DAVID HOTTMAN, APPELLANT,
v.
ANNA HOTTMAN, APPELLEE
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In a divorce case, the Florida Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed the final judgment of dissolution but reversed the trial court's award of a special equity interest in the marital residence to the ex-wife. The court held that contributions to general household expenses cannot form the basis for a special equity, though the trial court retained authority to award additional alimony if appropriate.
The trial court erred in awarding a special equity in the marital residence to appellee because contributions to general household expenses cannot form the basis for such an award. However, the trial court retains discretionary authority to award additional alimony to ensure equity between the parties.
[1] A trial court may err in awarding a special equity in a marital residence when a spouse's contributions were to general living expenses, not specifically to the acquisiti…
[2] Contributions made by a spouse to general household expenses, including mortgage payments, are generally considered non-recoverable contributions to the marriage for the…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“appellee's contributions to the general living expenses of the parties were "simply non-recoverable contributions to the marriage."”
Establishes the legal principle that household expense contributions cannot form the basis for a special equity award.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellant purchased the marital residence prior to marriage in 1967, financing it with mortgages. During the marriage, record title remained solely in…
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PER CURIAM.
Appellant seeks reversal of a final judgment of dissolution of marriage upon four points, three of which we affirm. We agree, however, with his argument that the trial court erred in awarding a special equity in the marital residence to appellee.
Appellant bought the residence prior to his marriage. In order to finance the purchase of the property, he gave a first and a second mortgage. One was satisfied before he and appellee married in 1967.
During the marriage, record title to the domicile remained in appellant’s name alone. Appellee, however, contributed her earnings and child support payments to a joint bank account from which household expenses, including the mortgage payments, were paid. The second mortgage was satisfied in 1977.
Despite the absence of evidence on the current value of the marital residence, the trial judge apportioned one-half of the principal balance of the second mortgage ($2,850.00) at the time of marriage against the purchase price of the home ($15,000.00) to award appellee a one-sixth interest in the property as a special equity. In making the award, the trial judge erred inasmuch as appellee’s contributions to the general living expenses of the parties were “simply non-recoverable contributions to the marriage.” Mitchell v. Mitchell, 368 So. 2d 628, 628 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979).
In Ingram v. Ingram, 379 So. 2d 955 (Fla.1980), the supreme court held a district court of appeal erred in reversing a trial court’s final judgment in which the court refused to grant the husband a special equity in the marital residence. The wife had entered the marriage with title to the house in her name. During the course of their eight-year marriage, the parties contributed to the house payments, although the husband made the largest financial contribution. In quashing the opinion of the appellate court with directions to remand, the supreme court wrote:
The determination of the trial judge that there was no “special equity,” as we have defined it ... was proper.... This does not mean that the trial judge was without the discretionary authority to make an alimony award to the husband if such an award was necessary to do equity between the parties.
Id. at 956 (citations omitted).
In the case under review, we reverse the decision on this point and remand the cause with directions to vacate the award of special equity. We note the trial court has the authority under Ingram to consider awarding additional alimony to appellee.
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART AND REMANDED.
BERANEK, HERSEY and GLICK-STEIN, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
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Dyson v. Dyson, 597 So. 2d 320 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)…unconnected with the marriage or of services over and above normal marital duties, but rather is more properly characterized as a contribution towards marital expenses. See Guarine v. Guarine, 525 So. 2d 1037 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988); Hottman v. Hottman, 418 So. 2d 304 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982). Her payments toward the mortgage on the property does, however, give rise to a marital interest in the property that is subject to equitable distribution. Second, the evaluation of Karen Dyson’s marital interest in the property…
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Gilda Amato v. Amato, 596 So. 2d 1243 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992)…rs.1 Florida law is clear that funds so intermingled lose their separate identity and become untraceable. Terreros v. Terreros, 531 So. 2d 1058 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988); Vandegrift v. Vandegrift, 477 So. 2d 638 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985); and Hottman v. Hottman, 418 So. 2d 304 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982). Such intermingling creates a presumption that she made a gift to her husband of an undivided one-half interest in the funds on deposit. Green v. Green, 314 So. 2d 801 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975). What this wife did with the proceeds sho…
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Vandegrift v. Vandegrift, 477 So. 2d 638 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985)…ith the a party’s salary or earnings from work during a marital relationship. See Ingram v. Ingram, 379 So. 2d 955 (Fla.1980); Duncan v. Duncan, 379 So. 2d 949 (Fla.1980); Mitchell v. Mitchell, 368 So. 2d 628 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979); Hottman v. Hottman, 418 So. 2d 304 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982); Hessinger v. Hessinger, 378 So. 2d 322 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980); Fiedler v. Fiedler, 375 So. 2d 1119 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979) cert. denied, 383 So. 2d 1193 (Fla.1980). In this case, unlike Walser v. Walser, 473 So. 2d 306 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985)…1 / 3
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Ingram v. Ingram, 379 So. 2d 955 (Fla. 1980)
- Mitchell v. Mitchell, 368 So. 2d 628 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979)