CLIFFORD SCOTT, JR., APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Scott appeals his conviction for attempted murder in the second degree, challenging the constitutionality of Florida's mandatory minimum sentencing statute requiring three years imprisonment for possession of a firearm during the crime. The Florida Supreme Court affirms the conviction and upholds the statute as constitutional.
The mandatory minimum sentencing statute is constitutional. The court rejected all of Scott's constitutional challenges and held that legislatively-established sentences that are not facially cruel and unusual withstand constitutional scrutiny based on due process, equal protection, separation of powers, and legislative usurpation arguments.
[1] Mandatory minimum sentencing statutes are constitutional when the sentence imposed is established by the legislature and is not facially cruel and unusual.
[2] A statute requiring mandatory minimum sentencing for attempted murder in the second degree with a firearm does not violate due process, equal protection, separation of po…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“if the sentence given is one that has been established by the legislature and is not on its face cruel and unusual, the imposition thereof will be sustained as against attacks based on due process, equal protection, separation of powers and legislative usurpation arguments”
Establishes the standard for reviewing legislative sentencing schemes—courts will uphold legislatively-established sentences unless facially cruel and unusual
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceScott was convicted of attempted murder in the second degree and possessed a firearm during the commission of the crime. Under Florida Statutes Sectio…
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ADKINS, Justice.
This is an appeal from a judgment adjudicating appellant (defendant in trial court) guilty of the crime of attempted murder in the second degree. The defendant contended that the mandatory minimum sentence requirements of Florida Statutes, Section 775.087(2) were unconstitutional. The trial court ruled that the statute was constitutional. The appeal was lodged in the First District Court of Appeal and transferred to this court. We have jurisdiction. Florida Constitution, Article V, Section 3(b)(1).
The only question presented was whether this statute could constitutionally require that a person who is convicted of attempt to commit murder in the second degree and who had in his possession a firearm must be sentenced to a minimum term of imprisonment for three years and must serve such minimum sentence before being eligible for parole.
The defendant concedes that Florida courts have consistently rejected constitutional challenges to statutes which require mandatory minimum sentences to be imposed and that as a general proposition, if the sentence given is one that has been established by the legislature and is not on its face cruel and unusual, the imposition thereof will be sustained as against attacks based on due process, equal protection, separation of powers and legislative usurpation arguments. O’Donnell v. State, 326 So. 2d 4 (Fla.1975), Owens v. State, 316 So. 2d 537 (Fla.1975), Owens v. State, 300 So. 2d 70 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974), appeal dismissed, 305 So. 2d 203 (Fla.1974), and Dorminey v. State, 314 So. 2d 134 (Fla.1975).
He contends the statute does not meet constitutional muster because:
1) It does not place defendant on notice that a conviction for this crime would subject him to the penalty provisions of the statute under attack;
2) The statute is discriminatory and misleading because it excludes from the mandatory minimum sentencing those individual's who possess and use deadly weapons other than firearms or destructive devices while in the commission of criminal acts;
3) The statute unconstitutionally binds trial judges to a sentencing process which wipes out any chance for a reasoned judgment;
4) The statute unconstitutionally usurps the functions of the Parole and Probation Commission.
We reject the contentions of the defendant and hold that the statute is constitutional. See Dorminey v. State, 314 So. 2d 134 (Fla.1975), Owens v. State, 316 So. 2d 537 (Fla.1975), Sowell v. State, 342 So. 2d 969 (Fla.1977).
•The conviction of the defendant is affirmed. It is so ordered.
ENGLAND, C. J., and ADKINS, BOYD, OVERTON, SUNDBERG, HATCHETT and ALDERMAN, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (13 total)
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Woods v. State, 740 So. 2d 20 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999)…at a statute which requires the imposition of a mandatory minimum sentence if certain conditions are met does not violate the separation of powers clause by virtue of the fact that it removes sentencing discretion from the judiciary. Scott v. State, 369 So. 2d 330 (Fla.1979). Accordingly, we hold that the Prison Releasee Reoffender Punishment Act does not violate the separation of powers clause of the Florida Constitution. Unlike the United States Constitution and the constitutions of some other states, the…
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Speed v. State, 732 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999)…ry sentences violate the separation of powers have been uniformly rejected by courts in this state. See, e.g., Lightbourne v. State, 438 So. 2d [*20] 380 (Fla.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1051, 104 S.Ct. 1330, 79 L.Ed.2d 725 (1984); Scott v. State, 369 So. 2d 330 (Fla.1979); Sowell v. State, 342 So. 2d 969 (Fla.1977). Accordingly, we reject the argument that the Act is unconstitutional because it requires the trial court to impose a mandatory minimum sentence. We find no merit in the other issue raised by S…
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Bryant v. State, 386 So. 2d 237 (Fla. 1980)…48). Under Florida law, however, there is no requirement that a defendant be advised of any mandatory minimum sentence. Knowles v. State, 356 So. 2d 885 (Fla.3d DCA 1978); Gonzalez v. State, 300 So. 2d 691 (Fla.2d DCA 1974). See also Scott v. State, 369 So. 2d 330 (Fla. 1979) (upholding the constitutionality of section 775.087(2) in the face of an allegation that the statute does not put a defendant on notice that conviction would subject such defendant to that section’s provisions). The indictment charged B…
Previewing 3 of 13 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State v. McHANEY, 314 So. 2d 134 (Fla. 1975)
- Sowell v. State, 342 So. 2d 969 (Fla. 1977)
- Owens v. State, 316 So. 2d 537 (Fla. 1975)
- O'Donnell v. State, 326 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1975)
- Houston Owens v. State, 300 So. 2d 70 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974)
- Monroe v. State, 305 So. 2d 203 (Fla. 1974)