J. H., A JUVENILE, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 3d DCA | 1979-05-15
No. 78-882
Before HAVERFIELD, C. J., and PEARSON and SCHWARTZ, JJ.
370 So. 2d 1219 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1979) Caution
Cited by 77 cases

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Synopsis

J.H., a juvenile, was adjudicated delinquent for robbery based on aiding and abetting. The court reversed, finding the evidence insufficient to prove J.H. intended to participate in the crime, as he merely happened to be present and fled after the robbery was committed.


Holding

The evidence was insufficient to support a finding of guilt. Presence at the scene and flight after the crime, without direct evidence of intent to participate, do not exclude a reasonable hypothesis of innocence and cannot support conviction as an aider and abetter.


Headnotes

[1] To convict a person as an aider and abettor, the prosecution must prove not only that the person assisted, but also that they intended to participate in the perpetration…

[2] Presence at the scene of a crime and flight thereafter, without more, is insufficient to prove intent to aid or abet the commission of the crime.

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Key Quotes

“For one to be convicted as an aider and abetter, it must be demonstrated not only that he assisted, but that he intended to participate in the perpetration of the crime in question.”

Establishes the legal standard for aiding and abetting liability requiring both assistance and intent.

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Facts & Procedural History

Mrs. Hopkins was approached on a bus bench by two males: Mack and J.H. Mack grabbed Hopkins' purse and fled; J.H. took no part in the actual robbery, …

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Opinion of the Court
SCHWARTZ, Judge.

SCHWARTZ, Judge.

J.H. appeals from an adjudication of delinquency based upon the trial court’s finding that he was guilty of the crime of robbery. We reverse because the evidence was insufficient to support the finding.

The facts are simple. The victim, a Mrs. Hopkins, was seated on a bus bench when she was approached by two males. One, who was named Mack, sat next to Mrs. Hopkins; the other, the respondent J.H., stood behind the bench. Mack struggled with the victim, grabbed her purse, and then fled the scene. J.H. took no part in the actual robbery and did not even talk to Mack, either before or during its commission. After Mack had taken the purse, however, J.H. ran away with him. When they were both apprehended a short time later, J.H. voluntarily agreed to speak to the officer since he “had not done anything wrong.” His statement was simply that Mack “grabbed the purse, he [J.H.] was behind the bench, and they both took off running.”

The trial judge obviously based the adjudication on the conclusion that J.H. was shown to have aided or abetted Mack’s actual commission of the robbery, and the state argues that this determination is supported by the record.

We disagree. For one to be convicted as an aider and abetter, it must be demonstrated not only that he assisted, but that he intended to participate in the perpetration of the crime in question. E. g. Ryals v. State, 112 Fla. 4, 150 So. 132 (1933); Douglas v. State, 214 So. 2d 653 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968). In this case there was no direct evidence of such an intention. The circumstantial evidence upon which the state necessarily relies — that J.H. was present at the scene of the crime and fled after it had been committed — was manifestly insufficient to exclude a reasonable hypothesis of innocence and thus to permit an affirmance.

K. W. U. v. State, 367 So. 2d 647 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979). A long line of cases involving similar facts has established that such evidence does not exclude the reasonable inference that the defendant had no knowledge of the crime until it actually occurred, and thus that he did not intend to assist in its commission. Lockett v. State, 262 So. 2d 253 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972); Douglas v. State, supra; Gilday v. State, 168 So. 2d 205 (Fla. 3d DCA 1964). Indeed the facts in this case are, if anything, even weaker than those in Lockett and Douglas. In each of those cases the defendant was a “wheel man” who drove the actual perpetrator to or from the scene of the crime and thus actually aided in its commission; there was no such evidence here.

Therefore, the record does not support a finding of guilt as to either of the indispensable elements of aiding and abetting.

The adjudication is reversed and the cause remanded with directions to discharge the respondent.

Reversed and remanded.


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Citator

Cited By (38 total)

  • Pack v. State, 381 So. 2d 1199 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980)
    …rise to any suspicion on his part that any illegal conduct had occurred, and subsequently fled from the police is not enough to establish that appellant had the intent to aid and abet his brother in the robbery of the drug store. See J. H. v. State, 370 So. 2d 1219 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979). The evidence presented does not refute the reasonable hypothesis that appellant accompanied his brother to the drug store, and knew nothing of the robbery at the time of their departure. This possible version of what took place i…
  • Gains v. State, 417 So. 2d 719 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982)
    …). The mere fact that he fled from the scene after the crime “does not exclude the reasonable inference that (he) had no knowledge of the crime until it actually occurred, and thus that he did not intend to assist in its commission.” J. H. v. State, 370 So. 2d 1219, 1220 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979). Applying these standards to the facts elicited by the prosecution, we find that Joseph Williams’ conviction cannot be sustained on the basis of circumstantial evidence. Considered in a light most favorable to the state’s ca…
  • G. C. v. State, 407 So. 2d 639 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)
    …ture necessary to support a conviction. Gustine v. State, 86 Fla. 24, 97 So. 207 (1923). Presence at the scene, without more, is not sufficient to establish either intent to participate or act of participation. J.L.B. v. State, supra; J.H. v. State, 370 So. 2d 1219 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979). Mere knowledge that an offense is being committed is not equivalent to participation with criminal intent. See, e.g., United States v. Martin, 533 F. 2d 268 (5th Cir. 1976). Knowledge that a crime is going to be committed and pre…

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