HELEN S. LENTON, APPELLANT,
v.
CHARLES T. LENTON, APPELLEE
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Helen Lenton appealed the trial court's denial of her petition to increase alimony payments after her ex-husband's actual income proved substantially higher than the financial estimates on which she had relied at divorce. The appellate court reversed, holding that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to modify alimony based on this significant change in the husband's financial circumstances.
The court held that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to increase alimony. A significant change in circumstances of one party is sufficient to justify modification of alimony, particularly where the receiving spouse's needs were not initially met. The husband's actual income being 60% greater than originally estimated constituted a material change in circumstances warranting an increase in alimony.
[1] A trial court abuses its discretion by denying a petition to increase alimony when there is ample evidence supporting the increase due to a dramatic improvement in the fo…
[2] Modification of alimony should consider the intent of the parties, their previous and present standards of living, and their previous and present earning capacities.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“A change in circumstances of only one of the parties is sufficient to justify a modification of alimony.”
Establishes the legal standard for alimony modification—a change affecting one party alone can support modification.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAt the January 1974 divorce, Mrs. Lenton agreed to $500 monthly alimony based on her ex-husband's financial affidavit projecting $41,000 annual income…
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BOARDMAN, Acting Chief Judge.
Helen Lenton appeals the trial court’s order denying her petition to increase alimony payments. She petitioned for modification because of a dramatic improvement in her former husband’s financial condition. After careful study of the record, we find that there is ample evidence to support an increase in alimony to appellant/wife, and we hold it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to deny the relief prayed for. We reverse.
The facts are not in material dispute. At the time the marriage of the parties was dissolved in January, 1974, the wife’s financial affidavit indicated that her monthly expenses, other than those connected with providing and maintaining the marital home, were approximately $1,650. However, in reliance on the husband’s financial affidavit, which indicated that he would have an income of $41,000 and had assets of $5,000, Mrs. Lenton agreed to accept $500 per month alimony, $400 per month child support for the parties two minor children, and use of the marital home which was to be insured and maintained by Dr. Lenton.
Dr. Lenton’s financial affidavit, upon which Mrs. Lenton had relied, proved to be inaccurate. In the three and one-half years between the dissolution and the time the petition for modification was filed, Dr. Len-ton earned an average of $66,000 annually, and his assets increased to $225,000.
At the hearing on the petition the trial judge found that Mrs. Lenton’s financial needs had not changed since the dissolution, and he refused to increase the $500 monthly alimony. This was error. In considering modification of alimony the trial court should consider the intent of the parties in making the original support agreement, the parties’ previous and present standards of living, and their previous and present earning capacities. Scott v. Scott, 285 So. 2d 423 (Fla. 2d DCA 1973). Here the wife agreed to accept a decrease in her standard of living at the time of dissolution because the husband apparently did not have the means to support her in the same style she had enjoyed during the marriage. However, she should not be held to this agreement when the projection of limited means is not accurate.
A change in circumstances of only one of the parties is sufficient to justify a modification of alimony. Meltzer v. Meltzer, 356 So. 2d 1263 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978); Sherman v. Sherman, 279 So. 2d 887 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973); Rogers v. Rogers, 229 So. 2d 618 (Fla. 2d DCA 1969). This rule is particularly appropriate where, as here, the needs of the spouse receiving alimony were not initially met.
The income which the husband actually earned was approximately 60% greater than the estimate relied upon by the wife. The cause is remanded with instructions that the $500 per month alimony be increased by 60% to $800 per month. The additional payments are to be commenced as of April 5, 1977, the date the petition for modification was filed. The trial court’s ruling is otherwise affirmed. AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part; and REMANDED with directions consistent with this opinion.
SCHEB and OTT, JJ., concur.
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Diane v. Bedell, 583 So. 2d 1005 (Fla. 1991)…GRIMES, Justice. We review Bedell v. Bedell, 561 So. 2d 1179 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989), because of its conflict with England v. England, 520 So. 2d 699 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988), and Lenton v. Lenton, 370 So. 2d 30 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979), cert. denied, 381 So. 2d 767 (Fla.1980). Our jurisdiction is predicated upon article V, section 3(b)(3), Florida Constitution. The parties were married in 1962. They lived with the wife’s mother while the husband attended medica…
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Powell v. Powell, 386 So. 2d 1214 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)…fied by a meaningful change in the financial circumstances of either party, relating to the needs of the spouse receiving the alimony or the ability of the other spouse to pay. E. g., Chastain v. Chastain, 73 So. 2d 66 (Fla. 1954); Lenton v. Lenton, 370 So. 2d 30 (Fla.2d DCA 1979); Meltzer v. Meltzer, 356 [*1215] So. 2d 1263 (Fla.3d DCA 1978), cert. denied, 370 So. 2d 460 (Fla.1979); Brown v. Brown, 315 So. 2d 15 (Fla.3d DCA 1975); Rogers v. Rogers, 229 So. 2d 618 (Fla.2d DCA 1969); Chord v. Chord, 209 So. 2…
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Bedell v. Bedell, 561 So. 2d 1179 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989)…such a paying spouse’s earnings substantially increase subsequent to the final judgment and the recipient spouse’s needs continue to remain unmet, it has been held that such spouse is entitled to an upward modification in alimony. Lenton v. Lenton, 370 So. 2d 30 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979), cert. denied, 381 So. 2d 767 (Fla.1980). This exception is no more than an elaboration on our oft-repeated rule that an increase in the paying spouse’s ability to pay alimony cannot, in itself, justify an upward modification in a…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Meltzer v. Meltzer, 356 So. 2d 1263 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978)
- Scott v. Scott, 285 So. 2d 423 (Fla. 2d DCA 1973)
- Sherman v. Sherman, 279 So. 2d 887 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973)
- Jolly H. Rogers v. Rogers, 229 So. 2d 618 (Fla. 2d DCA 1969)