JACK MARTIN SEUSS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Jack Martin Seuss pleaded nolo contendere to marijuana possession after police searched his vehicle and found over 100 pounds of marijuana. The court reversed the conviction, holding that Seuss's consent to the search was not freely and voluntarily given because law enforcement coerced consent through prolonged detention and threats to obtain a warrant.
The court held that consent was not freely and voluntarily given. Under the circumstances of prolonged detention, repeated refusals, instructions that he could not leave, and representations that officers could obtain authority to search regardless, Seuss's subsequent opening of the truck did not constitute valid consent.
[1] A search conducted after a suspect is detained for over an hour and repeatedly refuses consent, while being informed they cannot leave until the search occurs, is not bas…
[2] If law enforcement has probable cause to obtain a search warrant, they should do so rather than detain a suspect for an extended period while attempting to elicit consent…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Section 570.15(l)(b), Florida Statutes (1977), provides that if the owner or driver refuses to consent to access to a vehicle and there are no exigent circumstances, the inspector must obtain a search warrant before searching the vehicle.”
Establishes the legal requirement that a warrant must be obtained when consent is refused without exigent circumstances
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceSeuss drove a pickup truck with a camper top past an agricultural inspection station without stopping. After being stopped, he repeatedly refused to o…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Voluntary Consent To Search cases and more on FLexlaw
[*1204] PER CURIAM.
Jack Martin Seuss entered a plea of nolo contendere to possession of marijuana in excess of 100 pounds, expressly reserving the right to appeal the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress.- He urges that he did not freely and voluntarily consent to the search. We agree and reverse.
The record reveals that Seuss drove a pickup truck with a camper top past an agricultural inspection station without stopping. An inspection agent pursued the vehicle, stopped it, and asked permission to look in the back of the vehicle. When Seuss stated that he did not have a key to the back, the agent instructed Seuss that he would be required to return to the inspection station and that he would not be allowed to go anywhere until agents were able to look in the back of the vehicle. After returning to the station, the agent again asked if he could look into the vehicle and Seuss again refused. Then the agent offered Seuss the use of his screwdriver so that Seuss could break into the vehicle so that the agent could inspect it. Seuss refused, stating that he was not willing to break into his new vehicle. Subsequently, another agent summoned to the scene placed Seuss under arrest for failure to stop, at the inspection station. The second agent also asked Seuss to open the back of the truck and Seuss again refused. The agents summoned their supervisor, Garth Nobles, who, upon arrival, asked Seuss if he would open the truck. When Seuss again refused, Nobles stated that he would obtain the authority to inspect the vehicle. At the time this representation was made, he had no probable cause on which to secure a warrant.
Subsequently, Nobles placed a call to the state attorney in order to get a search warrant. While he was placing the call, Seuss offered one of the agents the key to the back of the truck. The agent refused the key and told Seuss that he had to open the truck himself, which Seuss did. No warrant was ever obtained. At the suppression hearing, Nobles did testify that he had sniffed at the back of the truck and smelled what he thought was marijuana. At one point in his testimony he stated that he smelled the marijuana before he placed the call to the state attorney and at another point he testified that he smelled it after he placed the call to the state attorney. In either case, it is uncontradicted that Nobles told Seuss that he could obtain the authority to search prior to his smelling what he thought to be contraband.
Section 570.15(l)(b), Florida Statutes (1977), provides that if the owner or driver refuses to consent to access to a vehicle and there are no exigent circumstances, the inspector must obtain a search warrant before searching the vehicle. Here, Seuss had been detained for more than an hour; he had refused repeated requests that he open the vehicle and allow the agents to inspect; he was informed that he could not leave until the vehicle was searched; and the supervisor represented that if Seuss continued to refuse, he could get authority to search anyway. Gonterman v. State, 358 So. 2d 595 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978); Powell v. State, 332 So. 2d 105 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976). If the agents had probable cause with which to get a warrant, they should have done so rather than detain Seuss for over an hour while attempting to obtain his “consent.”
Under these facts, we find that consent was not freely and voluntarily given and that the motion to suppress the marijuana should have been granted. In light of this result, the other points raised by appellant need not be decided.
REVERSED.
MILLS, Acting C. J., ERVIN, J., and MASON, ERNEST E., Associate Judge, concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Denehy v. State, 400 So. 2d 1216 (Fla. 1980)…the consent to search must be established by preponderance of the evidence. See McDole v. State, 383 So. 2d 553 (Fla. 1973). Since there was no evidence of coercion such as prolonged detention or a threat to obtain a search warrant, Seuss v. State, 370 So. 2d 1203 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979); Powell v. State, 332 So. 2d 105 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976), or repeated requests for consent, Gonterman v. State, 358 So. 2d 595 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978); Sarga v. State, 322 So. 2d 592 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975), the trial judge under the applica…
-
Gluesenkamp v. State, 391 So. 2d 192 (Fla. 1980)…or the driver should be allowed to continue. The fourth amendment prohibits unreasonable seizures as well as unreasonable searches. Detaining a driver and his vehicle for an inordinate amount of time is an unreasonable seizure. Cf., Seuss v. State, 370 So. 2d 1203 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979); Miller v. State, 368 So. 2d 943 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979). If the inspector is unsure of whether sufficient probable cause exists, he may detain the vehicle and seek assistance as was done in this case. The seizure in this case was n…
-
McDONNELL v. State, 981 So. 2d 585 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008)…t in tandem with others may well result in a finding that the consent was not voluntary”) (citation omitted). Additionally, cases have held that repeated requests for consent to search can render such consent involuntary. See, e.g., Seuss v. State, 370 So. 2d 1203 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979); Gonterman v. State, 358 So. 2d 595 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978). In the instant case, Christopher was asked two times, over the span of one and a half to two hours, if he would consent to a search of the home. Although this may not const…
Previewing 3 of 9 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Powell v. State, 332 So. 2d 105 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976)
- Gonterman v. State, 358 So. 2d 595 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978)