property'held as tenants by the entireties was supplied by one spouse from a source clearly unconnected with the marital relationship,” Ball v. Ball, supra, at 7 (emphasis supplied); Mitchell v. Mitchell, 368 So. 2d 628 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979); Forehand v. Forehand, 363 So. 2d 829 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978); Merrill v. Merrill, 357 So. 2d 792 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978). But a showing that property held as tenants by the entire-ties was acquired from a source connected with the marri…1 / 3
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Hottman v. Hottman, 418 So. 2d 304 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982)…est in the property as a special equity. In making the award, the trial judge erred inasmuch as appellee’s contributions to the general living expenses of the parties were “simply non-recoverable contributions to the marriage.” Mitchell v. Mitchell, 368 So. 2d 628, 628 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979). In Ingram v. Ingram, 379 So. 2d 955 (Fla.1980), the supreme court held a district court of appeal erred in reversing a trial court’s final judgment in which the court refused to grant the husband a special equity in the ma…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Shannon v. State, 335 So. 2d 5 (Fla. 1976)
- Emil Rossodivita v. The King's Surf Ltd., 252 So. 2d 825 (Fla. 4th DCA 1971)
- Steinhauer v. Lossie S. Steinhauer, 252 So. 2d 825 (Fla. 4th DCA 1971)