JOHNNELL LOCKETT, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Johnnell Lockett was convicted of breaking and entering with intent to commit grand larceny based on evidence that he was seated in his car while an unidentified person loaded stolen property into it. The court reversed, finding the evidence insufficient to prove Lockett's intent to aid and abet the crime beyond a reasonable doubt when based solely on circumstantial evidence.
The conviction is reversed because the circumstantial evidence of Lockett's guilt is not inconsistent with reasonable hypotheses other than guilt. While the evidence proved that Lockett was present in his car while stolen property was loaded, it does not eliminate the reasonable possibility that Lockett was unaware of his companion's criminal purpose when he arrived at the residence.
[1] Evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction for breaking and entering a dwelling house with intent to commit grand larceny where the prosecution relies solely on cir…
[2] Circumstantial evidence used to prove intent must be not only consistent with the guilt of the accused but also inconsistent with any other reasonable hypothesis.
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“However, upon this evidence, appellant's guilt (of the crime charged) would necessarily depend upon a showing of aiding and abetting under Section 776.011, F.S., F.S.A., which requires proof of his intent to participate.”
Establishes that presence alone is insufficient; the prosecution must prove intent to aid and abet the crime.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceEyewitnesses saw Lockett seated in the driver's seat of his parked car adjacent to the Entwistle residence. An unidentified youth emerged from the hou…
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Appellant was convicted of breaking and entering a dwelling house with intent to commit a felony, to-wit: grand larceny, and on this direct appeal challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the conviction. We find this point to have merit and reverse.
*254Eyewitnesses identified appellant as the person who was seated in the driver’s seat of an automobile parked on the street adjacent to the Entwistle residence, while an unidentified youth was seen to walk from the side door of that house to the automobile carrying a portable television set and two shot guns or rifles, and to load the same into the parked car. The eyewitnesses having then left the area to report the matter to the police, did not see the car being driven away and, of course, they did not know who had driven the car to the crime scene. The police broadcast a bolo alert and on the basis of the description an officer located the appellant’s car some 20 minutes later with appellant driving and a male and two female companions in the car. Other evidence established that the Ent-wistle home had been broken into that day, with the television and guns apparently stolen.
Despite appellant’s alibi, the evidence was certainly sufficient to establish (1) that it was appellant whom the witnesses saw seated in the car parked by the Entwistle home, and (2) that the unidentified youth seen loading the television set and guns into appellant’s car was guilty of breaking and entering a dwelling house with intent to commit grand larceny. However, upon this evidence, appellant’s guilt (of the crime charged) would necessarily depend upon a showing of aiding and abetting under Section 776.011, F.S., F.S.A., which requires proof of his intent to participate. Williams v. State, Fla.App.1968, 206 So.2d 446; Douglas v. State, Fla.App.1968, 214 So.2d 653.
Intent may be, and in fact usually is, shown largely by circumstantial evidence, but if the proof of intent rests solely upon circumstantial evidence (as it does here) the proof must be not only consistent with the guilt of the accused, but also inconsistent with any other reasonable hypothesis. Broadnax v. State, Fla.1952, 57 So.2d 651 and Williams v. State, supra. The-circumstances of appellant sitting in his car parked outside the Entwistle residence while stolen personal property is being loaded into the car is unquestionably consistent with guilt. Yet, it is not wholly inconsistent with a reasonable hypothesis other than guilt (of the offense charged). For example, such circumstances are not inconsistent with the hypothesis that appellant drove his car to the Entwistle residence at the request of his companion who gave a legitimate purpose as a pretext, and only after the companion-emerged'from the residence carrying the stolen personal property did appellant become aware' of his companion’s real purpose.
For the reasons stated and upon the authority of the cases cited, the judgment and sentence are severally reversed and this cause remanded for a new trial.
REED, C. J., and WALDEN and OWEN, JTJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (51 total)
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J. H. v. State, 370 So. 2d 1219 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)…ng similar facts has established that such evidence does not exclude the reasonable inference that the defendant had no knowledge of the crime until it actually occurred, and thus that he did not intend to assist in its commission. Lockett v. State, 262 So. 2d 253 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972); Douglas v. State, supra; Gilday v. State, 168 So. 2d 205 (Fla. 3d DCA 1964). Indeed the facts in this case are, if anything, even weaker than those in Lockett and Douglas. In each of those cases the defendant was a “wheel man” w…
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Clark Dean Chaudoin v. State, 362 So. 2d 398 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978)…tual perpetrator. Pope v. State, 84 Fla. 428, 94 So. 865 (1923). As in any other criminal case, the guilt of an aider or abetter can be established by circumstantial evidence. Williams v. State, 206 So. 2d 446 (Fla. 4th DCA 1968); Lockett v. State, 262 So. 2d 253 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974); Rosson v. State, 319 So. 2d 64 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975). Such evidence, however, must meet the test first set forth above; that is, it must be both consistent with guilt and inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis of innocence. Ev…
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Codie v. State, 313 So. 2d 754 (Fla. 1975)…rged. It is so ordered. ROBERTS, McCAIN, OVERTON and ENGLAND, JJ., concur. . Article V, Section 3(b)(3), Florida Constitution; Foley v. Weaver Drugs, Inc., 177 So. 2d 221 (Fla.1965). . 63 So. 2d 339 (Fla.1932). . 23 Fla. 546, 3 So. 158 (1887). . 262 So. 2d 253 (Fla.App.1972). . Kaminski v. State, supra, see Note 2, at p. 340. . State v. Brown, 177 So. 2d 532 (Fla.App.1965). . Loos v. Scarfone, 46 So. 2d 395 (Fla.1950). . Rule 3.191(d) (2) (i), Rules of Criminal Procedure. . 188 So. 2d 24 (Fla.App.1…
Previewing 3 of 51 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Ira Douglas v. State, 214 So. 2d 653 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968)
- Williams v. State, 206 So. 2d 446 (Fla. 4th DCA 1968)
- Broadnax v. State, 57 So. 2d 651 (Fla. 1952)