TERRY BRAGG, A/K/A TERRY DEE BRAGG, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 4th DCA | 1979-06-13
No. 78-714
Anstead, J., Moore, J., Geiger, Dwight L., Associate Judge
371 So. 2d 1082 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fourth District (1979) Caution
Cited by 14 cases

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Synopsis

Florida appellate court affirmed that opening an automobile engine compartment to remove a battery constitutes burglary of a conveyance under Fla. Stat. § 810.02(3), rejecting the defendant's argument that burglary requires entry into the passenger compartment.


Holding

Opening an engine compartment of a motor vehicle with intent to commit theft constitutes burglary of a conveyance under Florida law, regardless of whether the passenger compartment is entered.


Headnotes

[1] Under Fla. …

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Key Quotes

“'to enter a conveyance' includes taking apart any portion of the conveyance.”

Definition of entering a conveyance under Fla. Stat. § 810.011(2)

Facts & Procedural History

Defendant was charged with burglary of a conveyance for opening the hood of a 1971 Datsun automobile intending to remove the battery, without entering…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

This is an appeal from the trial court’s denial of the appellant’s motion to dismiss the charge of burglary of a conveyance under Section 810.02(3), Florida Statutes (1977). Defendant entered a nolo conten-dere plea and reserved his right to appeal the trial court’s ruling. The charge alleges that defendant opened the hood of a 1971 Datsun automobile intending to remove the battery. No charge is made that he entered the passenger compartment.

Appellant argues that it is not burglary, under the plain meaning of Sections 810.-02(1) and 810.011(2), Florida Statutes (1977), to “enter” the engine compartment, without “entering” the passenger compartment. We disagree. Section 810.02(1) defines burglary as “entering or remaining in a structure or a conveyance with the intent to commit an offense therein.” Section 810.011(2) defines conveyance as “any motor vehicle, ship, vessel, railroad ear, trailer, aircraft, or sleeping car,” and further states, “ ‘to enter a conveyance’ includes taking apart any portion of the conveyance.” There is no limitation in either the statutes or in case law indicating that the entering must be into the passenger compartment. There is no distinction between entering the engine compartment, the passenger compartment, or the trunk as far as its being an “entering” as prohibited by the obvious wording of Sections 810.02(1) and 810.011(2), Florida Statutes (1977). The trial court was correct in denying the motion to dismiss.

AFFIRMED.

ANSTEAD and MOORE, JJ., and GEIGER, DWIGHT L., Associate Judge, concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • State v. Hankins, 376 So. 2d 285 (Fla. 5th DCA 1979)
    …finition of “entering a conveyance” in Section 810.011(2) does not obviate the necessity for alleging facts in support of an intent to commit an offense therein. Dalby, supra. The facts of this case are distinguishable from those of Bragg v. State, 371 So. 2d 1082 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979). In Bragg the defendant opened the hood of a car and removed a battery. This was properly held to be an entering. In the case at bar there was no entering. AFFIRMED. CROSS, C. J., and DAUKSCH, J., concur.…
  • Drew v. State, 773 So. 2d 46 (Fla. 2000)
    …); State v. Harvey, 403 So. 2d 630, 630 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981) (holding that defendant’s loosening of the bolts in the engine compartment underneath the car with the intent to remove the alternator was sufficient to constitute an entry); Bragg v. State, 371 So. 2d 1082, 1083 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979) (holding it was proper to convict the defendant of burglary for opening the hood of a vehicle with intent to remove the battery).5 OTHER JURISDICTIONS Other jurisdictions with burglary statutes similar to Florida’s have a…
  • State v. Ransey R. Harvey, 403 So. 2d 630 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981)
    …act the starter. The State argues that these facts constitute an attempted burglary under section 810.02, because appellee had “entered” the conveyance within the meaning of the burglary statute. We agree and reverse on the basis of Bragg v. State, 371 So. 2d 1082 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979), which held that opening the hood of the engine compartment intending to remove a battery is burglary. We see no distinction as to whether appellee came from underneath the engine compartment, from the top, or from the side; he i…

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