IRIS BENSON, APPELLANT,
v.
SEYMOUR BENSON, APPELLEE
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In this dissolution of marriage case involving two lawyers, the trial court modified a lump sum alimony payment agreement by extending the payment period and forgiving accrued payments. The appellate court reversed, holding that lump sum alimony cannot be modified and that any support modification can only apply prospectively.
Lump sum alimony obligations cannot be modified, even when the payor claims diminished income. Property settlement agreements incorporated in final divorce decrees are contracts that courts cannot disturb except upon proof justifying modification as between strangers. Additionally, any modification of support payments can only apply prospectively from the filing of a modification petition, not retroactively to forgive accrued payments.
[1] Lump sum alimony, as part of a property settlement agreement incorporated into a final judgment, is not subject to modification.
[2] A court cannot modify the payment schedule of lump sum alimony based on a party's claim of reduced income or inability to make the originally agreed-upon installments.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Provisions a of a separation agreement constituting a final settlement of the rights which each party has in property accumulated during their marriage are to be construed in the same manner as any other contract. Rights in property which have become fixed and vested under the provisions of such agreement should not be disturbed by the courts, except upon proof which would justify modification or cancellation of a contract between strangers.”
Establishes that property settlement agreements are contracts entitled to ordinary contract law protection and cannot be modified absent the same justification required to modify contracts between strangers.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceIris and Seymour Benson, both lawyers, entered into a property settlement agreement incorporated in their Final Judgment that required lump sum alimon…
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LETTS, Judge.
In this case, involving the dissolution of a marriage between two lawyers, the parties entered into a property settlement agreement (incorporated in the Final Judgment) calling for lump sum alimony payable in installments. Four months later, the husband claiming considerable diminution in income petitioned the court to extend the period over which to pay the balance owed, thereby reducing the amount of the remaining installments. The court so ordered. We reverse.
We commence with the basic premise that lump sum alimony cannot be modified. Zimmer v. Zimmer, 328 So. 2d 525 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976); White v. White, 338 So. 2d 883 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976); Howell v. Howell, 164 So. 2d 231 (Fla. 2d DCA 1964). However, the husband here is arguing that he is not seeking a modification of the total lump sum to be paid, but only a reduced payment schedule because he does not have the present ability to continue the originally agreed to installments. We find no Florida case which has passed on this particular set of circumstances although we would comment that the failure to make payments pursuant to a pure property settlement agreement is not the subject of contempt proceedings, Burke v. Burke, 336 So. 2d 1237 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976).
We agree with the language of Sedell v. Sedell, 100 So. 2d 639, 642 (Fla. 1st DCA 1958),
Provisions a of a separation agreement constituting a final settlement of the rights which each party has in property accumulated during their marriage are to be construed in the same manner as any other contract. Rights in property which have become fixed and vested under the provisions of such agreement should not be disturbed by the courts, except upon proof which would justify modification or cancellation of a contract between strangers. Each of the parties is justified in relying upon the property settlement provisions of a separation agreement in planning the future course of their respective lives. Rights acquired under such agreements cannot be destroyed nor withdrawn by the courts upon the mere representation of either party that further compliance with the contract would prove burdensome or inconvenient. This is particularly true when the agreement has been ratified and confirmed by the court and incorporated in a final decree of divorce, (emphasis supplied)1
The only other point with merit' concerns the actions of the trial judge in forgiving accrued periodic support. This too was error. A court can only modify support payments prospectively from the time a petition for modification is filed. Steinau v. Steinau, 343 So. 2d 631 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977).
The cross-appeal is determined to be without merit.
REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS TO ENTER AN ORDER IN ACCORDANCE HEREWITH.
DOWNEY, C. J., and MOORE, J., concur. . There is no suggestion of proof to justify cancellation of a contract in the instant case.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (12 total)
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Riley v. Riley, 509 So. 2d 1366 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987)…2d DCA 1985); Shane v. Shane, 444 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1984). . Ball v. Ball, 440 So. 2d 677 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983); Woods v. Butter, 418 So. 2d 295 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1982); Schminkey v. Schminkey, 400 So. 2d 121 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981); Benson v. Benson, 369 So. 2d 99 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979); Burke v. Burke, 336 So. 2d 1237 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976); Howell v. Howell, 207 So. 2d 507 (Fla. 2d DCA 1968); but see Cox v. Cox, 462 So. 2d 122 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985). . See Tabas v. Hudson, 175 So. 2d 224 (Fla. 3rd DCA), appeal dismi…
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Adams v. Adams, 423 So. 2d 596 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)…cannot constitutionally be deprived until and unless a motion for modification is filed and favorably acted upon. E.g., Pottinger v. Pottinger, 133 Fla. 442, 182 So. 762 (1938); Fox v. Haislett, 388 So. 2d 1261 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980); Benson v. Benson, 369 So. 2d 99 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979); Smithwick v. Smithwick, 343 So. 2d 945 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977). These decisions reflect the rather straightforward notion that one who is required by court order to make specified payments may not cavalierly ignore the judgment, and,…
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August Urbanek v. Urbanek, 484 So. 2d 595 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986)…31 So. 2d 698 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983) (Since lump sum alimony involves payment of a fixed amount, it is a vested right and, as such, is not subject to modification, even under section 61.14, Florida Statutes). As this court explained in Benson v. Benson, 369 So. 2d 99 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979): We agree with the language of Sedell v. Sedell, 100 So. 2d 639, 642 (Fla. 1st DCA 1958), Provisions a [sic] of a separation agreement constituting a final settlement of the rights which each party has in property accumulated d…
Previewing 3 of 12 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Maxine Florence Sedell (now Maxine Sedell White) v. Sedell, 100 So. 2d 639 (Fla. 1st DCA 1958)
- Howell v. Howell, 164 So. 2d 231 (Fla. 2d DCA 1964)
- Burke v. Burke, 336 So. 2d 1237 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976)
- Steinau v. Steinau, 343 So. 2d 631 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977)
- Zimmer v. Zimmer, 328 So. 2d 525 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976)
- White v. White, 338 So. 2d 883 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976)