STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
RONALD ELDREDGE PIERCE, APPELLEE
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The State appealed a discharge order granted to Pierce under Florida's speedy trial rule, arguing Pierce had waived the rule. The appellate court reversed, holding that Pierce's oral waiver during a pre-trial conference was sufficient to waive speedy trial protections and therefore Pierce was not entitled to discharge.
The court reversed, holding that: (1) the trial court had jurisdiction to entertain a motion to set aside a discharge order when the order was based on erroneous or misrepresented facts; and (2) Pierce's oral waiver of the speedy trial rule was effective, and therefore he was not entitled to discharge for failure to be tried within 180 days.
[1] A trial court has jurisdiction to entertain a motion to set aside an order granting a motion for discharge, even in the absence of a specific rule authorizing such a moti…
[2] Relief from orders resulting from fraud, collusion, deceit, mistake, or inadvertence is obtainable.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Although the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure lack a specific provision authorizing a motion to set aside an order granting a motion for discharge, it is clear that relief from orders which are the product of fraud, collusion, deceit, mistake, inadvertence, etc. is obtainable.”
Establishes the trial court's jurisdiction to reconsider discharge orders based on erroneous facts
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligencePierce was arrested for unlawful possession of a controlled substance with intent to sell on February 14, 1978. On August 18, 1978—after more than 180…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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PER CURIAM.
The State seeks review of an order discharging Pierce from prosecution because of an alleged violation of the speedy trial rule, Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.191. We reverse.
Pierce was taken into custody for unlawful possession of a controlled substance with intent to sell, Section 893.13(l)(a) 1, Florida Statutes (1977), on February 14, 1978. On August 18,1978, Pierce moved for discharge under Rule 3.191(a)(1), Fla.R.Crim.P. alleging that he had been continuously available for trial since his arrest and that more than 180 days had elapsed since he had been taken into custody as a result of the conduct giving rise to the crime charged. After a hearing on the motion wherein it was represented to the Court that there had been no continuances or delays attributable to Pierce, an order was entered granting Pierce’s motion for discharge. The next day, the State moved the Court to set aside the discharge order because at a previous hearing in the cause, Pierce had “waived” the operation of the speedy trial rule. The evidence presented at the hearing on the State’s motion revealed that the trial had originally been scheduled for the week of June 26, 1978. At the pre-trial conference held June 26, 1978, the following transpired:
The Court: Call the next case, Mr. Heeb-ner. Mr. Heebner [Assistant State Attorney]: Your Honor, the State would call Ronald Eldredge Pierce, case number 289-CC.
Mr. Chester [Defense Counsel]: Your Honor, The Defendant will move for a continuance on that.
The Court: Okay. With a waiver?
Mr. Chester: Yes, sir. The Court: Okay, get me a written motion on that.
The evidence further revealed that neither a written motion for a continuance nor a written waiver of the speedy trial rule was subsequently filed. The trial court denied the State’s Motion to Set Aside Discharge based on his determination that he was without jurisdiction to entertain such motion.
We find that the trial court had jurisdiction to entertain the State’s Motion to Set Aside Discharge. Although the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure lack a specific provision authorizing a motion to set aside an order granting a motion for discharge, it is clear that relief from orders which are the product of fraud, collusion, deceit, mistake, inadvertence, etc. is obtainable. Cf. State v. Burton, 314 So. 2d 136 (Fla.1975). Here, the trial court’s order was premised upon erroneous and misrepresented facts. The facts as revealed at the hearing on the State’s motion clearly demonstrate that the order granting Pierce’s motion for discharge was erroneous. We find that the transcript of the hearing June 26, 1978 reveals a continuance requested by Pierce and a waiver by him of the speedy trial rule. Brown v. State, 328 So. 2d 497 (Fla.3d DCA 1976). Since Pierce had waived the speedy trial provisions, he was not entitled to discharge when he had not been brought to trial within 180 days from the time he had been taken into custody as a result of the conduct giving rise to the crime charged. Accordingly, the order discharging Pierce from prosecution is reversed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings.
McCORD, C. J., and MELVIN and BOOTH, JJ., concur.
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Teresita Fernandez v. Fla. Ins. Guar. Ass'n, Inc., 383 So. 2d 974 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)…v. Parker, 136 Fla. 689, 187 So. 620 (1939); McPhail v. Jenkins, 382 So. 2d 1329 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980); Harrell v. State, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 361 So. 2d 715, 717-18 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978). Affirmed. . In Ruiz v. Fernandez, 370 So. 2d 410 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979), we affirmed this judgment over both FIGA’s appeal on the merits, and the plaintiffs cross-appeal from the $10,000 limitation of the judgment against FIGA. Because of our ruling on the merits, we do not consider whether the prior…
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Snead v. State, 415 So. 2d 887 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982)…ial court was correct. Our initial decision was based upon erroneous and misrepresented facts due to lack of a complete record which when received by us clearly shows the trial court properly denied Snead’s motion for discharge. See State v. Pierce, 370 So. 2d 410 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979). It was unnecessary that we address in our initial decision the other issues raised by Snead because we held that he should be discharged. Now it is necessary that we determine them. We affirm in each instance. Snead contends t…
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Hood v. State, 415 So. 2d 133 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982)…mistake of fact or fraud on the court; nor did it involve any matter cognizable at common law as adequate to modify a judgment. See, e.g., State v. Burton, 314 So. 2d 136 (Fla.1975); Lovett v. State, 29 Fla. 384, 11 So. 176 (1892); State v. Pierce, 370 So. 2d 410 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979). In view of our disposition on the merits, we do not consider the authority of a trial court to rehear the matter of appellant’s speedy trial discharge. . A successor trial judge cannot review, modify or reverse on the merits an…
Authorities Cited
- State v. Ollis Burton, 314 So. 2d 136 (Fla. 1975)
- J. B. v. State, 328 So. 2d 497 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976)